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Abstract 
PROVISIONAL CAPITAL: NATIONAL AND URBAN IDENTITY IN THE 
ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING OF BONN, 1949-1979 
 
by 
Samuel L. Sadow 
Advisor: John V. Maciuika 
 This dissertation explores the physical transformation of Bonn in the postwar period, with 
a particular focus on the 1960s and 1970s, as the city accommodated the West German federal 
government. Bonn’s long campaign in the 1960s to redraw its municipal borders and the federal 
government’s construction of several high-rises in the city and its neighbor, Bad Godesberg, 
were the most concrete markers of Bonn’s evolution as a capital city in this period. The complex 
political processes and sometimes bitter conflicts behind each of these developments paralleled 
the gradual and successful entrenchment of democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany. At 
the same time, the close entanglement of Bonn’s urban space and federal architecture with West 
German national identity confounds our expectations about the ways that capital cities represent 
the values of the political systems and cultures that build them. Individually and collectively, 
Bonn’s government buildings offered little in the way of symbolic forms onto which citizens 
could project their growing sense of national identity and attachment to the democratic 
institutions that they housed. At the local level, the public universally despised the invasion of 
their cherished landscape. By focusing instead on the processes behind the planning initiatives 
and the reception of the new buildings, this dissertation demonstrates that Bonn’s perennially 
unfinished and provisional federal districts perfectly expressed the conflicting forces at work as 
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Samuel L. Sadow, 2013. 
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Figure 88. Robert-Schuman-Platz, 1983-1989, Bonn-Bad Godesberg. Photograph by 
“Wolkenkratzer.” Reproduced under a Creative Commons License. 
Figure 89. Gottfried Hansjakob, Landscape plan for the Rheinaue, 1970s, Bonn. Source: Karl-
Heinz van Kaldenkerken and Friedrich Busmann, Ausbau der Bundeshauptstadt: 10 Jahre 
Hauptstadtvereinbarung 1975 - 1985; Dokumentation (Bonn: Stadt Bonn, 1985), 68. 
Figure 90. Egon Eiermann, High-Rise for Members of the Bundestag (Langer Eugen), 1967-
1969 (left) and Helmut Jahn, Post Tower, 2000-2002 (right), Bonn. Photograph by 




 On May 10, 1949, Bonn became the provisional capital of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG). Only two days after ratifying the West German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), a 
Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarischer Rat) established at the direction of the three Western 
powers occupying Germany—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America—
convened in the central rotunda of the Museum Koenig in Bonn and selected that city over 
Frankfurt-am-Main by the narrow margin of 33-29. In the campaign leading up to the vote, 
officials from Bonn and the state of North-Rhine Westphalia aggressively promoted the city as 
an ideal site for the provisional capital. Bonn was relatively small and unknown, and thus 
seemed to pose little threat to Berlin as the once and future capital. In a nation that was still in 
ruins, Bonn possessed sufficient intact facilities for the fledgling government. It was close 
geographically to both Western Europe and the important industrial Ruhr region, and the 
occupation forces maintained a relatively small presence in the city. Over the next forty years, 
far longer than even the most pessimistic members of the Parliamentary Council would have 
predicted—until a similarly narrow vote in the Bundestag on June 20, 1991 returned the capital 
of a reunited Germany to Berlin—the federal government’s presence in Bonn would cause 
radical transformations in the city along social, political, economic, and not least, physical 
dimensions.  
 Previously a small, quiet city of university students and pensioners on the scenic banks of 
the Rhine, Bonn became a city of politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, and lobbyists and one of 
the most densely populated cities in the FRG. A city whose greatest claim to fame was being the 
birthplace of Ludwig van Beethoven became the site of the most important political discussions 
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and decisions facing West Germany, from Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s decisively pro-
Western Hallstein Doctrine to Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard’s midwifing of the 
Economic Miracle, and from Chancellor Willy Brandt’s pioneering Ostpolitik to Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl’s successful shepherding of the country through reunification with the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR). Bonn, a city of medieval churches, Baroque and Rococo palaces, 
and 19th-century villas along the Rhine, was swiftly reshaped by a profusion of immense 
concrete, steel, and glass administrative complexes and modernist high-rises.  
 This dissertation explores the physical transformation of Bonn in the postwar period, with 
a particular focus on the 1960s and 1970s, as the city accommodated the West German federal 
government. The following narrative demonstrates that in many ways, Bonn’s evolution as a 
capital city in this period parallels the gradual and ultimately successful entrenchment of 
democracy in the FRG. The most concrete markers of this development were the new buildings 
constructed for Parliament and the federal ministries, along with the concomitant dramatic 
reshaping of Bonn’s cityscape and geography. Their forms, starting with the first new federal 
buildings in Bonn—the Bundeshaus (Hans Schwippert, 1949; Figure 1) and the Foreign Office 
Building (Hans Freese, 1953-55; Figure 2)—reflect the specific contours of West German 
democratic principles and cultural values: pragmatic and functional, based on hard-won and 
messy compromises, full of partial victories, highly local, provisional.  
 At the same time, the close entanglement of Bonn’s urban space and federal architecture 
with West German national identity confounds our expectations about the way that capital cities 
communicate the values of the political systems and cultures that build them. Individually and 
collectively, Bonn’s government buildings from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s offer little in the 
way of symbolic architectural forms that unambiguously express the power, prestige, or 
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confidence that accrued to West Germany as it emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s as a pillar of 
the N.A.T.O military alliance and the third largest economy in the world. Indeed, even in the 
decidedly ostentatious form of a high-rise, the projects at the heart of this dissertation display an 
extreme reluctance towards staking out any identity for the nation at all. However, Bonn’s 
architecture is not mute. In its very reticence, it communicates a modesty and humility that 
thoroughly captures the identity of a nation struggling and succeeding to demonstrate a renewed 
commitment to democratic institutions while simultaneously negotiating a monstrous past and 
the hardening ideological and geographical divisions of the Cold War.  
 Historians such as Deborah Ascher Barnstone have attempted to forge connections 
between aspects of the architecture’s modernism and West German democracy via the metaphor 
of transparency. However, this analysis oversimplifies both modernism and democratic 
governance and thus captures only a tiny sliver of the relationship between architecture and 
politics in Bonn.1 This dissertation’s fine-grained history of the key planning and architectural 
developments in Bonn between the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and Willy Brandt’s 
administration shows that it is a mistake to assume straightforward and stable connections 
between built form and identity. Close attention to the processes behind the planning policies and 
buildings as well as local context and reception reveals a more complex relationship; Bonn’s 
perennially unfinished and provisional federal districts perfectly expressed the conflicting forces 
at work as West Germans consolidated their identity as members of a democratic and pluralistic 
civil society. 
 Bonn’s transformation took place in the broader context of a Europe that was piecing 
itself together after the catastrophe of World War II destroyed its cities and traumatized its 
                                                            
1 Deborah Ascher Barnstone, The Transparent State: Architecture and Politics in Postwar 
Germany (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1-86. 
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citizens. The reconstruction of buildings and spirits proceeded differently in each country, and 
was determined significantly by their various roles in the war. Thus, even though its global 
empire crumbled and material shortages slowed the physical reconstruction of its heavily 
bombed capital, London, the United Kingdom’s role in the moral and military victory over 
fascism was beyond question. British national identity quickly assimilated its victor status, and 
the country’s leaders took a prominent seat at the discussions that shaped the postwar world 
order. In the war’s immediate aftermath, France largely forestalled a reckoning with the Vichy 
government’s collaboration with the Nazi regime, instead valorizing the worthy French 
Resistance and laying claim to being a liberated and thus innocent country and people. By 
maintaining its innocence, France could pivot to reasserting its prewar cultural eminence with 
Paris at the epicenter, even as the West’s cultural center of gravity was fast shifting to New 
York. The war experience led to profound changes in both France and the United Kingdom, but 
their place among the victorious Allies allowed for substantial continuity in fundamental aspects 
of their identities as nations. 
 Postwar Germany faced almost diametrically opposed circumstances, as the experience 
of World War II left German identity, a tenuous concept to begin with, in a state of near total 
bankruptcy. Germany as a nation had only come into existence in 1871 with Wilhelm I’s 
proclamation of the German Empire comprised of Prussia and its neighboring—and often 
unwilling—German-speaking kingdoms and duchies. In the Wilhelmine era, the imperial 
government alternately cultivated a sense of national belonging among its subjects and 
suppressed the various religious and regional identities within its borders by way of imposing a 
distinctly Protestant and Prussian definition of German-ness on the citizenry. The loss of World 
War I and the abdication of Emperor Wilhelm II in 1918 undermined any progress that German 
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rulers had made in establishing a stable national identity, as the country’s government, its 
borders, and its very existence were at the mercy of the United States and its allies. The 
democratic Weimar Republic that emerged from the defeat never laid claim to a national identity 
resilient enough to sustain it through the consecutive political and economic crises of the late 
1910s and 1920s that crippled the government’s legitimacy from the day of its founding. This 
opened the door for the rise of Adolf Hitler to Chancellor in 1933 and his subsequent declaration 
of the Third Reich under the banner of National Socialism. Hitler articulated the most forceful 
vision of German national identity since Wilhelm I, but it was based on an anti-Semitic ideology 
of racial superiority that the Führer used to license a ruthlessly expansionist policy of annexation 
and conquest towards Germany’s neighbors, a brutal policy of repression and terror towards its 
own citizens, and the attempted extermination of Jews, Slavs, and other ethnic groups deemed 
inferior from all of Europe.  
 Finally, Hitler’s definition of German identity led him to embroil the continent in a 
savagely destructive war, in which the country’s ultimate loss was total. The Allied military 
campaign left considerable portions of the Germany’s cities, housing stock, transportation 
networks, and economic capacity in ruins. Moreover, the collective descent of the nation into 
National Socialism and the subsequent devastation and military defeat left every aspect of what it 
meant to be German suspect and open to radical redefinition. With the ruptures of 1871, 1918, 
and 1933 still fresh in the country’s historical memory, the Germans left to pick up the pieces 
after 1945 had little in the way of precedents or models with which to reconnect or emulate, as 
they moved from occupation through reconstruction and denazification towards reclaiming 
sovereignty.  
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 To compound the problem for Germany, in 1949—after years of increasing tension 
between the Allied occupying powers and the Soviet Union—the country split irreparably in two 
with the declaration of the democratic Federal Republic based in Bonn followed shortly by the 
foundation of the socialist German Democratic Republic based in East Berlin. The opposed 
ideologies of East and West Germany and the emerging superpowers that sponsored them had a 
dramatic effect on each side’s capacity to form and project a coherent, affirmative national 
identity. The Soviet Union provided East German identity with an anchor in its imposition of an 
ideology in which to be a communist was to have always been anti-fascist. The retrospective 
absolution from Nazi crimes for those who would adhere to communist principles—chief 
amongst which was obedience to the edicts of the ruling Socialist Unity Party—short-circuited 
any processing of guilt or acceptance of responsibility for the Holocaust and World War II, but it 
also permitted East Germany to construct a relatively strong national identity that could animate 
the country’s social structures and cultural production. 
 As its capital city, East Berlin came to embody the evolution of “actually existing 
socialism” in the GDR to a high degree. As a direct descendant of the royal Prussian—and after 
1871 the imperial German—capital, Berlin has drawn scholarly attention as an avatar of German 
national identity. The remarkably quick succession in which Berlin and its citizens experienced 
imperial, democratic, National Socialist, communist, and finally again democratic regimes, 
makes it particularly rich territory for the study of the relationship between architecture, urban 
planning, and politics.2 In this vein, historians have examined numerous examples of East 
Berlin’s architecture—including such projects as the Stalinallee (Figure 3), the Palast der 
                                                            
2 For a particularly valuable study of the entire scope of Berlin’s urban history, see Brian Ladd, 
The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997) and Michael Z. Wise, Capital Dilemma: Germany’s Search 
for a New Architecture of Democracry (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998). 
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Republik (Figure 4), and not least the Berlin Wall (Figure 5)—analyzing the ways in which they 
both intensified and mediated the public’s identification with the government and the ruling 
Socialist Unity Party.3  
 East Berlin’s twin to the west has provided these same historians with a natural point of 
comparison. Like East Berlin, West Berlin was the recipient of a tremendous amount of 
government largesse in the form of prestigious architectural projects from internationally famous 
architects, including the development of the Hansaviertel (Figure 6) in 1957, with buildings 
designed by Alvar Aalto, Oscar Niemeyer, and Walter Gropius and buildings by Hans Scharoun 
and Mies van der Rohe in the Kulturforum (Figure 7). Unlike East Berlin, West Berlin was never 
a political power center, and as an exclave was quite economically, demographically, and 
culturally eccentric to the main body of West Germany. However, its position on the symbolic 
and geographic front line of the Cold War led the FRG and its allies to turn West Berlin into an 
ideological showcase for the West. In this context, West Berlin’s impressive architectural 
heritage serves as an ideal case study for the ways in which design became an instrument for the 
projection of soft power and ideology in Cold War statecraft.4 The same isolation and 
eccentricity, however, make it easy to overestimate the extent to which these buildings are 
definitive representations of West German national identity, and the anomalous local context in 
                                                            
3 See for example, Emily Pugh, Architecture, Politics, and Identity in Divided Berlin (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014); Francesca Rogier, “The Monumentality of Rhetoric: The 
Will to Rebuild in Postwar Berlin,” in Anxious Modernisms: Experimentation in Postwar 
Architectural Culture, eds. Sarah Williams Goldhagen and Réjean Legault (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2000), 165-189; Anke Kuhrmann, Der Palast der Republik: Geschichte und 
Bedeutung des Ost-Berliner Parlaments- und Kulturhauses (Petersberg: Imhof, 2006); and 
Deborah Ascher Barnstone, “Transparency in Divided Berlin: The Palace of the Republic,” in 
Berlin Divided City, 1945-1989, eds. Philip Broadbent and Sabine Hake (New York: Berghahn, 
2010), 100-114. 
4 For an analysis of the way that Berlin became a center for concentrating soft power in the Cold 
War face off between the Western capitalist democracies and Eastern socialist states, see Greg 
Castillo, Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
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West Berlin, including its political, economic, and historic aspects, point towards a more 
internationalist understanding of its postwar urban development. 
 In West Germany, democracy was no less an imposition by the United States than 
socialism was for the GDR by the Soviet Union, but national identity was a far more fraught 
issue. The Western powers made acceptance of responsibility for genocide and the war a 
precondition for re-admittance into the Western European community, which combined with 
processes of denazification5 and reeducation—however truncated and imperfect—greatly 
inhibited the formation of any sense of national pride across many spheres of public life. With 
such a devastating demonstration of the menace of nationalism in their immediate memories, 
avoiding speech and action that raised the specter of a return to those beliefs and behaviors 
became imperative.  
 The division of the country also contributed to West Germany’s inchoate identity, as the 
initial legitimacy of the FRG as the democratic successor to the Third Reich was predicated on 
its claims to being a provisional entity. This designation allowed the FRG to disavow 
responsibility for the current, illegitimate division of the country at the hands of the Soviet 
occupiers in the East and position itself as a placeholder for the democratically elected 
government of the entire German people, a future condition predicated on free and fair elections 
in all German lands. This curtailed any expressions of a positive national identity in the Bonn 
Republic because they could too easily be construed as an acceptance of disunion and the 
forsaking of Germans trapped in the East. By and large, West Germans responded to the near 
complete incapability to assert a national identity with a combination of a sort of collective 
amnesia with regards to the immediate past, a resolute focus on the enormous task of physical 
                                                            
5 The Soviets also initiated a process of denazification in the former Nazi territories, but it 
quickly became a pretext for arresting political opponents of the regime and eliminating dissent. 
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and economic recovery, and a compensatory turn to the local, where history and identity were 
less charged and more easily recuperated.6 
 Bonn’s cityscape registered all of these currents. For the first two decades of its tenure as 
capital, there was a near absolute silence amongst federal and municipal planners on issues of 
representation in national buildings, as they focused single-mindedly on the practical, functional, 
and economic considerations in accommodating a quickly growing bureaucracy. This was 
certainly the case in the 1950s when the prospect of reunification remained even faintly on the 
horizon, but its persistence into the 1960s—after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 
foreclosed most thinkable paths towards a political union and after the Bund’s7 engagement of 
such leading architects as Egon Eiermann and Sep Ruf—is more indicative of an inability on the 
part of planners to conceive of a West German capital in such idealist, nationalist terms. Even 
when the dam started to break in the late 1960s, the first efforts to consider Bonn as a capital city 
were marked by a similar, functionalist approach. When questions of how to represent the West 
German polity finally entered the picture in the early 1970s, federal planners and local activists 
both proposed a definition of democracy that foregrounded respect for the rights of the individual 
citizen. This may have aligned well with democratic politics as it was practiced in the FRG, but 
it proved stubbornly difficult to translate into large-scale designs that satisfied all of the local and 
national constituencies that had a stake in the outcome. The upshot was that few buildings made 
                                                            
6 These German responses to the Holocaust, World War II, and the Cold War divide are explored 
with depth and nuance in Alon Confino, Germany as a Culture of Remembrance: Promises and 
Limits of Writing History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); and Konrad 
Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
7 Throughout this dissertation, I will use the German word Bund as a synonym for the West 
German Federal Government. All translations from German are by the author unless otherwise 
noted. 
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it from the drawing table to execution, and Bonn’s government districts were left incomplete, 
with only a few isolated high-rises to mark the Bund’s presence.  
 Those projects—the office tower for Bundestag members designed by Egon Eiermann 
(1965-69; Figure 8) and the two towers for federal ministries designed by Planungsgruppe 
Stieldorf (1969-75; Figure 9), along with the mostly unrealized plans to create a parliamentary 
district—epitomize Bonn’s transformation into a capital city. As a mid-sized German city, Bonn 
had been quite typical. It has a pedestrian commercial center arranged around several plazas, a 
medieval church, a university, and the main train station, all of which are surrounded by largely 
residential neighborhoods. As a capital city, however, Bonn became utterly unusual. A large 
majority of federal buildings, including the Bundestag and Chancellery, were located in marginal 
or interstitial sites and are not well integrated into the surrounding urban fabric (Figure 10). 
Many important ministries occupied—and still occupy—repurposed barracks or villas with little 
indication of their presence beyond a plaque at the entrance. In the selection of Bonn as the 
capital, the very existence of these structures was a significant point in the city’s favor. In spite 
of Bonn’s building stock having suffered mightily during the war, the city’s boosters could point 
to numerous large, intact, and vacated sites in which to house ministries.  
 However, the preference for adaptive reuse was also a way for the new government to 
maintain as modest a profile as possible, and this self-effacement fit with the extreme 
ambivalence of West Germans towards their national identity and geopolitical circumstances. 
The federal high-rises and the Bund’s even more ambitious proposals interrupted this modesty in 
spectacular fashion, and although they gave the government a prominent material presence onto 
which the public could begin to project a sense of collective identity, their appearance was 
difficult to assimilate into a capital city and nation, the existence of which was still provisional. 
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At the local level, they were extremely controversial for the way they dominated and seemed to 
disrespect the surrounding landscape, creating a severe sense of dissonance between federal 
architecture and its immediate urban context. 
 There are still echoes of the discord between Bonn and the federal buildings that radically 
altered its space in the sense of disbelief, commonly expressed by visitors to the city, that it ever 
could have been the seat of a national government, much less that of one of the world’s largest 
economies. Throughout its tenure as capital, journalists, diplomats, and even chancellors 
frequently disparaged Bonn’s distinctive and occasionally irreconcilable blend of provincialism 
and power politics. A 1986 article in the Los Angeles Times collects many of the most incendiary 
insults, including Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s reference to Bonn as a “collection of crippled 
villages,” and an unnamed American correspondent’s description of the city as “half the size of a 
Chicago cemetery—and twice as dead.”8 Such remarks may be unfair, but there is no avoiding 
the fact that Bonn lacks the pomp and scale of many other capital cities. Some of this criticism 
was aimed at the city’s lack of nightlife and cultural amenities, but nothing did more to engender 
perceptions of contradiction or shortcomings in Bonn than the built environment of the city 
itself. 
 On its own, however, the evident inability of federal planners to think in terms of national 
symbols and identity is wholly insufficient to explain Bonn’s idiosyncratic and contentious 
appearance. A dense constellation of social, political, and economic factors shaped Bonn’s 
postwar development. These ranged from party politics in the Bundestag to the legal minutiae of 
the planning process to the vicissitudes of individual planners and the whims of prima donna 
architects, but they were all underlain by a fundamental tension between local and national 
                                                            
8 Even the title of the article contains an insult. William Tuohy, “Village-Class Capital: Bonn—It 
Rhymes With Yawn,” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 1986. The second quote has also been 
attributed to Berliners, replacing Chicago with Berlin. 
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interests and prerogatives that emerged soon after the Bund arrived. While federal planners’ 
focus on practical concerns allowed them to avoid thornier issues of symbolism and 
representation, their preoccupation with basic functional requirements was also dictated by the 
need to accommodate a federal bureaucracy that ballooned rapidly after 1949. In a mid-size city 
like Bonn, where by 1966 the federal government employed approximately 22,400 people in a 
metropolitan area with roughly 300,000 residents,9 the sheer magnitude of this need badly 
strained virtually every aspect of urban planning, including housing supply, zoning, land prices, 
traffic, public transportation, and public service provision, as well as such regional issues as 
municipal boundaries and intercommunal relations. Moreover, the federal government’s 
presence in Bonn placed enormous pressure on the political process surrounding planning itself, 
occasionally pushing it to the breaking point. 
 Even though federal law unequivocally gave planning authority to local governments, 
Bonn initially found itself ill-equipped to negotiate with the Bund as an equal partner, and the 
Bund was ready and able to take advantage of its considerable leverage as an employer and land 
owner in order to get its way. On one hand, the national government had to meet an almost 
insatiable need for functional space, often in blatant contravention of Bonn’s nominally 
provisional status as capital. On the other hand, for many residents of Bonn and its neighboring 
towns, the federal complexes appearing along the B9 highway that ran through the city 
constituted an invasion that seemed to bring nothing except unbearable traffic and the utter 
disfigurement of the mythologized Rhine landscape. This confrontation between the local and 
the national is at the core of Bonn’s postwar architectural and planning history. As 
environmental conditions and quality of life deteriorated in the late 1950s, the municipal 
government engaged in increasingly forceful efforts to retain control over its urban space and 
                                                            
9 Stadt Bonn, Neuordnung Bonner Raum (Bonn: Stadt Bonn: 1967), unpaginated. 
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conserve its traditional identity, and the imperfect compromises that it reached, more than 
anything else, determined the evolution of the city’s urban landscape and the forms of the federal 
buildings that populated it.  
 In the conflict between the Bund and Bonn, perhaps the single greatest source of tension 
centered on the effects of federal development on those aspects of the city’s physical space that 
had become the most potent focal points for the development of a strong sense of local identity. 
Across West Germany, local identity created a sense of collective belonging and compensated 
for a shattered national identity during the painful process of rebuilding and rehabilitation.10 
Bonn experienced an intensified version of this dynamic, as the transformation of the city into 
the seat of the national government raised the idea of national identity in an immediately visible 
way. Moreover, to a great extent local identity in Bonn derived from the city’s landscape and 
historical architecture, with the immutable Rhine River itself as the original and foremost source. 
Residents perceived the proliferation of federal buildings in the city and the new and uncertain 
identity that they portended as a threat to cherished local monuments and the closely held 
associations that had accrued to them in local collective memory.  
 This was even further compounded by the fact that Bonn laid claim to nearly two 
thousand years of recorded history, dating back to a Roman military settlement founded in the 1st 
century BC. This history included a stint after 1597 as the seat of the powerful Cologne 
Archdiocese and the birth of Ludwig van Beethoven in 1770. During the height of German 
Romanticism, Bonn’s picturesque location at the foot of the “Seven Hills” (Siebengebirge: 
Figure 11) made the city an important tourist destination. Atop the Hills’ most famous peak 
stands the ruin of Burg Drachenfels (“Dragon’s Rock”), a 12th-century castle built by Archbishop 
Arnold I of Cologne that was destroyed during the Thirty Years’ War (Figure 12) and linked by 
                                                            
10 Confino, Germany as a Culture of Remembrance, 81-91. 
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legend to Siegfried, the hero from The Song of the Nibelungs, and his triumphant battle against 
the dragon Fafnir.  In the 19th century, popular interest in nature, the Middle Ages, and national 
creation myths like the Nibelungs combined with easier rail travel to draw visitors from all over 
Europe to Drachenfels and, by proximity, Bonn.11  
 Mirroring the Drachenfels on the opposite side of the Rhine, although at lower altitude 
and without the attachment to German mythology, is the Godesburg (Figure 13). Built a century 
after Drachenfels and destroyed somewhat earlier—in 1583 during the Cologne War—the ruins 
of the Godesburg sit imposingly on top of a volcanic outcropping and loom over the middle of 
the town of Bad Godesberg. Natural springs are found in the vicinity of the castle, and the 
restorative powers that several 18th-century Electors attributed to their waters led to the 
establishment of Bad Godesberg as a prominent spa town,12 further contributing to robust 
tourism in the Bonn area. In the postwar era, both Drachenfels and Godesburg underwent 
extensive renovations— the latter designed by the prominent German architect Gottfried 
Böhm—which enhanced their attraction as tourist sites by adding modern services and 
conveniences.  
 The twinned peaks with their medieval ruins are only two of the most prominent 
reminders of the tight connections between the landscape, history, and myth and the Bonn 
region’s well-developed sense of local identity. Given these long-standing relationships, it was 
inevitable that the growth of the federal government in Bonn and its voracious need for space 
would create friction between the Bund and its host city. Any interventions into the landscape, 
and particularly those at the scale proposed by federal planners, threatened to disrupt the delicate 
                                                            
11 Ironically, it was the English poet Lord Byron who first brought Drachenfels to international 
attention with a poem of the same name, which he wrote while making his way up the Rhine in 
1816. 
12 The term “Bad,” indicating that it is a spa town was only added to the city’s name in 1925. 
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equilibrium between the city’s space and the local public’s identification with it. The public’s 
most outraged and determined responses to planning developments in Bonn invoked precisely 
that threat to local identity. Such tension could play out between cities as well, as Bad Godesberg 
repeatedly invoked its traditional identity as a spa town as part of its justification for resisting 
Bonn’s campaign during the 1960s to expand its municipal boundaries to include the 
surrounding towns. 
 Bonn framed that campaign in terms of planning necessity and maintaining a functional 
metropolitan area. As the actual capital city, Bonn received the majority of the stresses and 
burdens of accommodating a federal bureaucracy, but the communities on its borders felt the 
impact intensely as well. Although these communities often played the role of release valve, 
offering space and flexibility when both began to dwindle in Bonn, they also hosted many of the 
ancillary institutions that accompanied a federal government, such as embassies, think tanks, and 
advocacy groups, and they were important sources of housing for the region’s ballooning 
population. The intensive development in Bonn’s suburbs was outside the purview of its 
municipal planning authorities, but it nevertheless contributed to their difficulties because so 
much of the city’s infrastructure and services were shared. Thus, Bonn led a long campaign in 
the 1950s and 1960s to incorporate the neighboring towns, particularly Bad Godesberg to the 
south, Duisdorf to the West, and Beuel on the other side of the Rhine, into a single municipal 
entity, Greater Bonn (Groß-Bonn). These communities strongly resisted Bonn’s overtures, 
rightly fearing a dramatic loss of autonomy in any such regional integration and not wanting to 
sacrifice their independence and identities in the service of helping Bonn counter a similar 
perceived threat from the federal government. 
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 The imperative to find or create office space for its workforce put the Bund on a collision 
course with Bonn, but this conflict over space implicated numerous other forces, cumulatively 
encompassing the entire political economy of urban planning and building in the capital city. The 
most material of these forces was finance. For the federal government, creating new 
infrastructure was expensive, and any building proposal was inevitably caught up in budgetary 
debates around how best to allocate limited government resources. The cost of the Bund’s 
building projects in the 1960s would become a major point of contention for Bundestag 
members, and the controversy would frequently spill out into the public through the press’s 
coverage and commentary. Furthermore, as the Bund became a dominant participant in Bonn’s 
limited commercial real estate and rental markets, it distorted prices and invited financial 
speculation, threatening to push out non-governmental businesses and institutions. For Bonn, the 
presence of the federal government proved to be incredibly expensive. The costs of expanding 
services for a growing residential and commuter population outstripped the city’s tax base. State-
level financial subsidies from North-Rhine Westphalia were not enough to fill the gap, and until 
Bonn forced the issue in 1969 (see Chapter 3), the Bund insisted that the Basic Law all but 
prohibited federal support for localities.13 The city was forced to go into debt, and by July 1965, 
Bonn had the highest municipal debt in the FRG: 175 million Deutschmarks (DM), or 1200 DM 
per resident. Bonn’s changing demographics further exacerbated the problem, as the population 
density in the city soared to nearly 4,600 people per square kilometer—the highest rate in the 
country—imposing severe new strains on the city’s infrastructure and services.14 
                                                            
13 The Bund insisted that federal subsidies or reimbursements were only permitted for individual 
projects where the effects of federal activity could be concretely documented. Bonn and its 
neighbors routinely took advantage of this legal avenue, but it was far from adequate. 
14 Both figures are from Der Spiegel, “Bonn: Schulden und Ehre,” July 14, 1965, 44-45. The 
article compares Bonn’s per capita debt with Hannover (953 DM) and Cologne (623 DM). 
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 Bonn’s Mayors, City Managers, Council members, and public quickly and correctly 
identified the Bund as the source of the city’s planning crisis, but they also viewed the federal 
government as the entity with both the responsibility and, crucially, the means to help solve it. 
This made Bonn’s representatives receptive to proposals for development and construction 
projects because such plans also offered opportunities to address the city’s planning problems. 
Often this was done in the context of the plans themselves, by increasing parking supply or 
modifying roads. However, as Bonn’s fiscal situation and ability to meet its citizens’ needs 
declined in the early 1960s, economics assumed a much broader and more central role in land 
use, zoning, and development negotiations with the Bund. Bonn’s demands of the Bund became 
divorced from any specific proposal, pushing the limits of what was legally permissible under 
the West German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and becoming a major point of tension between the 
two sides. Bonn would eventually extract substantial financial concessions from the federal 
government, but not before the complete collapse of the relationship between the city and the 
state. 
 For many politicians, concerns about budgetary fitness and the economics of federal 
development in Bonn could also serve as a convenient proxy for the more abstract and 
intractable problem of the capital city’s “provisional” status. At the national level, that status 
hampered the formation of a distinctly West German identity. In Bonn, it proved to be a major 
irritant in the planning process and an impediment to both the city and the Bund’s abilities to 
meet their needs. In the first months after the founding of the FRG in the West and GDR in the 
East, there was genuine uncertainty about the potential duration of a divided Germany and 
sincere hope that the two sides and their Cold War sponsors, the United States and Soviet Union, 
respectively, could reach an accommodation that allowed for reunification. Under such 
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circumstances, it made little sense to build extensively in Bonn. Instead, adapting the city’s 
existing building stock to meet the temporary new demand for office space seemed an expedient 
solution to the problem.  
 Nevertheless, as the months and years passed and no clear path to reunification emerged, 
the government in Bonn still had to perform the duties of a national government—write laws, 
regulate the economy, conduct foreign relations, and (after 1955) prepare for the national 
defense—and these duties required an increasing number of personnel who needed space to work 
and live. Within a year of relocating to Bonn, several ministries reported that they were running 
out of space, and by the mid-1950s virtually every department was feeling the pinch.15 Yet 
because Berlin remained the historical and presumptive future capital of Germany, many 
politicians, representing significant portions of the West German populace, were hesitant to 
commit more to Bonn, either financially or with a greater physical footprint. While they framed 
their objections primarily in terms of the good of the Republic—such as loyalty toward Berlin or 
a desire to avoid moves that might jeopardize any imminent thaw in relations with the East—
they also extended their concern to the city, not wishing to leave it with a host of brand new 
buildings that would sit empty after the imminent restoration of Berlin as the capital. 
 Conflict in the Bundestag over Bonn’s provisional status tended to break down along 
party lines. The Social Democrats (SPD) were generally more pro-Berlin and anti-development, 
while the Christian Democrats (CDU)—albeit sometimes begrudgingly and with conditions—
were more supportive of new development in Bonn. This party alignment was established during 
Parliamentary Council debates in 1948-49 over which West German city would host the new 
                                                            
15 See, for example, a memo by Heinz Oeftering, the head of the Finance Ministry department 
that at the time included the Federal Building Agency, addressed to the Federal Ministers and 
prefacing a draft of a cabinet presentation on the state of federal accommodations in Bonn, 
December 22, 1950 (BArch, B 157/34). 
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government. At the time, the SPD, led by Kurt Schumacher, strongly backed Frankfurt-am-Main, 
a traditional SPD stronghold with an outsized place in the history of democracy in Germany, 
while the CDU, with Konrad Adenauer at the helm, supported Bonn, a city with a minimal 
international and political profile. The SPD would subsequently use objections to federal 
building proposals, couched in terms of Bonn’s provisional status, as a way to challenge Bonn’s 
legitimacy and thwart its primary rival for control of the Bundestag. Thus, West German party 
politics also became deeply implicated in federal planning issues, and the two sides would 
remain mostly unchanged in their orientation towards Bonn until the ascension of Willy Brandt 
as the first SPD Chancellor in 1969. 
 This presented a paradox for the federal building officials whose job was to find suitable 
accommodations for all federal employees. There simply was no way to accomplish the task in 
Bonn without new construction, but any new building ran the risk of appearing to violate Bonn’s 
provisional status. This certainly was the case with the Federal Foreign Office building, which 
upon its completion in 1955 was one of the largest administrative complexes in the country, and 
which prompted the headline in the Belgian socialist newspaper, Le Peuple, “In Bonn, the 
provisional becomes final.”16 The tensions surrounding the federal government’s ability to meet 
its need for space while preserving the illusion that it was prepared to return to Berlin at a 
moment’s notice opened up very different fault lines in the planning process than those induced 
by economic pressures. Where financial considerations ultimately pitted federal and local 
interests directly against each other, Bonn’s provisional status aligned federal building officials 
and the pro-development municipal planning offices against the pro-Berlin or fiscal conservative 
factions in the Bundestag.  
                                                            
16 Le Peuple, “À Bonn le provisoire devient définitif,” March 3, 1953. 
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 Bonn’s provisional status and the problems it created for federal building officials and 
local urban planners were inextricably caught up in West Germany’s Cold War circumstances, 
but the nation’s recent history also impinged significantly on the postwar politics of federal 
architecture. Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime’s racist and hyper-nationalist rhetoric, its 
reification in the bombastic and dehumanizing neoclassicism of its official architecture (Figure 
14), and the inescapable association of both with the horrors of the Holocaust understandably 
made the country’s new governors skeptical towards grand national symbolic statements. In the 
early years of the Federal Republic in particular, federal officials were keenly aware of the 
potential for negative associations with National Socialism in the government’s buildings. When 
the Bund housed several ministries in Bonn in barracks that had been built for the purposes of 
the Nazi Wehrmacht, Heinz Oeftering, a department head at the Finance Ministry, whose section 
at the time included the Federal Building Agency (Bundesbaudirektion), framed the decision 
explicitly in terms of essential expediency given the government’s pressing needs.17 Such 
pressing practical needs were very real for the new national government, but they also offered 
planners an effective way to sidestep the more difficult problem of trying to assimilate a tragic 
and guilt-ridden history into the design of new national symbols. 
 In their analyses of Bonn’s federal architecture, Deborah Ascher Barnstone and Michael 
Z. Wise have both placed a great deal of stress on the reliance on modernism—beginning with 
Hans Schwipprts’s Bundeshaus—as evidence of a self-conscious and emphatic rejection of Nazi 
monumentalism and embrace of modernism’s historical connection to progressive politics in 
Germany.18 However, that prevalence of modernism in federal architecture reflects more the rise 
of a postwar generation of architects, such as Egon Eiermann and Günter Behnisch, who had 
                                                            
17 Finance Ministry department head, Heinz Oeftering, letter to all of the Federal Ministers 
regarding accommodations in Bonn, March 23, 1950 (BArch, B 157/331). 
18 See Barnstone, The Transparent State, 27-61; and Michael Z. Wise, Capital, 23-38. 
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been trained either during the heyday of the Neues Bauen movement of the 1920s or in the 1950s 
when the modernist idiom had become conventional, rather than an ideological commitment.  
 Nevertheless, the legacy of modernist architecture in Germany serves as an ever-present 
cultural backdrop to the creation and reception of the modernist buildings that mushroomed 
around Bonn after 1949. Proponents of federal development occasionally attempted to exploit 
the functional or aesthetic tenants of modernism as a way to build support for building proposals 
and establish the legitimacy of their design preferences. For example, federal planners justified 
the high-rise form as preserving a maximum amount of potential green space at ground level in 
language strongly evocative of Le Corbusier’s modernist urbanism of the 1920s, particularly the 
idea of the “tower in the park.”19 However, the emerging critiques of modernism in the 1950s 
and 60s blunted these arguments, and the local public’s emphatic rejections of the concrete, 
glass, and steel buildings intruding into their city’s historical fabric turned the architectural style 
into an aggravating factor in the relationship between the Bund and its host.20  
 The press, led by Bonn’s two major daily newspapers, the General-Anzeiger and the 
Bonner Rundschau, abetted the public in its efforts against federal development. Both papers 
closely covered the Bund’s planning activities in the city, disseminating descriptions and, 
crucially, images of the various proposals and interviewing local and national politicians and 
planning officials. Their editorial coverage of federal planning proposals for the city, as 
manifested in regular opinion columns and letters to the editor, was almost uniformly negative 
                                                            
19 Wolfgang Leuschner, Treasury Ministry Building Department, Memo describing meeting 
between federal, state, and local planning officials, October 22, 1965 (BArch, B 157/4240). For a 
discussion of Le Corbusier’s urbanist theories, see William J. R. Curtis, Le Corbusier: Ideas and 
Forms (New York: Rizzoli, 1986), 60-66. 
20 The turn against modernist design principles and theories of urban planning in the decades 
after World War II was an international phenomenon exemplified by Team X’s splintering from 
C.I.A.M. in 1953 and the publication of Jane Jacob’s The Death and Life of Great American 
Cities in 1961.  
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and amplified public concerns, making them difficult to ignore. Indeed, in the 1960s, a feedback 
loop emerged in which local reporting on federal building plans elicited public criticism, which 
caused the press, sensing a controversy, to scrutinize federal development more intensely, with 
each new revelation they uncovered sparking a louder public outcry. 
 Occasionally, national news outlets, such as the weekly magazine, Der Spiegel, or the 
daily Die Welt, would report on federal building activity in Bonn. Although their attention was 
more sporadic and geared towards a broader audience, it was not necessarily any friendlier. 
National reports naturally prioritized national concerns, such as the effect on the federal budget 
rather than the impact on the local landscape, but they reinforced an atmosphere of skepticism 
towards federal building that could easily transform into outright opposition and cause problems 
for elected representatives. Thus, for federal building officials desperate for both funding and 
political legitimacy for their designs in Bonn, the press could be the most direct way for them to 
communicate with the public, but it was more often a persistent obstacle in that it gave the public 
an equal platform with which to respond and counter the efforts of planners.  
 The public’s participation in urban planning discussions found official sanction in West 
German planning law, particularly the Federal Building Law (Bundesbaugesetz) of 1960. This 
law, which replaced and unified the patchwork of local and state-level planning laws that had 
emerged in the immediate postwar era, set the terms, rights, and obligations of participation by 
private and public stakeholders in every level of the planning process, including zoning, 
development planning, the exercise of eminent domain, appraisals, infrastructure provision, and 
administrative procedures. As such, the Federal Building Law provided the legal framework for 
the development of the buildings and complexes at the center of this dissertation. Crucially for 
Bonn, the law established local autonomy in urban planning by vesting authority in towns and 
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municipalities21 and promoted civic engagement by requiring the public disclosure of plans and 
the solicitation of public comment.22 These provisions in particular would prove to be imperfect 
but indispensable tools for Bonn’s local planning officials and public as they faced down the 
Bund in the late 1960s. Combined, they provided the leverage to win valuable and long-sought 
concessions from the federal government in exchange for granting it permission to seek more 
radical transformations of the city’s space. 
 The Federal Building Law governed the planning process in the FRG, and it became an 
important fulcrum in the relationship between the country and its capital city. However, the 
technical, legal aspects of planning accounted for only one piece of the overall process of 
conceiving and executing a government building. At the federal level, decisions about where and 
how to build had to be made through an arduous legislative process and implemented by a 
cumbersome bureaucracy. Building proposals first had to clear the Bundestag’s Budget 
Committee (Haushaltsausschuß) before being considered by the entire body. This not only 
required the hard work of democratic coalition building, it also meant working within a 
legislative schedule with a crowded agenda that was not always propitious for building officials’ 
quick development timelines. Furthermore, changes in the composition of the Bundestag’s party 
blocs, determined approximately every four years, could dramatically alter those agendas, further 
complicating the Bund’s efforts to build suitable accommodations, even for the Bundestag itself. 
Bonn’s City Council also had authority to approve or block federal building projects, particularly 
in cases involving zoning or land use issues, thus further compounding the legislative obstacles 
facing federal planners. For the local authorities, many city planning decisions were subject to 
                                                            
21 Bundesbaugesetz vom 23. Juni 1960, § 2 (1), Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil 1 (June 29, 1960): 345. 
22 Bundesbaugesetz, § 2 (6), Bundesgesetzblatt, 345. 
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review and approval at the state level, usually by the North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) district 
president (Regierungspräsident) in Cologne, adding yet another wrinkle to the process. 
 Outside of the legislative sphere, federal building proposals were also subject to the 
discretion of multiple federal ministries and agencies, each of which could claim responsibility 
for different aspects of any building proposal. Chief among these was the Building Department 
(Bauabteilung) of the Federal Treasury Ministry (Bundesschatzministerium), which had the 
broadest authority over federal building efforts and was responsible for tracking the Bund’s 
space needs, which made the department acutely aware of any shortfalls in Bonn and placed it 
under the most intense pressure to remedy them. Immediately subsidiary to the Building 
Department was the Federal Building Agency, which was in charge of most aspects of a building 
project’s execution, including site planning, blueprints, and construction management, and the 
Agency handled many federal projects entirely in-house. Even when an outside architect, such as 
Egon Eiermann, was involved, he would work closely with the Federal Building Agency in the 
creation of detailed construction drawings. The Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium 
der Finanzen) was responsible for budgeting and tracking expenditures for building projects and 
thus demanded input in the planning phases. The planning process also naturally involved 
whichever ministry or agency was the nominal “client” for a project, and in cases such as the 
Bundesrat and Bundestag or Chancellor, satisfying the client could prove difficult. By 
comparison, Bonn’s municipal planning bureaucracy—which was centralized in the City 
Planning Office (Stadtplanungsamt) under the control of the elected City Manager—was quite 
streamlined. 
 At the federal level, the Chancellor had the authority to establish, eliminate, and reshuffle 
ministries and agencies in accordance with his policy priorities. The constantly shifting 
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bureaucratic landscape—with the attendant changes in department designations and official 
titles—can make it difficult to track the responsibilities of the various parties involved in the 
planning process. For example, Chancellor Adenauer placed the Building Department during his 
first administration in the Finance Ministry but shifted it in 1957 to the newly created Federal 
Ministry for the Federal Patrimony (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftlichen Besitz des 
Bundes),23 which was renamed in 1961 as the Treasury Ministry. When Chancellor Brandt 
eliminated the Treasury Ministry in 1969, the Building Department moved back to the Finance 
Ministry, but only until 1972, when it was shifted to the Federal Ministry for Regional Planning, 
Building, and Urban Development (Bundesministerium for Raumordnung, Bauwesen und 
Städtebau).24  
 The byzantine bureaucracy surrounding the federal planning and building process made it 
the subject of persistent attempts at reform, many of which proved counterproductive. Often the 
first step in such attempts was the creation of a committee, working group, or advisory council 
within and across ministries, and their proliferation only added to the red tape facing federal 
building projects while at the same time increasing expectations and pressure for projects to 
remain on time and on budget. In the late 1960s and into the 1970s, reform efforts centered 
around the demand for open competitions for every federal building project. The local Bonn 
public along with key outside interest groups, such as the Association of German Architects 
(Bund Deutscher Architekten or BDA)—whose members stood to benefit greatly in terms of 
                                                            
23 The Ministry for the Federal Patrimony was the successor to the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation (Bundesministerium for wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit), which itself 
succeeded the Federal Ministry for Marshall Plan Affairs (Bundesministerium for 
Angelegenheiten des Marshallplanes). 
24 The “Bundesbauministerium” (Federal Building Ministry) has an even more fractured history. 
Founded as the Federal Ministry for Housing (Bundesministerium for Wohnungsbau) when a 
housing shortage was one of the most pressing issues facing West Germany, it was renamed four 
times between 1949 and 1972, adding Regional Planning and Urban Development to its portfolio 
and trading Housing for the more general “Building.” 
 26 
exposure and commissions from such competitions—were the principal advocates for open 
competitions, and they were largely successful in implementing this reform. However, 
competitions added yet another procedural layer to the process and ended up dramatically 
lengthening development timelines, as briefs had to be written, entries had to be solicited, and 
juries had to be convened. 
 Amid all of the procedural complexity and inertia inherent in legislative bodies and large 
bureaucracies, we should not underestimate the influence that individual officials and planners 
could exert on the planning process and on the development and final form of federal building 
projects. Wolfgang Hesse, Bonn’s City Manager from 1964-1975, was the first to suggest linking 
federal development in Bonn to increased and unrestricted financial aid from the Bund, and in so 
doing he dramatically shifted the tone and substance of federal-municipal relations. Eugen 
Gerstenmaier, the Bundestag President from 1954-1969, almost single-handedly shepherded 
Egon Eiermann’s Bundestag office tower project through the legislative process. Critics of the 
building rewarded Gerstenmaier by permanently linking his name to the unpopular edifice with 
the derisive nickname “Lanky Eugen” (Langer Eugen). Within the federal planning bureaucracy, 
there was a strong tendency for officials to remain within the same agency or department for 
their entire professional careers and gradually work their way through the hierarchy. Thus, an 
official such as Johannes Rossig, who started out as an assistant in the Building Department in 
the early 1950s and eventually became the department’s longtime chief, was involved in 
hundreds of projects and ultimately came to mold the federal building process itself.  
 The thick tangle of economic, political, legal, and procedural issues involved in building 
for the Bund—especially when one takes into account the local role in the process—offered 
numerous opportunities for projects to fail or be indefinitely postponed under any number of 
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pretexts, from budgetary to functional to aesthetic. Thus, it is not surprising that, relative to the 
pace and ambition of federal building proposals in the 1960s and 70s, so few plans reached 
fruition. The failed projects—and the reasons for their failure—are as important to understanding 
Bonn’s evolution as the West German capital as the plans that came to completion. When we 
consider not only the skyscrapers but also the gaps in Bonn’s skyline where skyscrapers might 
have been, we get a much clearer picture of a capital city shaped by democratic forces. The 
confrontation between local and national needs, desires, and prerogatives in Bonn led to 
compromises that culminated in a hybrid identity for the city that confounded expectations for a 
capital representing a major economic and NATO military power. Beyond Bonn, the following 
study demonstrates that close attention to local context and conditions when dealing with 
ostensibly national symbols raises significant questions about the extent to which we should 
consider them as such.  
 Bonn’s postwar architectural legacy is emblematic of West German history and national 
identity in that it was the product of an essentially democratic approach, with freedom and power 
distributed throughout a complex, malleable, and negotiable system. What critics have described 
as unpretentiousness or self-effacement in Bonn’s federal landscape and linked to a 
corresponding modesty and moderation in politics and government in the FRG is in reality the 
result of a planning process that enshrined local autonomy and encouraged civic participation. 
The city’s physical evolution is concrete evidence of West Germans learning through daily 
practice the difficult lessons of democracy and establishing via those efforts one of the most 
robust and successful representative governments in the modern world. Initially, Bonn had to 
force its way to the planning table, but the extraordinary steps that the municipal government and 
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the local public took to preserve what they valued about their city ultimately resulted in a capital 
city that is as much a local as a national phenomenon.  
 
Literature and Methodology 
 
 This dissertation is a contribution to a field of study centered on the complex relationship 
between architecture and urban planning, politics and political institutions, and identity. Capital 
cities offer ideal subjects for such inquiries, and scholarship on national architecture in capitals 
from Washington, D.C. to Berlin to Brasilia and beyond is varied and robust. This scholarship is 
based on the premise, articulated by Lawrence J. Vale in the preface to the second edition of his 
seminal study of capitals, Architecture, Power, and National Identity, that the “… architecture 
and urban design of government districts can become a diagnostic tool for understanding 
political relationships” because they are the “… setting through which we express ideals like 
democracy, or freedom, or other kinds of national values, and this colors the way the citizen sees 
and perceives the government.”25 Vale’s work provides a useful framework and vocabulary for 
thinking about capital cities, but his subsequent case studies give clear favor to the formal 
analysis of architectural forms, style, and visual symbolism as the primary bearers of meaning in 
national buildings and the principle sources of any projections of national identity and political 
ideologies to the public.  
 As this dissertation demonstrates, Bonn is particularly fertile ground for developing new 
insights into the connections between the built environment, politics, and identity, but this is 
more because it confounds rather than conforms to Vale’s assumptions. The scholarship on the 
                                                            
25 Lawrence J. Vale, Architecture, Power, and National Identity, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 
2008), vii. 
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architecture and urban planning of Bonn is sparse, but what work has been done has largely been 
consistent with Vale’s approach. For example, Barnstone’s study, The Transparent State: 
Architecture and Politics in Postwar Germany, asserts that transparency was the central 
metaphor in Bonn’s federal architecture linking it to West German democratic politics. In doing 
so, she reduces the concept of transparency in architecture to the ability to see through glass and 
political transparency to the ability of the citizen to be physically present and witness 
government proceedings.26 This oversimplification is incommensurate with both the multiple 
ways that transparency can operate in a structure and the complex relationship between a 
democratic government and its citizens, and it offers only a superficial understanding of the 
relationship between architecture and politics in Bonn. The German architectural critic, Ingeborg 
Flagge, has disparaged Bonn’s unfinished federal districts as evidence of the Bund’s lack of will 
to express any ideals in built form. This might be true in a very narrow sense, but it also ignores 
the fact that the absence of buildings in Bonn is the result of the kinds of democratic processes 
that undergird the ideals that Flagge would presumably wish to see expressed more concretely.27  
 Against this reductive critical approach, Bonn’s rather extreme idiosyncrasies as a capital 
strongly support a broadening of identity to include both national and local identity and a de-
emphasis of form and style in the analysis of its postwar planning history. Specifically, the 
peculiar interaction between Bonn’s status as a “provisional” seat of government—an almost 
singular phenomenon in modern history—and its two thousand-year history, which fostered a 
strong sense of local identity and attachment to the landscape, led, among other things, to Bonn 
remaining resolutely independent from its newfound role as a political power center. This 
                                                            
26 Barnstone, The Transparent State, 1-86. 
27 Ingeborg Flagge, “Provisorium as Schicksal: Warum mit der Bonner Staatsarchitektur kein 
Staat zu machen ist,” in Architektur und Demokratie: Bauen für die Politik von der 
amerikanischen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart, eds. Ingeborg Flagge and Wolfgang Jean Stock 
(Ostfildern-Ruit bei Stuttgart: Verlag Gerd Hatje, 1992), 224-245. 
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unusual condition militates in favor of close, careful attention to local history and context when 
considering Bonn’s transformation into a national capital. To that end, this dissertation presents 
rigorous and detailed reconstructions of several pivotal moments in the architectural and 
planning history of Bonn.  
 In order to achieve a fine-grained picture of events, this dissertation relies 
overwhelmingly on primary sources, including governmental memos and reports, personal 
correspondence, and proceedings from the West German Bundestag found in local and federal 
archives, as well as the ample contemporary coverage of planning issues found in the local and 
national press. Contrary to analyses that present strong connections between built form and 
national identity, the history below demonstrates that the federal planners and lawmakers tasked 
with creating space for a growing bureaucracy in ways that respected Bonn’s provisional status 
barely considered representational concerns and symbolism in their deliberations. On the other 
side of the equation, the local residents whose lives and space were most directly affected by 
each new federal construction project viewed them almost exclusively in terms of their 
disfiguring effects on the local surroundings. Those who were in a position to create national 
symbols were preoccupied with more prosaic concerns, and the most immediate historical 
audience for the buildings saw them as anything but national artifacts. This is not to deny 
national identity any role in interpretations of Bonn’s federal architecture, but to insist that any 
capital city’s identity is always a hybrid and that the national piece may not be so easily or firmly 
rooted in formal elements. 
 This dissertation is also a contribution to the history of West Germany. The 
historiography of postwar Germany is vast and rife with contentious debates, not least of which 
concern the response of ordinary Germans and their governments to the cataclysm of National 
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Socialism and World War II. With regard to West Germany, two major questions that have 
preoccupied historians have been how the population successfully negotiated the transition to 
democracy and how citizens managed to recover any sense of collective identity in the context of 
total political and moral collapse. The history of the country’s provisional capital offers 
instructive answers to both, and these answers support and build on the conclusions of historians 
such as Alon Confino and Konrad Jarausch.  
 In Germany as a Culture of Remembrance, Confino demonstrates the unique centrality of 
the German concept of Heimat—a concept that can span local, regional, and national registers of 
identity—in constructions of national identity throughout modern German history, including the 
Bonn Republic. In West Germany in particular, Heimat “allowed one to link to a selective 
personal and collective experience of the Third Reich, while sidestepping moral questions.”28 In 
both the federal planning proposals in Bonn and the local response to them, that selective 
experience of the Third Reich amounted to its almost total effacement. However, the public 
mobilized other, more ancient aspects of its history as a bulwark against dealing with the 
problematic issue of a new national identity that—with the influx of politicians and the 
conversion of many of its buildings—arrived earlier and more noticeably in Bonn than elsewhere 
in the FRG. Over time, the strong local identity also proved to be an integrative force. As the 
local public pushed back against the most ambitious federal projects, using arguments grounded 
in the effects of those projects on the city and landscape, the compromises and accords that the 
Bund and Bonn achieved opened space for the city to begin to accommodate the federal 
buildings in its space and assimilate its national role into its identity. 
 Those types of debates and compromises play a central role in Konrad Jarausch’s After 
Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995. In Jarausch’s account of the emergence and 
                                                            
28 Confino, Germany as a Culture of Remembrance, 91. 
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consolidation of democracy and civil society in the Federal Republic, neither the imposition of a 
new political system by the United States nor its acceptance at an intellectual level by the 
conquered Germans was enough to make the country democratic. Rather, democracy had to be 
“founded anew from within and learned through active participation.”29 Within this dynamic, 
local self-government was particularly important in the broader reorientation because it allowed 
citizens to play a role in solving their own problems.30 Overall, it was the small day-to-day acts 
of self-government—voting, criticizing elected officials, protesting, participating in citizen 
movements—and then witnessing the fruits of their labors in steadily improving material 
conditions and responsive, responsible governments that cemented a spirit of democracy in West 
Germany. Bonn’s postwar planning history bears excellent witness to this evolution. To the 
extent that Bonn is a democratic capital, it is because its architects and inhabitants worked 
extremely hard at the practice of democracy in the course of its creation, getting better at it with 
each conflict. With history as a guide, these efforts become legible in Bonn’s peculiar landscape.  
 In its narrow focus on a single city over a defined and relatively brief period of time, this 
study is decidedly a microhistory. However, even as it contracts the field of study to a few square 
miles over a few decades, there is a corresponding dilation in the approach towards 
interdisciplinarity. It moves far beyond traditional architectural or planning history to incorporate 
political, social, and legal history, as well as aspects of geography and political science. Given 
the inherently political nature of the architecture in question and of the processes behind its 
planning and execution, this last part is particularly important, and the analysis below takes 
strong cues from the theories of statecraft and politics developed by James C. Scott in Seeing 
                                                            
29 Jarausch, After Hitler, 131. 
30 Ibid., 134. 
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Like a State.31 Scott’s analysis offers a useful framework in which to consider the behavior of 
federal and municipal officials and the public in Bonn.  
 According to Scott, in order for modern states and their agents to develop and implement 
regimes of administration and control within increasingly complex societies, they must first 
rationalize those societies based on their observable characteristics and extrapolations of their 
needs. These rationalizations, necessarily based on a limited set of objective criteria, inevitably 
include significant mismeasurements, misapprehensions, and blind spots. In the eyes of the state, 
however, the flattened model comes to stand in for society itself and forms the basis for official 
policies and initiatives. In example after example, Scott demonstrates how large-scale state 
action based on such rationalized models of society will ultimately impede rather than facilitate a 
functioning social order, often with tragic results for the populations in question. To counter this 
dynamic, Scott posits practical knowledge and informal processes dispersed across society serve 
as an indispensable check against and palliative for the destructive actions of the state.32 
 While the stakes in developing the FRG’s capital were not nearly as high, the 
rationalizations not as severe, and the blind spots not as glaring as in the large-scale social 
engineering projects around the world that form the basis for Scott’s analysis, federal and 
municipal planners in Bonn were very much “seeing like a state.” It was a state with exquisite 
technocratic vision but that steadfastly refused to see itself in any of its proposals. In their 
inability to contemplate the projection of a positive national identity as one aspect of their role in 
planning the capital city, officials also blinded themselves to the deeper and potentially 
threatening resonances their buildings would have for Bonn’s residents, who were busy 
fashioning and claiming a highly localized identity for themselves. With increasing urgency and 
                                                            
31 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
32 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 1-10. 
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volume, the city’s residents resisted federal proposals until they finally succeeded in changing 
the process behind their creation, reshaping it to better account for a broader spectrum of local 




 This dissertation unfolds essentially chronologically, notwithstanding significant 
temporal overlap between the chapters dealing with the critical events of the 1960s in Bonn. That 
decade, culminating in the crucial turning point of 1969, is the centerpiece of this study because 
it saw the federal and municipal governments, as well as the local public, finally struggling to 
come to terms with what it meant for the nation and the city to transform Bonn into the 
functional capital of the Federal Republic of Germany. The struggle took place largely in the 
arena of architecture and urban planning, as the Bund initiated several large-scale, long-term 
development projects intended to accommodate the growing bureaucracy of a modern national 
government and as Bonn sought to manage the effects of that growth and assert control over its 
space and identity through an effort to restructure the political geography of the entire region. 
 The space and identity that Bonn fought so hard to control and preserve during its tenure 
as the West German capital, however, were inseparable from the city’s two-millennia history and 
its particular place on the western bank of the mythic Rhine river. For residents of postwar Bonn, 
that history, along with the local identity that they drew from it, was firmly rooted in or 
associated with specific aspects of the environment, individual buildings and natural landmarks, 
the relationships between them, and ancient divisions between the communities in the area. For 
the first time in the 1960s, the proposals by both Bonn and the Bund seriously threatened to 
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change or disrupt many enduring and identity-affirming features of the city and region. In order 
to provide a vivid sense of the stakes involved in these transformative confrontations, Chapter 1 
offers a geographical and historical overview of Bonn’s development as a city, primarily through 
the lens of architecture and urban planning, dating back to the Roman Empire. Additionally, the 
chapter sets the stage for the struggles of the 1960s by describing the architectural history of the 
first decade of Bonn as the capital, a period in which the concept of the provisional held much 
greater sway with politicians and planners and prevented local and federal officials from 
adequately addressing a number of slowly building urban planning problems. 
 Chapter 2 picks up right around 1960 with the beginning of Bonn’s concerted campaign 
to redraw its boundaries and incorporate the neighboring communities, including Bad Godesberg 
and Beuel, which sat on the opposite bank of the Rhine. The ostensible motive for this 
integration was to give Bonn the capacity to regulate the rampant growth in the suburbs and 
provide adequate municipal infrastructure and services for the entire metropolitan area. The 
consolidation of planning authority for the entire area into a single planning office under the 
direction of a single City Manager also gave Bonn far greater leverage to check the Bund’s 
increasingly ambitious building agenda. However, Bonn’s neighbors, in particular the wealthy 
and self-sufficient Bad Godesberg, tenaciously resisted the merger with Bonn, and the episode 
demonstrated clearly that Bonn’s fight to preserve its traditional identity from obliteration at the 
hands of the Bund in no way precluded the city from posing a similar threat to its smaller 
neighbors. The animated discourse that took place around Bonn’s proposals and the numerous 
counter-proposals for reforming regional administration and planning further resulted in a 
substantial normalization of the city’s status as capital towards something more enduring. 
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 Chapter 3 turns from intra-communal relations to the planning and execution of the first 
major federal building project of the 1960s in Bonn, a process that led to the first major clash 
between Bonn and the Bund over the sale of a prime piece of city-owned land. The project—a 
30-story office high-rise designed by Egon Eiermann for Bundestag members—marked Bonn as 
the capital city more starkly and clearly than anything that preceded it, sparking controversy 
among federal officials and lawmakers as well as the local public. For federal legislators, the 
building seemed in both size and expense to undermine Bonn’s provisional status and thus 
Berlin’s place as the legitimate German capital. For locals, the building’s scale marred the 
cherished Rhine landscape and Bonn’s skyline, and the tower’s extreme conspicuousness 
threatened to leave little room for any identification of the city besides as the federal capital. To 
add to this discontent, the negotiations between the Bund and Bonn over the land and zoning for 
the skyscraper failed to deliver any guarantees from the Bund for assistance with Bonn’s 
growing financial and urban planning difficulties, many of which were directly attributable to 
presence of the federal government.  
 In Chapter 4, the architectural and political strands laid out in the two previous chapters 
come together in the fall of 1969 with serious consequences for the city and the federal 
government. After the successful execution of the Parliamentary tower, federal planners set their 
sights on the next major project, a massive complex of high-rises for numerous federal ministries 
on the northern edge of Bad Godesberg. The Bund completed two of the towers, but in the 
course of carrying out a second phase of the development with two additional towers, local 
residents suddenly found that they had a significantly enlarged platform from which to express 
their growing disaffection with federal architecture in Bonn and the legal authority to affect it in 
a Bonn that doubled in size and population with the incorporation of Bad Godesberg and the 
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other neighboring towns. The tempest reached the highest levels of the West German 
government with Chancellor Willy Brandt stepping in to stop any further federal construction in 
the capital. In the aftermath, Bonn finally forced the Bund to offer the city substantial financial 
support and enact reforms in the planning process, introducing greater transparency, competition, 
and most importantly, local input on all projects. 
 Finally, the dissertation concludes with an analysis of the status of identity—national and 
local—in Bonn’s urban space as the uneasy truce took hold between the Bund and the city in the 
wake of the events of 1969-1970. The agreements, discussions, and planning competitions that 
emerged from the collapse of the Bund-Bonn relationship seemed to augur a period of rapid 
progress in addressing each party’s priorities, but any optimism quickly yielded to stasis on 
many fronts, as several new layers were added to an already sclerotic planning process. The kind 
of transformative projects envisioned in the early 1970s never materialized. Bonn was more 
secure than ever in its status as a national capital, but the slow pace of construction left it visually 
and architecturally as one of the most peculiar capitals in the world. Beyond the solitary high-
rises, West Germany’s capital offered few visible symbols around which a strong national 
identity could coalesce. However, the lack of such structures and symbols was the result of a set 
of processes that reflected democratic values far more concretely than an inert building ever 
could. These processes also finally allowed Bonn’s residents to preserve important aspects of 
local history and identity while in practice a new national identity as democratic citizens became 
ever more entrenched. 
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Chapter 1: An Historical Survey of Bonn Through its First Decade as Capital 
 
 The city of Bonn straddles the Rhine River just under thirty kilometers south of the much 
larger Cologne, around seventy kilometers south of Düsseldorf—the state (Land) capital of 
North Rhine-Westphalia—and only around seventy-five kilometers east of the French-German 
border. Bonn sits at the northernmost end of the so-called “Romantic Rhine” and marks the 
transition between the Middle Rhine and Lower Rhine, where the river emerges from a series of 
gorges and steep valleys into the broad plain that takes it to its delta in the Netherlands. Thus, to 
the south of the city on both sides of the Rhine, the landscape rises dramatically, creating 
constantly shifting scenic vistas of steep vineyard-covered slopes topped by craggy peaks and 
ruined castles. These natural formations hem in the city along the river on both sides as they 
taper off towards the north. On the western side lies the plateau that forms the northern-most 
edge of the Eifel mountain range, while on the eastern shore sits the Siebengebirge.  
 The broadening of the Rhine and gentle flattening of the landscape from south to north 
around Bonn also help explain site’s suitability as an Ancient Roman castellum, the foundation 
of which in 11 BC marked the beginning of over two thousand years of continuous settlement, 
making Bonn one of the oldest cities in Germany. In conjunction with the landscape, this 
impressive history, inconsistently preserved and carefully curated, provides the foundation for 
modern local identity in Bonn. As with the landscape, local identity adheres primarily to the 
physical markers of the city’s history, such as monuments, buildings, and the city plan itself. 
Federal building proposals after 1949 never directly endangered this architectural patrimony—
and in some cases, where they incorporated existing buildings, they even helped to preserve it—
but the accumulation of large and highly visible federal buildings dramatically changed the way 
that the city looked and felt to its residents. The city’s postwar building spree, and its 
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associations with the federal government, threatened to overwhelm the eclectic mix of medieval, 
Baroque, and 19th-century architecture from which the local public drew collective meaning. 
While Bonn initially viewed its role as the provisional capital as an honor, as time passed and the 
Bund’s presence grew, and problems arising from its newfound status as the capital mounted in 
the 1950s and 60s, the city came to view its new identity as political power center with 
increasing ambivalence. 
 
Roman and Medieval Bonn: Garrison Town to Christian Stronghold 
 
 Considering the history of Bonn through the lens of its architecture and urban planning 
helps us to account for the contours of the local public’s identity—an identity that the federal 
government in a sense inherited when it arrived in the city. This history also explains the 
distinctive physical condition of Bonn in 1949. This condition—comparatively intact, with 
significant usable office space and habitable housing stock—became a critical plank in Bonn’s 
campaign to become the capital. This relatively healthy urban condition also affected subsequent 
federal development, by determining which sites and spaces in and around Bonn were available 
to the federal government and, among those, which were acceptable development sites for the 
city and its residents. Except for the presence of the city itself, little remains of Bonn’s illustrious 
Roman past. Those artifacts that have been recovered—such as human remains, grave markers, 
weapons, and coins—have been removed to museums. From its beginnings as a small military 
outpost, Bonn grew by the 2nd century AD into a permanent legionary fortress with a peak 
population, including soldiers and ancillary industries and tradesmen, of around 17,000. A 
significant Roman military presence persisted in Bonn until the collapse of the empire in the 4th 
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century AD, after which the fort’s structures and the surrounding settlement were absorbed first 
into a succession of small Frankish kingdoms before becoming part of the Merovingian and then 
Carolingian empires.  
 Over this same period, Christianity gradually took hold in the Rhineland. In Bonn, the 
location of worship sites determined key lasting features of the cityscape as early as the 4th 
century, when local Christians established a shrine dedicated to the martyrs St. Cassius and St. 
Florentius, Roman legionaries who according to legend had been executed in Bonn during the 3rd 
century. The site of this shrine—already embellished by 400 AD with a small church-like 
structure—marked an enduring cornerstone for the city of Bonn, eventually becoming the site 
where the Bonn Minster (Bonner Münster) was completed nearly a millennium later (Figure 15). 
Worshippers renovated, rebuilt, and expanded the sanctuary several times between the 4th and 8th 
centuries, before the shrine received official recognition during the Carolingian period with the 
endowment and construction of the Collegiate Church of St. Cassius and Florentius. The 
Carolingian structure was razed around 1050 to make way for a larger basilica and an adjoining 
cloister in the newest Romanesque style. Completed episodically over the next two hundred 
years, it represented a unique configuration of a three-aisled basilica with double choirs, a single 
crossing and transept in front of the long eastern choir, an octagonal tower and spire over the 
crossing, and twin towers flanking the choirs.1 In the midst of construction in 1166, the provost 
of the Collegiate Foundation, Gerhard von Are, had the relics of Cassius and Florentius 
translated from their grave site beneath the ancient shrine to the high altar of the new church, and 
their elaborate new reliquary combined with the imposing new surroundings advertised Bonn as 
a site of significant wealth and religious power. The Bonner Münster marked the spiritual heart 
                                                            
1 Bonn’s main church also became a model for the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church in Berlin 
after Kaiser Wilhelm II spent time studying at the university in Bonn. 
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of the city, and as the rest of Bonn grew around it, came to mark its commercial core as well. 
Today, as throughout most of the 20th century, the basilica defines one side of the city’s largest 
pedestrian plaza, the Münsterplatz, the other sides of which are filled with stores, businesses, and 
restaurants (Figure 16). Until the construction of several high-rises in the 1960s, the church’s 
tower and steeple were the city’s tallest and most visible and recognizable landmark.  
 The Münsterplatz is at the western edge of Bonn’s historic district (Altstadt), which— 
though it has been much altered since it first developed during the Middle Ages—is still easily 
identified by its dense network of twisting, narrow streets punctuated by open squares and 
plazas. It was originally defined by a formidable city wall (Figure 17), which was built in the 
second half of the 13th century but was then gradually dismantled over the intervening centuries 
both by destructive conquests of the city and the city’s organic expansion outward. With the 
removal of the final gate, the Sterntor, at the end of the 19th century, the city constructed a 
monument to its erstwhile wall in the form of a model gate, also called the Sterntor, several 
blocks from where its progenitor had stood (Figure 18). While it may be an historicist simulacra 
of a medieval city gate that bears little physical resemblance to the original, its crenellations, 
portcullis, and rough-hewn stone immediately connect the viewer to Bonn’s history as a walled 
city. Moreover, Bonn’s city wall left other indelible markers, as its footprint is still discernible in 
the Altstadt’s street plan, where a series of roads traces a path dividing the dense medieval core 






Early Modern Bonn: Rise of the Prince-electors to the cult of Beethoven 
 
 The construction of the city walls cemented Bonn’s status as a city, and the Altstadt and 
its immediate surroundings remain the city’s social and commercial center. From the 13th century 
onward, due to the city’s proximity to Cologne and status as a Free City technically outside the 
authority of the titular rulers of the Electorate of Cologne, Bonn became a favorite alternate 
residence for the Prince-electors. This ensured that Bonn accumulated modest levels of wealth 
and prestige as it grew steadily into the Early Modern period, but it failed to protect the city from 
the ravages of periodic aggression by neighboring powers or natural disasters such as floods and 
plagues. The presence of a Prince-elector made Bonn particularly vulnerable to violence during 
the religious wars of the 16th century in the wake of Martin Luther’s Protestant Reformation. The 
conversion of Prince-elector-archbishop Gebhard Truchsess von Waldburg to Protestantism in 
1583 threatened the balance of power in the Holy Roman Empire’s electoral college, 
precipitating the Cologne War. Backed by the Pope and by Spanish and Bavarian armies, Ernest 
of Bavaria (r. 1583-1612)—a scion of the powerful southern German Wittelsbach dynasty and 
Gebhard’s replacement—expelled the Protestant but in the process devastated much of the 
territory around Cologne, including Bonn and the Godesburg castle (see Fig. 13).  
 The rise of Prince-elector-archbishop Ernest heralded the beginning of nearly 180 years 
of Wittelsbach rule in the Electorate of Cologne. In 1597, Ernest dramatically altered Bonn’s 
fortunes by making permanent what had been merely a preference amongst Prince-electors, 
naming the city as his Residenz, the official seat of his electoral administration. This was Bonn’s 
first stint as a political power center, but the extraordinary depredations caused by the Thirty 
Years’ War and the frequent conflicts of the 17th century initially severely stunted any of the 
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material benefits that might have resulted from the elevated political status. However, after a 
final siege and occupation of Bonn during the War of Spanish Succession in 1703,2 the 18th 
century witnessed a prolonged boom in the city. A succession of Archbishop-Electors 
transformed the city with extensive building projects that updated it with contemporary Baroque 
and Rococo trends and imparted a substantial and lasting element of Bonn’s present physical 
character.  
 Archbishop-Elector Joseph Clemens of Bavaria (r. 1688-1723) laid the foundations for 
two of Bonn’s largest and most opulent palaces. For his primary urban palace, the 
Residenzschloss (Figure 20), Joseph Clemens relied on designs by Enrico Zucalli, the Swiss-
born court architect to the Wittelsbachs. Construction began in 1697 but was interrupted by the 
1703 siege of the city, which briefly forced the Archbishop-Elector into exile. After his return to 
Bonn, Joseph Clemens turned to the French court architect, Robert de Cotte, to renovate and 
complete Zucalli’s palace, as well as to design a second residence, which was to be the 
Archbishop-Elector’s rural summer retreat just outside the city walls in an area called 
Poppelsdorf. Begun in 1715, the Schloss Clemensruhe, or Poppelsdorfer Schloss (Figure 21), 
replaced a medieval castle that had been destroyed in 1689 and clearly advertised the wealth of 
the Wittelsbach Electors. Joseph Clemens also commissioned de Cotte to design a grand 
thoroughfare connecting the two palaces, resulting in the half-mile long Poppelsdorfer Allee, a 
broad parkway flanked by tree-lined streets (Figure 22). Its construction required the slighting of 
a substantial section of Bonn’s city walls, marking the end of Bonn as a fortified city but also 
removing a significant restraint on its physical expansion. Poppelsdorfer Allee’s noble patronage 
and carefully contrived beauty quickly made it a nucleus for settlement and growth that lasted 
                                                            
2 Two earlier occupations occurred in 1673 during the Franco-Dutch Wars and 1689 during the 
Nine Years’ War. 
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into the 20th century, particularly amongst the city’s elite. The palace buildings on either end of 
the street, combined with the elegant, mostly 19th-century townhouses that line the wide expanse 
of grass in the center, render the Allee still among Bonn’s most picturesque locations. 
 Clemens August (r. 1723-1761)—Joseph Clemens’s nephew and successor, and the last 
Wittelsbach Elector of Cologne—increased the pace of building in his domain, completing and 
expanding his uncle’s projects in Bonn while initiating the creation of several new palaces, 
cementing his place as one of the great arts patrons of the 18th century. His crowning 
achievement was not in Bonn but rather in Brühl, a small village halfway between Bonn and 
Cologne, where beginning in 1723 Clemens August had built the spectacular Schloss 
Augustusburg (Figure 23). Initially, he commissioned his own court architect, Johann Conrad 
Schlaun, to renovate a ruined medieval castle in Brühl into a modern Baroque palace. After 
completion of this initial work in 1728, Clemens August turned to the Bavarian Wittelsbach 
court architect, François de Cuvilliés, to redesign the surrounding park and gardens, embellish 
the façades, modernize the interiors of the main residence, and design the Falkenlust. Finally, 
from 1740-46, the Elector commissioned the German Rococo master, Johann Balthasar 
Neumann, to create a monumental staircase near the main entrance of the Augustusburg (Figure 
24). Together with stucco and fresco collaborators, Neumann created an extravagant decorative 
scheme that glorifies its patron in the extreme and endures among Germany’s great Rococo 
masterpieces. 
 In Bonn, Clemens August enlisted Balthasar Neumann again to finish the summer palace, 
Schloss Clemensruhe, and he continued work on the urban Residenzschloss based on de Cotte’s 
designs. Clemens August relied extensively on the services of the French architect Michel 
Leveilly, whom Joseph Clemens had brought to Bonn in 1719 on the recommendation of de 
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Cotte, Leveilly’s teacher in Paris. Leveilly supervised the construction of the Falkenlust in Brühl 
when de Cuvilliés had to return to the Wittelsbach court in Munich, and in Bonn he used the 
same architect’s plans to construct the Koblenzer Tor (Figure 25), a triumphal Baroque gate 
integrated into a wing of the Residenzschloss that ceremoniously marked the entrance into the 
city on the main road from the city of Koblenz to the south. Leveilly got the opportunity to 
execute his own design in a new City Hall (Rathaus) for Bonn (Figure 26), commissioned by 
Clemens August in 1737 to replace the one destroyed in 1689. Now referred to as Old City Hall 
(Altes Rathaus), Leveilly’s building defines and presides over the Altstadt’s other major square, 
the Marktplatz, in similar fashion to the Bonn Minster and the Münsterplatz, and it still houses 
the offices of the mayor and serves as the backdrop for local ceremonial occasions.  
 The final Archbishop-Elector of Cologne, the Archduke Maximilian Franz of Austria (r. 
1784-1794), left his indelible mark on the city less through architecture than by his patronage of 
a singular musical talent, Ludwig van Beethoven (b. 1770). In terms of architecture and urban 
development, Maximilian Franz left a larger impact on Bad Godesberg, where in 1790 he 
acquired the mineral springs and began transforming the town into a health resort with such 
amenities for the public as spas, lodging, scenic promenades, and entertainment facilities. Chief 
among these last was the Redoute (built 1790-92; Figure 27), a festival hall in the Neoclassical 
style by uncle-nephew architects Michael and Adam Franz Friedrich Leydel. Here the 
Archbishop-Elector hosted balls and concerts, including a 1792 recital by a young Beethoven for 
the Classical master Franz Joseph Haydn. This meeting led Maximilian Franz, who already 
employed Beethoven in his court orchestra, to sponsor the 22 year-old musician’s travel to 
Vienna to enter Haydn’s tutelage. Beethoven never returned to Bonn, and composed all of his 
major works after leaving the city. Nevertheless, as his fame grew rapidly in his adopted city and 
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spread beyond, Bonn was quick to claim him as its native son, and his influence on the city’s 
identity is overwhelming. In 1845, only eighteen years after his death, Bonn erected a large 
statue of the composer in the center of the Münsterplatz and inaugurated a music festival in his 
honor that still occurs annually in a concert hall that also bears his name, Beethovenhalle (Figure 
28). By 1889, his family home had been turned into a museum dedicated to Beethoven’s life, and 
his name now appears on streets, cafés, and official promotional materials all over the city. As 
the rhythms of national politics and the edifices of federal government began to dominate the 
city, the diminution or loss of the automatic association between Bonn and its hometown hero 
became a significant source of anxiety for local residents and planners. 
 
Bonn in the 19th and Early-20th Centuries 
 
 Bonn’s tenure as the seat of an Electorate came to an abrupt end in October, 1794 when 
the French Republican Army of Sambre-et-Meuse occupied the city and forced Maximilian 
Franz to flee to the Habsburg stronghold of Vienna. This marked the beginning of over twenty 
years of French rule in the city, and after 1801 it was part of the Rhin-et-Moselle department in 
Napoleon’s French Empire. With the formal dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, 
Bonn entered a completely new political world with only its palaces to mark its former position 
of prominence and power. As part of the agreement that emerged from the 1815 Congress of 
Vienna, where Europe’s great powers met to piece the continent back together in the wake of 
Napoleon’s defeat, Bonn became part of the Rhine Province of the Kingdom of Prussia, then 
under the rule of King Friedrich Wilhelm III. From there, Bonn entered the German Empire upon 
its declaration by Emperor Wilhelm I in 1871. 
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 In many ways, Bonn hardly seems to have registered its relegation from the seat of an 
Electorate of the Holy Roman Empire to a small city on the far western edge of Prussia, as the 
city experienced another extraordinary boom during the 19th century, becoming one of the 
wealthiest cities in the kingdom. Unprecedented peace and stability in the region along with the 
acceleration of the industrial revolution, even in late-to-industrialize Prussia, provided the 
conditions for rapid population growth across the entire kingdom and particularly in its cities. 
Bonn benefited from these trends, growing from just over 10,000 residents at the end of 
Napoleon’s reign to over 80,000 by 1905.3 In 1887, the Prussian government granted Bonn the 
status of “independent city” (kreisfreie Stadt), splitting the city from the surrounding Bonn 
County (Kreis Bonn) and placing it directly under provincial authority, an administrative 
arrangement reserved for larger cities. In 1904, Bonn substantially expanded its territory by 
incorporating the surrounding towns of Poppelsdorf, Kessenich, Endenich, and Dottendorf 
(Figure 29). Bonn would turn to the incorporation of its smaller neighbors as a way to control its 
development again after becoming the capital, but in the postwar context of a federal democracy 
with robust civil liberties, this would prove to be a much more difficult strategy to implement 
(see Chapter 3). 
 In the 19th century, Bonn’s specific circumstances engendered a particular kind of growth 
that distinguished it from its industrializing counterparts in the region. Its proximity to those 
industrial centers along the Ruhr river, such as Essen and Duisburg, where coal mining and steel 
production were powerful economic engines, and its position on the Rhine River, a major 
transportation and trade conduit, attracted businessmen and magnates. However, the beauty of 
                                                            
3 Edith Ennen and Dietrich Höroldt, Vom Römerkastell zur Bundeshauptstadt: Kleine Geschichte 
der Stadt Bonn (Bonn: Stollfuß Verlag, 1985), 364-365. By comparison, Cologne grew from 
over 49,000 in 1816 to almost 430,000 in 1905. Wikipedia, "Demographics of Cologne," 
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Cologne 
(accessed September 10, 2015). 
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the surrounding landscape—which was quickly being bound to national myths and Romanticist 
ideals, and was relatively free of the factories and proletarian housing estates that were markers 
of the economic and social upheavals currently wracking the kingdom—made the city especially 
popular as a site of tourism, leisure, and especially retirement with members of the newly-rich 
industrialist class. By the eve of World War I, Bonn could count two-hundred millionaires 
amongst its residents, and it was the third-richest city in Prussia.4   
 In 1818, soon after Bonn’s accession into Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm III established the 
University of Bonn (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn) as a successor to an 
earlier academy that had been shuttered during the French occupation. It was one of only six 
universities in Prussia at the time,5 and the king’s action thus inaugurated Bonn as an important 
center of research and learning. “University town” became a pillar of Bonn’s local identity on 
par with its history as the residence of Cologne’s Archbishop-Electors and its contemporary 
evolution into an enclave for the upper class and destination for Romantic tourism. It helped that 
the city’s new identity was immediately and quite literally situated within the context of the 
historical, as the University of Bonn took over the two vacated Electoral palaces, the 
Residenzschloss and Poppelsdorfer Schloss, as its primary buildings.  
 As the University grew in size and scope in the 19th century, it added buildings at a rapid 
clip, beginning with an anatomy building designed by university architect Friedrich Waesemann 
in 1821.6 In 1824, the Prussian master Karl Friedrich Schinkel imposed his authority as head of 
the Prussian Building Commission on the project and revised a planned cupola over the main 
                                                            
4 Stadt Bonn, Bonner Zeittaffel: 1880 bis 1930, 
http://www.bonn.de/familie_gesellschaft_bildung_soziales/stadtarchiv/geschichte/zeittafel/01295
/index.html?lang=de (accessed September 10, 2015). 
5 The others were in Berlin, Greifswald, Königsberg, Halle, and Breslau. Of course, the other 
German states had their own august and ancient academic institutions. 
6 Today, the building serves as the Academic Art Museum, housing the university’s extensive 
collection of plaster casts of antique sculptures. 
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anatomy theater into the current colonnaded drum. This marked the first of two times that 
Schinkel would emend designs for the university, with the second coming in the 1840s when he 
removed exterior ornamentation from an astronomical observatory by Waesemann’s successor, 
Peter Joseph Leydel.7 Subsequent university architects, most notably August Dieckhoff and 
Jacob Neumann, added several more large buildings in the second half of the 19th century, all 
straightforward, functional structures clad in various modes of academic classicism with 
occasional nods to the Italian Renaissance.8  
 The university’s initial reoccupation of historic structures foreshadowed the Bund’s 
actions during its first years in Bonn over two centuries later. In both episodes, such adaptive 
reuse proved to be a limited but viable strategy for successfully embedding a new identity for the 
city within its historical landscape. However, unlike the federal presence after 1949, the 
university’s expansion occurred in the context of the organic growth of the city in the 19th 
century and coincided with increased urban development activity around the Bonn region. The 
school’s campus provided a nucleus for the renovation of the surrounding Südstadt, the 
neighborhood just to the south of the Altstadt. Using the Poppelsdorfer Allee—the parkway that 
once connected the Archbishop-Elector’s palaces and now connected the university’s main 
buildings—as both a border and a cue for the character of the new district, Paul Richard 
Thomann, Bonn’s city architect (Stadtbaumeister), proposed a precinct filled with elegant blocks 
of large townhouses that were intended for university professors, military officers, and other 
members of the local bourgeoisie. Südstadt’s conversion into a wealthy residential neighborhood 
over the next 50 years, roughly 1860-1910, was paralleled by a similar conversion of Nordstadt, 
                                                            
7 Andreas Denk and Ingeborg Flagge, Architekturführer Bonn, Architectural Guide to Bonn, 
trans. Claus Warren Offermann (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1997), 19, 24. 
8 These include Dieckhoff’s Chemistry Institute (1864-67), Neumann’s Physiology Institute 
(1875-78), and a New Anatomy Building (1868-72) designed by Dieckhoff and finished by 
Neumann. 
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the area just to the north of Bonn’s historical center. Here, however, modest historicist facades of 
the three-story multi-family apartment buildings that line the streets demonstrate a more middle-
class focus.  
 Begun slightly later, Bad Godesberg’s creation of the Villa Quarter (Villenviertel) along 
the Rhine to the north of the town center aimed at an older, wealthier clientele that might be 
drawn to the local health spas. The large freestanding and duplex villas display the variety of 
stylistic tastes of retiring members of the moneyed class in turn-of-the-century Germany, 
including the complete spectrum of historicist revivals, more contemporary Jugendstil, and even 
Bauhaus inflected modernism in the latest examples from the 1920s. After 1949, Bonn and Bad 
Godesberg’s villas would enter the service of the federal government, housing the Chancellery 
and Presidency, several federal agencies and ministries, federal state delegations, and, 
particularly in Bad Godesberg, many foreign embassies. The adaptation of existing buildings to 
new uses was always more palatable to the local public than new construction, because it left the 
cityscape intact, changing its tenor while allowing traditional associations to coexist relatively 
comfortably with Bonn’s new role as capital. 
 Bonn’s 19th-century prosperity and location on the Rhine between regional Prussian 
capitals Cologne and Koblenz earned the city a stop on the route of one of Prussia’s earliest rail 
lines, run by the Bonn-Cologne Railway Company (Bonn-Cölner Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft). The 
company was founded in 1837, and by 1844 it had completed the line between its eponymous 
cities and was planning a southward extension to the town of Rolandseck, which opened in 1856. 
Three years later, the line extended south beyond Koblenz, where it tied into the main rail 
network of the neighboring Grand Duchy of Hesse. Being on a trunk line of Germany’s 
proliferating railways was a stimulus for economic growth that brought with it an accelerating 
 51 
flow of people and goods, along with a measure of prestige. Cities like Bonn constructed ever 
larger and more ornate train stations as conspicuous symbols of the status that the railway 
conferred and heralds of arrival to and departure from the city. To that end, Bonn completed its 
neo-Renaissance travel palace in 1885.  
 However, for Bonn, the specific route of the rail line through the city brought with it 
significant disadvantages. Over the protests of the university, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV allowed 
the Bonn-Cologne Railway Company to bisect the city along an east-west trajectory, separating 
the Altstadt from much of Südstadt (see Fig. 19), with only a few crossing points. More 
egregiously, the railway cut across the Poppelsdorfer Allee near the former Residenzschloss, 
marring one of the city’s most attractive and cherished thoroughfares. The king commissioned 
his Garden Director-General, Peter Joseph Lenné, to design the intersection of the parkway and 
the railroad, which mitigated but did not eliminate the adverse effect of the cleavage. With 
increased rail traffic and the advent and spread of the automobile in the mid-20th century, the 
division of the city by the railroad became more of a functional problem, as the limited crossings 
severely restricted the flow of traffic from one part of the city to the other. The issue remained 
relevant for Bonn into the postwar period, but the only feasible solution—the excavation and 
burial of the rail lines in underground tunnels—could only be carried out by the federal 
government and the German Federal Railway (Deutsche Bundesbahn). Federal planners 
periodically raised the possibility of solving Bonn’s railroad problem as a potential bargaining 
chip in exchange for the city’s approval of the Bund’s plans elsewhere.  
 Another sign of Bonn’s rising fortunes in the 19th century was the entirely locally-
financed construction of the city’s first bridge over the Rhine in the 1890s (Figure 30). This 
bridge connected Bonn with the town of Vilich (renamed Beuel in 1922), more tightly integrating 
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the communities on either side of the river, which had previously been connected by ferries. 
Such flourishing came to a sudden end in Bonn, as it did for the entire German Empire, with the 
outbreak of World War I in August 1914. Bonn emerged from that war physically intact but once 
again under French occupation, a situation that would persist until 1926. Nevertheless, Bonn’s 
population continued to grow, reaching a pre-World War II peak of over 100,000.9  
 The city’s experience under National Socialism was typically brutal. The Nazi Party 
installed its own mayors in all of the city halls in the region immediately upon assuming power 
in 1933. Local civilians and members of Adolf Hitler’s SA paramilitary forces destroyed all of 
the city’s synagogues during Kristallnacht on November 10, 1938, and the Nazi terror machine 
completely decimated Bonn’s small Jewish population. Those that had not successfully fled or 
emigrated by 1941 were transported to concentration camps and murdered in the Holocaust.10 
 Like many cities along the strategically critical Rhine, Bonn paid a heavy price during the 
Allied bombing campaigns of World War II. American and British bombers raided Bonn forty-
three times between 1940 and 1945, ultimately destroying almost twenty percent of the city’s 
housing and damaging over seventy percent of it.11 American troops entered Bonn without a 
fight on March 9, 1945, but after the German surrender, Bonn and the Rhineland were placed 
under British occupational authority, and political rehabilitation and physical reconstruction of 
the city began. The British moved quickly to create the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) 
by merging the former provinces of Westphalia and the Rhineland, and they reconstituted the 
local governments. However, initial rebuilding efforts were slow, hampered by shortages, and 
                                                            
9 Ennen and Höroldt, 365. 
10 Ibid., 322-323. 
11 Bad Godesberg, on the other hand, was largely spared wartime damage. Hartwig Beseler, 
Niels Gutschow, and Frauke Kretschmer. Kriegsschicksale: deutscher Architektur: Verluste, 
Schäden, Wiederaufbau: eine Dokumentation für das Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
vol 1. (Neumünster: Karl Wachholtz Verlag, 1988), 377-396. 
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focused on restoring the housing supply. Activity picked up in the late 1940s, exemplified by the 
rapid planning and reconstruction of the Rhine bridge (Figure 31), which the Nazi Wehrmacht 
had destroyed during their retreat from Allied Forces in 1945.  
 
The Selection of Bonn as the Provisional Capital: Modesty as a Virtue 
 
 Bonn’s path to becoming the provisional capital began with the Six Powers Talks 
between the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg, which took place in London during the first half of 1948. The talks resulted in the 
introduction of the Deutschmark and a call for the Western occupied territories to form a national 
government, prompting the Soviets to withdraw from the Allied Control Council and launch their 
blockade of West Berlin. The suddenly frozen relationship between occupying forces set 
Germany on an irreversible path to postwar division, and rendered Berlin infeasible as a potential 
capital city for the new state that would soon emerge from the Western zones. The Six Powers 
asked the Minister-Presidents of the eleven German states under Western control to convene a 
Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarischer Rat) in order to draft a new constitution that would be 
the basis for forming a government to rule the new country.  
 Karlsruhe’s mayor proposed his city as a host of the Parliamentary Council, and similar 
proposals followed from Koblenz, Frankfurt, Bonn, and Celle. Hermann Wandersleb, North 
Rhine-Westphalia’s Chief of the State Chancellery, lobbied for Bonn on the basis that its former 
Pedagogical Academy, a Bauhaus-style building designed by Martin Witte in the early 1930s (see 
Fig. 1), could provide an ideal meeting place for the Council. On August 13, 1948, the Minister-
Presidents held a vote over the phone in which eight chose Bonn. The Parliamentary Council 
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opened its proceedings on September 1, 1948 in the large central rotunda of the city’s natural 
history museum, Museum Koenig (Figure 32), and one of its first actions was to elect as Council 
President the former mayor of Cologne and future first Federal Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. 
The Council’s primary task was drafting a constitution, but the members were highly conscious 
of the exclusion of the eastern part of the country from the process and insistent that any 
document that they approved be provisional and open to revision once East-West relations 
resumed, a prospect that in 1948 still seemed imminent. Thus, rather than calling it a 
“Constitution” (Verfassung), the Council opted for “Basic Law” (Grundgesetz), which more 
clearly signaled the supposedly temporary nature of the West German state that it defined.  
 Establishing a new national government, however provisional, immediately raised the 
question of where that government would be housed. In selecting a host city, a principal concern 
was to avoid any appearance of foreclosing the possibility of reunification or in any way 
forsaking those German brethren remaining under Soviet authority. As Bonn was already 
successfully housing the Parliamentary Council, it seemed natural that the city would be a prime 
candidate to become the capital, and Hermann Wandersleb began preparing the application on 
the city’s behalf. At the same time, the Minister-President of Hesse, Christian Stock, again put 
forward Frankfurt, which had been Bonn’s main competition in the Parliamentary Council 
decision.12 Frankfurt appeared to have location, size, and history on its side, as it had been at the 
center of the failed 1848 democratic revolutions in Germany, and its St. Paul’s Church had 
served as the meeting place of the country’s first Parliament. Frankfurt was also home to the 
Bizonal Economic Council (Wirtschaftsrat), an important precursor to the West German 
Bundestag, and thus the city already served some limited capital functions.  
                                                            
12 The mayors of Stuttgart and Kassel also put their respective cities forward as candidates, but 
Stuttgart lacked the support of the residents, and the Minister-President of Hesse would not 
support another Hessian city to compete against Frankfurt. 
 55 
 However, in the context of a German people and nation still under occupation and rapidly 
fracturing into two, Frankfurt’s strengths were also its weakness, while the factors that 
recommended Bonn as a suitable site for the Parliamentary Council continued to work in its 
favor. Even though large parts of its urban core had been destroyed, Bonn could credibly claim to 
have ample space in undamaged buildings outside of the city center to house federal 
organizations. To emphasize this point and present the selection of Bonn almost as a fait 
accompli, the state government hired Hans Schwippert to begin renovating the Pedagogical 
Academy into a parliamentary building in November 1948, six months before the Council’s May, 
1949 vote designating Bonn the (provisional) capital. 
 Bonn’s location on the west bank of the Rhine in the British Zone of Occupation had 
several ostensible benefits. The city had the backing of the British, who wanted to bring 
important institutions into their zone after much of the postwar governance and administration 
had revolved around Frankfurt in the American Zone. It guaranteed that the Rhineland, against 
some of the more draconian suggestions by the French government to partition the region, would 
remain an integral part of Germany. Furthermore, Bonn’s distance from the Soviet zone and 
proximity to the rest of Western Europe made it seem safer in the event of invasion or military 
conflict with the East. Bonn also more easily satisfied the demand that the West German capital 
be entirely free of occupation military forces as a way to avoid undue foreign influence on 
domestic affairs. Frankfurt—where the American military government established its 
headquarters in Hans Poelzig’s IG Farben building (1928-1930)—had an enormous foreign 
military presence that would have been extremely difficult to relocate. However, by 1948, Bonn 
only hosted a residual Belgian force that could vacate the city quickly and without complication. 
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 Ultimately, the decisive factor in Bonn’s favor came down to its more modest status, 
reflected in its smaller size and lower historical stature, which lent the city a naturally provisional 
character as a capital. In the wake of National Socialism and World War II, Bonn’s two-hundred 
years as the seat of an electorate in the Holy Roman Empire seemed as remote as its Ancient 
Roman roots. Bonn’s supporters, and more generally proponents of striking the most conciliatory 
and least divisive posture in forming a new government, assumed that selecting a less populous, 
less prominent city would pose little threat to Berlin as the legitimate German capital and leave a 
clearer, easier path to reconciliation and reunification. To that end, the Basic Law initially 
avoided even specifying a capital city or seat of government, so that the law would not have to 
be amended later.13 Were the government placed in a larger city of greater prominence like 
Frankfurt, the concern was that it would too easily become entrenched, diminishing Berlin’s 
status as a symbol for united Germany and an impetus for striving towards reunification. 
 While Bonn’s fundamentals—size, space, location, and history—all spoke in its favor as 
a more credible choice for the provisional capital, the city and its supporters, especially soon-to-
be Chancellor Adenauer, also shrewdly navigated the selection process to ensure victory. 
Adenauer had not been involved in the decision to host the Parliamentary Council in Bonn, but 
once Bonn was a serious contender to become the provisional capital, the Christian Democratic 
Union leader, who now lived in the small town of Rhöndorf just across the Rhine from Bonn, 
threw his considerable influence and skill behind the campaign. Perhaps his most critical 
contribution was to reframe the decision between Bonn and Frankfurt along political party lines. 
The Rhineland, including Bonn, and Frankfurt were each political strongholds for and drew the 
bulk of their support from the two major political parties then coalescing in postwar West 
                                                            
13 Only in 2006 was Article 22 of the Basic Law amended to include language identifying Berlin 
as the capital. 
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Germany, respectively the CDU and its chief rival, the Social Democratic Party. Adenauer 
capitalized on this split, portraying the selection of Frankfurt as a defeat for the CDU and then 
maintaining total discipline among the twenty-seven members of his party at the Parliamentary 
Council’s vote on May 10, 1949. By picking up three votes from the smaller center-right Free 
Democratic Party and a couple of local SPD supporters, Adenauer tipped the ballot in Bonn’s 
favor, although only by four votes, 33-29.  
 However, Adenauer’s canny exploitation of political rivalries to secure Bonn’s place as 
the seat of the West German government was not without negative consequences for the city. It 
left an embittered SPD that saw the close partisan vote as grounds for attacking the legitimacy of 
Bonn as the capital and questioning the Parliamentary Council’s authority to make a decision 
seemingly outside the scope of writing a constitution. When the first sessions of the new 
Bundestag began meeting in September, the SPD immediately reopened the capital question. A 
second vote was held on November 3, 1949, and Frankfurt again lost, this time 200-176. Even 
ratification by the Bundestag would not stop routine challenges to Bonn’s legitimacy and 
legislative maneuvers that wreaked havoc on the federal and municipal governments’ capacity to 
plan adequately for the realities of housing a growing bureaucracy, culminating in 1956 with a 
complete halt in federal building activity. As a compensatory gesture in 1949, the Bundestag vote 
for Bonn was accompanied by a resolution, passed with an overwhelming majority, affirming 
Berlin as the capital and stating that government functions would return to that city as soon as 
free and open elections were held across the Soviet Zone of Occupation. The resolution 
reaffirmed Berlin’s place and underlined Bonn’s provisional status while at the same time 
essentially guaranteeing the division of Germany would endure by setting conditions for 
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reunification that could never gain the acquiescence of the authoritarian governments in the 
Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic. 
 
Federal Architecture in the First Years as Capital 
 
 In the first few months of the Federal Republic’s existence, there was enough available 
space in Bonn to house the government in otherwise vacant buildings around the city. These 
spaces were purchased or donated to the Bund by the occupation authorities, the state of North 
Rhine-Westphalia, or the city itself. Bonn could meet its obligations in a manner that fulfilled the 
promises it had made in its application and accorded with its placeholder status. Several large 
ministries took advantage of unoccupied military and police barracks (kaserne), the internal 
structures of which made them easily convertible into office space. The Ministry of Economics 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft) settled in the Gallwitz-Kaserne (built 1936-38), a former 
Nazi Wehrmacht artillery garrison (Figure 33); the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, and Forests 
(Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten) took over the Troilo-Kaserne 
(built 1936-38), a former Wehrmacht infantry barracks (Figure 34); and the Ministries of the 
Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern) and Finance respectively occupied the Düppel-Kaserne 
(built 1913) and the Husaren-Kaserne (built 1907; Figure 35), neighboring former Prussian army 
barracks in the northern district of Bonn-Castell. In all of these cases, financial and logistical 
necessity trumped any discomfort stemming from the use of buildings with Imperial or National 
Socialist associations.14  
                                                            
14 Jan Uelzmann, “Bonn, the Transitional Capital and its Founding Discourses, 1948-1963” (PhD 
diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2011), 67-68. 
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 Other ministries were housed in Bonn’s numerous villas, which came with more neutral 
historical ties and offered both sufficient size and a more dignified aura suited to official and 
representative functions. The Ministry of Justice (Bundesministerium der Justiz), after a brief 
time sharing space with the Finance Ministry, was given the Rosenburg, a Neo-Gothic mansion 
built for a university professor in 1831 on the city’s southwestern outskirts (Figure 36). Haus 
Carstanjen (built 1881; Figure 37), named for the Cologne banker who built it as his summer 
villa, served as the headquarters for the Ministry for Marshall Plan Affairs (Bundesministerium 
für Angelegenheiten des Marshallplanes) and then the Ministry for the Treasury. Its location in 
Bad Godesberg indicates that Bonn’s capital functions were already spilling beyond the city’s 
borders in the early years of the Federal Republic, and the Haus Carstanjen was far from the only 
such case. The Gallwitz-Kaserne and Troilo-Kaserne were both located in the village of 
Duisdorf, which bordered Bonn to the west, and many of the larger houses in Bad Godesberg’s 
Villa Quarter were acquired by foreign governments as embassies and ambassadorial residences. 
The United States took control of a 19th century villa, the Schloss Deichmannsaue (Figure 38), 
on the southern edge of Bad Godesberg, first as the headquarters of the Allied High 
Commissioner of Germany and then as the American Embassy. The fact that so many federal and 
international organs found homes outside of the technical seat of government was an 
unremarkable matter of expedience, but this government sprawl would become highly relevant to 
Bonn’s campaign in the 1960s to incorporate its neighbors.  
 The Federal President (Präsidialamt) and Chancellor (Kanzleramt), concomitant with 
their prominent roles in the new government, took over two neighboring 19th-century villas just 
south of the city center that served as both offices and residences and were conveniently located 
near the new Bundeshaus. President Theodor Heuss moved into Villa Hammerschmidt (Figure 
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39), a Neoclassical villa designed in 1860 by August Dieckhoff for a wealthy industrialist, and 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer settled in Palais Schaumburg (Figure 40), built at the same time as 
Villa Hammerschmidt and enlarged several times subsequently, most notably by Prince Adolf zu 
Schaumburg-Lippe. The Pedagogical Academy that had hosted the Parliamentary Council 
became the core of the Bundeshaus, which was the home of the newly constituted West German 
parliament comprising an upper chamber (Bundesrat) and lower chamber (Bundestag). Hans 
Schwippert’s 1949 renovations and additions, including the celebrated glass-walled plenary 
chamber (Figure 41), were some of the only new construction that greeted the federal 
government when it arrived in Bonn. The low-key Modernism of the original Academy and of 
Schwippert’s designs offered a fitting setting for a legislative body eager to position itself as a 
clean break from the horrific recent past. The extensive use of glass offered a small yet felicitous 
amount of literal transparency to a government that strove for functional and ideological 
transparency. However, as Deborah Ascher Barnstone’s analysis demonstrates, the interpretation 
of such formal features as demonstrative concrete symbols of West German democratic values 
requires an arbitrary overemphasis on a single formal aspect—the transparency of glass—and a 
reduction of the political relationship between citizens and their elected government to fleeting 
moments of visual contact across a glass screen.15 
 Within two years, however, the Bund had outgrown its secondhand quarters and begun an 
aggressive and expensive building campaign. Between 1951 and 1954, the Finance Ministry saw 
its campus around the Husaren-Kaserne enlarged by ten new buildings all designed and executed 
by the Federal Building Agency (see Fig 35). The Ministry for the Post and Telecommunications 
(Bundesministerium für Post und Telekommunikation) received an entirely new building 
designed by Josef Trimborn in 1953 and completed in 1954 (Figure 42). From 1954-56, the 
                                                            
15 Barnstone, The Transparent State, passim. 
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Federal Building Agency constructed new offices for the Federal Press and Information Office 
(Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung) on a plot adjacent to the Chancellery 
(Figure 43). Even though the designs of these buildings, inside and out, were rigorously 
utilitarian, their size and the speed with which they were conceived and executed already pointed 
to a Bonn Republic that was more than merely provisional.  
 The most dramatic indication in that direction during this early period was the 
construction of the Federal Foreign Office Building. The establishment of a West German 
Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) was a concrete marker of the country’s ascension to full 
sovereignty as it took control over its foreign affairs, but the ministry’s headquarters—which 
were designed by the Berlin architect Hans Freese after a nationwide architectural competition in 
195116—were one of the largest administrative complexes in the nation at the time of their 
completion in 1955. Freese’s design earned the pejorative nickname “House of a Thousand 
Windows” (“Haus der tausend Fenster”), and the scale was difficult to square with Bonn’s 
provisional status (see Fig. 2). That most of this new construction occurred in a relatively 
compact area south of Südstadt near the Bundeshaus, turning it into an incipient Federal District 
(Bundesviertel), only further suggested that the Bund was settling in for a more permanent stay. 
 Even with the new buildings coming on line in the mid-1950s, growth in the federal 
workforce far exceeded the available space in Bonn. In a cycle that even the most disciplined of 
modern governments would recognize, new office space facilitated a larger bureaucracy, which 
inevitably created a demand for more space. For example, the massive Federal Foreign Office 
building was already too small to accommodate the ministry’s entire workforce even before 
                                                            
16 Other entrants into the competition include a young Egon Eiermann and the early German 
Modernist, Otto Bartning. 
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construction began.17 At the local level, the presence of the federal government in Bonn meant 
that the capital suffered from an intensified version of the same dynamic playing out in other 
West German cities; the rapid postwar population growth that both accompanied and 
underpinned the “Economic Miracle” outpaced the capacity of local and state governments to 
expand services and improve infrastructure. However, the politics surrounding Bonn’s 
provisional status also intruded, exacerbating an already unfavorable set of conditions in the city 
and frustrating attempts to ameliorate their effects. 
 
The Building Freeze of 1956 
 
 In 1956, Bonn again found its legitimacy threatened in the Bundestag. The influential 
journalist and CDU legislator Gerd Bucerius initiated the action, but it found its greatest 
resonance with the SPD, whose members had overwhelmingly opposed the choice of Bonn in 
1949 and remained sympathetic to efforts to undermine it. Bucerius served both as Adenauer’s 
Commissioner for the Economic Advancement of Berlin (Bundesbeauftragter für die Förderung 
der Berliner Wirtschaft) and as the Chairman of the Berlin Committee in the Bundestag and 
genuinely supported efforts towards reunification. At the time, the Soviet policy of de-
Stalinization, combined with more convulsive events like the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, 
seemed to offer an opening for dramatic change, and Bucerius believed that moving the capital 
immediately to Berlin could catalyze greater political reconciliation between East and West 
                                                            
17 Memo by Konsul Lorz at the Foreign Office, October 3, 1952 (PA AA, B 111, Bd. 6). 
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Germany. The national press, led by Bucerius’ own Die Zeit newspaper, encouraged and 
amplified the appeal for a return to Berlin in frequent articles and columns.18  
 Bucerius’s initiative and the Cold War developments that prompted it brought the CDU 
Bundestag member into temporary alignment with the SPD’s agenda, which intertwined patriotic 
desires for reunification with more factional interests in undermining Bonn’s legitimacy. These 
latter found expression in an SPD-led investigation in the Bundestag into federal expenditures 
for accommodations in Bonn, the results of which were quite damaging to the city. At the time of 
Bonn’s application to become the provisional capital, the state government of North Rhine-
Westphalia guaranteed the city financial support to meet its new obligations. However, that 
support was estimated as a one-time investment of 3.8 million Deutschmarks. This modest 
figure, which made Bonn more attractive to the Council, almost immediately proved to be 
fantastically low, and by 1956 construction costs had spiraled to over DM 70 million.19 The vast 
discrepancy opened the door to insinuations of fraud and sustained demands that the Bund quit 
Bonn at the earliest opportunity. Frantic investigations by Chancellor Adenauer’s administration 
quickly revealed that a move to Berlin would be prohibitively costly and most likely proscribed 
by the treaties governing Berlin’s status as an occupied city. Nevertheless, the opening gave the 
SPD and its allies in the Bundestag the momentum they needed, and on October 3, 1956 they 
passed a resolution halting all new construction projects in Bonn. This prohibition was not 
repealed even once it became clear that moving the government to Berlin remained impossible.20 
 Moreover, the building freeze (Baustopp) in Bonn was not accompanied by a temporary 
halt in government hiring. This forced the Bund to move any expansion in its bureaucracy into 
                                                            
18 Ralf Dahrendorf, Liberal und unabhängig: Gerd Bucerius und seine Zeit (Munich: C.H. Beck, 
2000), 131-140. 
19 Uelzmann, 66. 
20 For a more in-depth discussion of the origins and history of the building freeze and its 
meaning in the context of Bonn’s development as the capital of West Germany, see Ibid., 76-99. 
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rented quarters, which had unintended adverse consequences for Bonn and the surrounding 
communities. With the Bund now adding enormous demand to a rental market with limited 
supply, rents soared, not only substantially raising costs for the government but also for any other 
business that leased office space in the city.21 The prospect of high rental income drew in 
commercial developers, who rapidly bought land and constructed office complexes, often solely 
for the purpose of leasing them to the federal government. The most prominent of these projects 
was the large development by the German insurance conglomerate Allianz built on a site 
adjacent to the Bundeshaus known locally as the Tulpenfeld (Tulip Field). Designed by the West 
German architect Hanns Dustmann and completed between 1964-1968, the complex centered 
around an 18-story high-rise and provided some 37,000 square meters of office space, virtually 
all of which was leased to the FRG (Figure 44). 
 For the first couple of years, the federal government adhered strictly to the building 
freeze,22 but by the beginning of the 1960s, federal planning officials in the Ministries of Finance 
and the Treasury slowly began to reintroduce proposals for new federal construction and, in 
apparent defiance of the law, win approval for them from the federal cabinet and Bundestag. The 
first major project to be executed as the government gradually retreated from the Baustopp was a 
new sprawling facility for the Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung) 
in Duisdorf. Its successful completion represents the power of necessity to overcome political 
hurdles and the quickly growing clout of the newly formed West German military, especially in 
                                                            
21 An article from May 1966 in Der Spiegel reports that the Bund’s annual rental costs nearly 
doubled between 1962 and 1966 from 2.4 million to 4.4 million Deutschmarks. Der Spiegel, 
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Letter from Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to Federal Minister for the Federal Patrimony 
Hermann Lindrath, April 8, 1958 (BArch, B 136/4670). 
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the context of the FRG’s entry into NATO. Its location on the outskirts of Bonn was a response 
both to a need for space and security concerns, but it also points to another negative consequence 
of the building freeze. The political and practical difficulties of large-scale development in the 
city of Bonn pushed federal planners to seek alternatives just across the city lines. The resulting 
haphazard and uncoordinated growth across the Bonn region was not directly under Bonn’s 
control, while still adding great pressure to the center’s infrastructure. 
 By the end of the 1950s, the apparent legal, political, and financial constraints on the 
Bund’s ability to suitably plan for and accommodate its workforce were beginning to severely 
threaten the efficient functioning of the legislature and administration. The resulting disarray 
redounded to Bonn’s detriment, for with its would-be primary planning partner so hamstrung, the 
city alone had neither the financial nor the administrative capacity to manage the region’s rapid 
transformation. Even as the impediments to building began to fall, the Bund found that Bonn’s 
extraordinary history—embedded deeply in the architecture and urban space of the city itself—
militated against the large-scale development that the federal bureaucracy desperately needed. 
Bonn’s medieval core and the immediately surrounding districts—which contained the city’s 
most important historical landmarks, however damaged by war—were already mostly claimed 
by older institutions and prior uses. This pushed the Bund further to the outskirts, where it used 
barracks and villas, two available and easily repurposed building types. However, Bonn’s 
postwar population growth pushed dense settlement into these outskirts—along with the 
attendant traffic, pollution, land speculation, and other modern inconveniences—at the same time 
that the federal government began planning large new parliamentary and ministerial campuses, 
including multiple high-rises, in those same places. Suddenly the presence of the federal 
government and its detrimental effects on the growing city were impossible to ignore.  
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 Bonn the university town, the gateway to the Romantic Rhine, the provincial retirement 
destination, seemed poised to become completely effaced by Bonn the national capital, and the 
local populace was unprepared for the scale or swiftness of the changes. The city pushed back in 
attempts to manage the transformation on some of its own terms, as well as to gain support for its 
own planning agenda and receive fair compensation for its losses. It encountered a Bund that, in 
quietly resuming building activity, tried to minimize exposure and the potential for conflict by 
moving that activity just outside of Bonn and putting its planning process behind closed doors. 
 The lack of local input and control in the face of growing problems, a changing cityscape, 
and a shifting identity were prime motives behind the actions taken by Bonn and its increasingly 
frustrated residents in the 1960s. The city’s first major initiative—the redrawing of its municipal 
borders to include its immediate neighbors on both sides of the Rhine—was only indirectly 
aimed at the Bund. In enlarging itself, Bonn primarily sought to gain the necessary planning 
authority in order to tackle the issues then plaguing the entire region, but one salutary effect of 
integration was that the newly enlarged municipal entity also finally had the political and legal 
leverage to force the federal government to meet its demands for assistance and an active role in 
the process. Bonn’s campaign for regional consolidation, however, came at the cost of alienating 
the outlying communities that were the targets of its ambitions, threatening them with the same 
kind of loss of local identity that Bonn feared suffering at the hands of the Bund. 
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Chapter 2: Making “Groß-Bonn”: Regional Planning and the Struggle to Redraw Bonn’s 
Municipal Borders, 1961-1969 
 
 Although it is not clear exactly when Bonn’s administrators first realized that expanding 
the city’s municipal borders could be an effective solution to its growing financial and urban 
planning problems, Bonn submitted its first application to incorporate all of the communities 
along its borders in September 1953. At that point, Bonn’s interest was only in annexing its two 
largest neighbors, Beuel and Bad Godesberg, and its motives were primarily economic. Fueled 
by explosive growth in the four years since becoming capital—there was never any doubt about 
the underlying reason for Bonn’s trajectory—the city’s municipal debt was 228 DM per capita 
and rising. Integrating Beuel and Bad Godesberg—both of which were in a much stronger 
financial position at the time—was a straightforward way to reduce that burden.1 Yet neither city 
reciprocated Bonn’s interest in the idea, and the proposal would lie fallow for nearly a decade. In 
the 1960s, when Bonn re-launched its campaign to incorporate outlying communities—this time 
gathering momentum from a growing chorus of supporters—the neighboring cities remained 
unreceptive, and even became openly hostile to any suggestion of integration. 
  Regional integration may have made economic sense for Bonn from a very early point, 
but the city’s increasingly unmanageable problems across the entire spectrum of its planning 
responsibilities made a merger seem more and more like the only sufficient solution. The 
building freeze of 1956 and the havoc it wreaked for Bonn and Bund alike and the slow, quiet 
actions that the Bund took to skirt around the moratorium drove Bonn in the early 1960s to begin 
to make the case for incorporation in much greater detail and with much greater urgency. 
Achieving Bonn’s objective, which quickly expanded beyond the incorporation of Beuel and 
                                                
1 Robert Strobel, “In Bonn wächst alles in die Enge,” Die Zeit, November 19, 1953. 
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Bad Godesberg to include the collection of smaller villages and towns along the city’s border, as 
well as a complete reorganization of the area at the county (Kreis) level, required legal and 
legislative action by the Minister-President (Ministerpräsident) of North Rhine-Westphalia and 
the state’s parliament (Landtag). This would take nearly a decade of constant proposals and 
counterproposals, careful coalition building, and public dialogue. 
 Bonn was placed in the somewhat ironic position of trying to colonize its neighbors as a 
way to forestall its own colonization at the hands of the Bund. Bad Godesberg and the other 
towns resisted, fearing not only the end of local self-government, but also that Bonn would co-
opt their commercial activity, shift resources away from their communities, and trample on their 
traditional character. For both sides, the fear that the cities would lose their physical and 
historical character amid the changes—and disaffection with the distinctly modernist shape of 
those changes—was tied directly to the residents’ sense of local identity. Bad Godesberg saw its 
identity as a provincial spa town being completely erased as it became merely a district of its 
larger neighbor, and Bonn saw its identity as a picturesque university town being completely 
subsumed by its new position as the West German capital. In Bonn’s case, its fears had already 
been made manifest in the sale of the Gronau for the purposes of a quickly rising skyscraper (see 
Chapter 3). 
 When the so-called “Bonn Act” (Bonn-Gesetz)2 finally passed on May 13, 1969 and went 
into effect on August 1, the effect on the city and its relationship with the federal government 
was immediate and profound. The consequence of the law for the political geography of Bonn 
and the surrounding region was dramatic consolidation. In a stroke, Bonn roughly doubled its 
population to almost 300,000, but it more than quadrupled its territory from 31 square kilometers 
                                                
2 The full title of the law was “Gesetz zur kommunalen Neugliederung des Raumes Bonn.” 
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to approximately 140 square kilometers. It incorporated the towns of Beuel and Bad Godesberg 
along with the smaller villages on its western and northern borders, Buschdorf, Duisdorf, 
Ippendorf, Lengsdorf, Lessenich, and Röttgen, which had previously belonged to the 
intercommunal district (Amt) of Duisdorf. The newly created Greater Bonn (Groß-Bonn) 
remained independent (kreisfrei) from the surrounding county, but a single entity, Rhein-Sieg-
Kreis, replaced the two counties, Landkreis Bonn and Siegkreis, which had previously been 
separated by the Rhine. All told, ninety-six communities were reduced to a mere twenty 
following the municipal consolidations implemented under the Bonn Act (Figure 45).  
 The law also temporarily dissolved local governments and administrations until new 
elections could be held to reconstitute municipal councils and offices based on the new political 
map. For Bonn, the state government in Düsseldorf appointed Franz Meyer, the Minister-
President of NRW from 1958-1966, to serve in a custodial role until a new city council could be 
seated. This caesura in local governance, although brief, came at a crucial moment for federal 
planning in the city. The Bund was on the verge of finalizing the second phase of a project with 
Bad Godesberg that envisioned seven high-rise office towers along the city’s northern edge and 
would have gone a long way towards solving the federal government’s space shortage while also 
radically changing the urban character of the city. However, as described in Chapter 4, the new 
political geographical alignment forced federal and municipal planners to retrace many of their 
steps for the project. When Meyer, Bonn’s temporary steward, took unilateral action to maintain 
the momentum of reorganization, the move was disastrous for the Bund, which was 
simultaneously experiencing its most dramatic political upheaval since 1949 with the election of 
its first SPD Chancellor, Willy Brandt. 
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 The reorganization of the Bonn region was controversial, particularly in the wealthy and 
economically vital communities of Beuel and Bad Godesberg, but it was far from unique. The 
creation of Groß-Bonn and Rhein-Sieg-Kreis occurred in the context of a decade-long wave of 
local government reorganization (Gebietsreform) across North Rhine-Westphalia and the other 
states of the Federal Republic beginning at the end of the 1960s.3 These regional reforms, almost 
all of which led to the significant consolidation of villages and communities, were intended to 
streamline a cumbersome patchwork of local jurisdictions that was a legacy of earlier, mostly 
19th-century reforms, and the issues involved were similar across the country. Rapid population 
and economic growth, along with the reconstruction and expansion of rail and road networks in 
the 1950s, triggered greater integration at the local level between neighboring communities and 
especially between larger cities and their suburbs. Integration meant sharing the benefits of 
economic growth, but it also meant sharing the stresses and strains of that growth, such as 
demand for municipal services that outstripped supply and increased traffic from commuters. 
The multitudes of small municipal administrations and planning departments were neither 
equipped to tackle such intercommunal developments nor were the myriad available forms of 
legal coordination and cooperation adequate for the kinds of long-term, large-scale, and often 
expensive investments that the growing towns and regions required. Regional reorganization and 
consolidation established communities that were in stronger economic positions, with larger, 
better staffed planning departments, and, crucially, the legal authority to devise and carry out the 
measures necessary to equip their territories with adequate infrastructure and services. The same 
                                                
3 In the NRW alone between 1967 and 1976, sixty-one such Gebietsreform laws were passed. 
Ministerium für Inneres und Kommunales des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rechtsportal, 
https://recht.nrw.de/lmi/owa/br_bes?anw_nr=2&gld_nr=2&ugl_id=664&aufgehoben=N 
(accessed April 27, 2015). 
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dynamic held for Bonn, and proponents of integrating Bad Godesberg, Beuel, and other towns 
into the capital made the case for it in similar terms.  
 
The Effects of the Bund on City Planning in the Capital 
 
 The presence of the federal government was having a profound impact on the pace and 
nature of urban growth in Bonn, and so the Bund naturally figured into the arguments both for 
and against regional integration. With Bonn’s selection as the seat of the West German federal 
government in 1949, legislators and bureaucrats were not the only arrivals. The Bund attracted 
numerous ancillary organizations—foreign delegations, trade groups, and lobbyists, to name a 
few—that both supported and subsisted on governmental activity. Thus, the extraordinary growth 
experienced across the FRG in the postwar era came earlier and more intensely to Bonn than to 
other cities, and the distortions and stresses that it caused were much more severe. By 1955, 
Bonn’s population was already 139,201, a nearly forty percent increase over its prewar high in 
1939, and Bad Godesberg’s population had grown by a whopping eighty-eight percent to 
57,245.4 In comparison, although it grew substantially from wartime lows, Cologne’s population 
over the same period was still well below its 1939 level while the nearby cities Dortmund and 
Essen had only eclipsed their prewar population by around eleven percent each.5  
 The growth in Bonn had the further complication that a significant portion of new arrivals 
to the city were transitory, such as Bundestag members who returned to their home districts when 
                                                
4 Table 4, “Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung von 1871 bis 1961,” appended to Cologne District 
President Franz Grobben, “Stellungnahme des Regierungspräsident in Köln zur Neugestaltung 
des Bonner Raumes,” March 8, 1963 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/186). 
5 Statistics drawn from Jeffry M. Diefendorf, In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German 
Cities After World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 127. 
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parliament was not in session or embassy employees assigned to the city for a fixed term. These 
impermanent residents presented a problem for local planners trying to determine future needs 
for services and housing, and even as they carried out the quotidian business of making Bonn 
into a national capital, they held little stake in contributing to or protecting the local identities 
that their very presence was beginning to threaten.  
 The federal government quickly consumed virtually all of Bonn’s available residential 
and office space, and the city’s roads, utilities, schools, and other services could not keep pace. 
Furthermore, Bonn’s provisional status discouraged the kinds of integrative and holistic planning 
measures and infrastructure creation that might have mitigated or prevented the problems that 
began plaguing the city and lowering the quality of life to the point that its population actually 
began shrinking in the early 1960s.6 The space shortages within Bonn drove people and 
development into the suburbs, a particularly vexing trend for Bonn’s city planners, who could do 
little more than watch while the Bund planned massive installations just across city lines, paying 
scant attention to broader urban planning concerns and imposing on towns that were even less 
well equipped to accommodate the growth in population and demand for services that came with 
it.  
 The Bund’s presence was drawing the entire region into a planning crisis. As regional 
reorganization became a centerpiece of Bonn’s response, the most often rehearsed justifications 
for extending Bonn’s borders revolved around improving the quality of life for the city and 
region’s residents: expanding roads and transit networks to improve connectivity and reduce 
traffic, improving sewer and water provision systems, preserving green space and protecting the 
                                                
6 Table 3, “Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung von 1955 bis 1962,” appended to Cologne District 
President Franz Grobben, “Stellungnahme des Regierungspräsident in Köln zur Neugestaltung 
des Bonner Raumes,” March 8, 1963 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/186). 
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environment, and increasing the housing supply. It would also help solve more prosaic problems, 
such as the fact that telephone calls between Bonn and Bad Godesberg were considered to be 
long-distance while they were two separate cities. Bonn’s leaders argued, ultimately with 
success, that expanding the city’s territory to include that of its neighbors would give its planners 
the legal authority and the financial resources via an expanded tax base to execute such 
measures. In making its case for incorporating the neighboring communities, city officials turned 
a harsh spotlight on the federal government and its clear and singular role in the city’s chaotic 
development and mounting difficulties. Acknowledging the Bund’s transformative role in Bonn 
initiated another, related discussion regarding the function of Bonn as a capital city, its role in 
representing the nation, and the relationship between a capital and a national government. 
 For local officials and planners, this discussion would significantly shift their 
assumptions surrounding these fraught issues, and altered assumptions brought with them 
different expectations and demands from the federal government. Critically, in the emerging 
discourse on the meaning of Bonn as the capital, the concept of the provisional assumed a new, 
diminished position, as Bonn’s planners rightfully began to identify Bonn’s provisional status as 
a major contributing factor behind the inadequate planning and resources that the Bund had put 
into the city during its first decade as capital. One of the earliest observers to make this argument 
was the West German journalist, Wolfgang Höpker, who published a scathing review of city 
planning in Bonn in the September 1960 issue of the national journal, Der Monat.7 Höpker 
accused the municipal and federal politicians in Bonn of using the provisional as an excuse to 
abdicate any responsibility for Bonn’s health, leading to a city that poorly served its residents and 
                                                
7 The American journalist and intellectual Melvin Lasky founded Der Monat in Berlin in 1948 
with Marshall Plan funds as a staunchly anti-communist literary and political journal. It was later 
revealed that the magazine received funding from the United States Central Intelligence Agency. 
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its national government. He rejected incorporation as a solution and suggested instead that the 
regional administrations collaborate within the bounds of planning law.8 The force of his 
arguments struck a nerve with Bonn’s planners, who circulated the article within the City 
Planning Office as an appendix to a draft of their earliest application for the incorporation of six 
communities in Amt Duisdorf.9 
 Höpker’s article was also prescient, for a year later events on the Cold War stage caught 
up with local circumstances in Bonn to cast overwhelming doubt on the wisdom of continuing to 
treat Bonn as a provisional capital. The construction of the Berlin Wall by the GDR in August 
1961 opened a new chapter in the relationship between East and West Germany and indefinitely 
suspended any prospect for reunification. The impact on attitudes towards Bonn was felt 
immediately at all levels; three days after the enclosure of West Berlin, Chancellor Adenauer 
stated that he wanted to make Bonn “one of the most beautiful capitals in Europe.”10 Even 
though politicians would continue to invoke Bonn’s provisional status throughout the 1960s as 
justification for their opposition to federal building projects, it became more and more of a 
shibboleth detached from political reality. With such a pronouncement from the Chancellor, 
planners at the federal and municipal level very quickly ceased to acknowledge the provisional 
as a legitimate guiding principle for the city’s development.  
                                                
8 Incorporation was too statist for Höpker, who developed his center-right political instincts 
through associations with Gustav Stressemann’s German People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei) 
during the Weimar Republic. Wolfgang Höpker, “Hauptstadt auf Widerruf: Bonn — oder das 
Provisoriumm als Ausflucht,” Der Monat, September, 1960, 20-28. 
9 The six communities were Buschdorf, Duisdorf, Ippendorf, Lengsdorf, Lessenich, and Röttgen. 
Bonn City Planning Office, Draft of “Unterlagen für eine Raumordnung im Bereiche der 
Bundeshauptstadt Bonn,” August 1961 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/214). 
10 Chancellor Adenauer quoted in Der Spiegel, “Hauptstadt-Planung: Apolis bei Rhöndorf,” 
September 13, 1961, 37. 
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 Local officials pressed the argument that it was in the Bund’s best interests to support 
healthy, long-term urban development in its capital city and furthermore that the Bund had a 
responsibility to provide material and political aid to its municipal host. Federal officials were 
just as quick to shift their expectations, and even with the building freeze still technically in 
effect, the Chancellor’s pronouncement coincided with several major regional planning 
initiatives from the Bund, as federal planners refocused their attention on fulfilling the 
government’s long-neglected space requirements. However, the primary objective of enlarging 
and rationalizing federal infrastructure in Bonn colored any presumptions of responsibility on the 
part of the Bund towards the city as such, and the resulting gap in expectations became a 
significant source of friction in federal-municipal relations. So long as the region remained 
fragmented, and federal planners could look across Bonn’s city lines for suitable development 
sites, Bonn had little leverage with which to force the Bund to acknowledge any responsibility 
toward the city. In the context of the regional planning debate, there were federal officials who 
saw the deteriorating conditions in the region and the increasing tensions between Bonn and its 
neighbors as a threat to the Bund’s plans and the well-being of its workforce, and they advocated 
for more proactive involvement in the capital’s affairs. However, the greater consensus among 
federal officials was that the Bund had little to gain and risked a great deal through seeking to 
participate in the various regional planning organizations and associations that the municipalities 
were proposing, and they relied on political and legal pretenses to avoid taking a stance on the 
issue. 
 In addition to the city’s growing debt and strained infrastructure and services, the Bund’s 
ambitious building agenda, which emerged in 1961 in a series of discussions between federal, 
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state, and local officials,11 also helped thrust regional reorganization to the top of Bonn’s agenda. 
The Bund’s proposals, which included new ministry buildings across the region, a new bridge 
over the Rhine in southern Bonn or northern Bad Godesberg, and the underground burial of the 
federal rail line passing through the city, seemed to offer coherent, long-term solutions for both 
the lack of federal office space and for several of the region’s growing planning problems. Local 
officials from both Bonn and its neighbors welcomed the federal engagement in regional 
planning, but the scope of the proposals raised difficult questions regarding the division of 
financial responsibility and practical control amongst the affected communities and the state and 
federal governments. In the context of these major construction or regional planning proposals 
that originated with the Bund, all parties seemed content with the suggestion of forming formal 
Working Groups (Arbeitsgemeinschaft) composed of representatives from each stakeholder as 
the best way to coordinate the initiatives.12 
 
The First Regional Reform Proposals 
 
 Bonn’s City Planning Office advocated the creation of Working Groups in its subsequent 
regional planning proposal, but in one case it also went beyond this compromise approach. The 
three-stage regional plan from August 1961 included establishing a planning Working Group 
                                                
11 The two most extensive and widely attended meetings took place in Cologne on January 30, 
1961 and at the Finance Ministry in Bonn on July 7, 1961. Meeting Minutes, January 31, 1961 
and July 12, 1961, respectively (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/171). 
12 The working group option was proposed by Heinz Langer, an official in the NRW’s Ministry 
for Regional Planning, Housing, and Public Works (Ministerium für Landesplanung, 
Wohnungsbau, und öffentliche Arbeiten) at a June 22, 1961 meeting between Langer, Wolfgang 
Leuschner of the Treasury Ministry’s Building Department, and Günter Schubert of Bonn’s City 
Planning Office and seconded by Bad Godesberg’s City Manager, Fritz Brüse, in the larger 
federal planning meeting on July 7, 1961. Meeting Minutes, June 23, 1961 and July 12, 1961, 
respectively (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/171). 
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with Beuel and Bad Godesberg and a Special Planning Committee (Sonderplanungsausschuß) 
with the surrounding counties, Landkreis Bonn and Siegkreis. It also proposed the immediate 
incorporation of the six villages in Amt Duisdorf.13 Bonn framed its justification for annexing 
Buschdorf, Duisdorf, Ippendorf, Lengsdorf, Lessenich, and Röttgen in largely altruistic terms: it 
provided the means for these small municipalities to manage adequately their rapid growth. 
However, the focus on the smaller villages was also strategic. In 1961, Duisdorf was already 
home to several ministries, including Economics, Food, Agriculture, and Forests, and Labor and 
Social Affairs, all of which were the subject of expansion plans, while at the same time the Bund 
was planning a sprawling new development for the Ministry of Defense. The Defense installation 
was particularly galling because of its apparent haphazard conception and its lack of 
consideration for the landscape and other city-planning concerns.14 Duisdorf was under the most 
immediate threat of unwieldy overdevelopment, and its annexation would give Bonn’s planners 
the ability to halt the Bund’s plans or at least modify those plans to the city’s benefit. Despite 
these efforts, the Defense Ministry was completed according to the Bund’s wishes and expanded 
several times during the 1960s. It became an important negative reference point for Bonn’s 
planners as they continued to build their case for regional reorganization. 
 Two months later, in a speech to the City Council, the leader of the Council’s majority 
CDU faction, Robert Streck, made it clear that the city’s regional planning policy would be one 
of integration, not collaboration. The speech was markedly vague on numerous points, including 
the conditions that were making integration necessary, the causes of those conditions, and the 
                                                
13 Bonn City Planning Office Assistant Klaus Martin, Notes from August 1, 1961 Meeting 
between Bonn City Planning Office and officials from the NRW Interior Ministry, August 2, 
1961 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/214). 
14 Bonn Director of Building Günter Schubert, Memo regarding the Bund’s plans for the 
Ministry of Defense in the Hardtberg, December 14, 1961 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/171). 
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specific structure of any merger. But once Streck stated, “[t]he Bonn region must be consolidated 
through the ‘integration’ of all of the individual communities that are dependent on each other … 
economically, in terms of transportation, and culturally … under an agency that represents and 
enforces the unified will of the entire region in these matters,”15 there was no turning back for the 
city. 
 Despite certain ambiguities in Streck’s declaration, the reaction of Bonn’s neighbors 
demonstrates that they took it as the opening salvo in an attack on their sovereignty and that the 
“agency” (Organ) to which Streck referred could only mean Bonn’s own municipal 
administration. The state government in Düsseldorf asserted that municipal borders should not be 
changed. Fritz Brüse, Bad Godesberg’s City Manager, insisted that the region’s problems could 
only be solved through cooperation that preserved the independence of every municipality. Hans-
Josef Bost (CDU), mayor of Amt Duisdorf, objected in the strongest terms, charging that Bonn 
had done nothing but “complain and think of itself” (gejammert und an sich gedacht) without 
any constructive effort at solving its problems through cooperation.16  
 With all its neighbors and the state government aligned against any form of integration, 
no matter how vaguely defined, the political environment for achieving Bonn’s aims was far 
from conducive. Nevertheless, the city pressed ahead, making its case in earnest by inviting 
North Rhine-Westphalia’s Minister-President, Franz Meyers, and the Cologne District President 
(Regierungspräsident), Franz Grobben,17 to a meeting on December 20, 1961 in Bonn where 
                                                
15 Bonn City Councillor Robert Streck, Speech to Bonn City Council on October 26, 1961, 
reprinted in Bonner-Rundschau, November 11, 1961. 
16 All commentary on Streck’s speech taken from General-Anzeiger, “Nachbargemeinden gene 
Schwarzen Peter zurück,” October 28-29, 1961. 
17 The state of North Rhine-Westphalia is subdivided into five districts (Regierungsbezirk), with 
Bonn located in the Cologne District. The districts have no legislative powers and deal primarily 
with administrative issues between their constituent cities and counties. 
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Mayor Wilhelm Daniels and Bonn’s city planning leaders offered their arguments in person. In a 
series of methodical presentations in the august space of Bonn’s Old City Hall, the city’s 
representatives aimed to convince the state authorities that redrawing Bonn’s boundaries was the 
only suitable option.18 The arguments would become far more detailed and elaborate in 
subsequent iterations, but this early outline already presented all of the key arguments in support 
of consolidation as well as the final form of Bonn’s proposal for integration, on which the city 
would offer no compromise. 
 The presentations focused on the regional issues that were most pressing for the area’s 
residents at the time: housing and transportation. Franz Schmidt, Bonn’s City Manager, noted 
that the arrival of the Bund and all of the attendant institutions had displaced housing in Bonn to 
the point that there was virtually no more available space for residential development within the 
city’s borders. Ludwig Marx, Bonn’s City Planning Director (Stadtbaudirektor) asserted that 
solving the city’s transportation problems would require no less than two new bridges over the 
Rhine, a new beltway around the city, and the burial of the train tracks, which would create more 
land for development on the surface. Furthermore, Marx asserted that housing development in 
the suburbs and transportation planning must be closely coordinated to ensure that people were 
settled along transportation routes. Another city planning official, Dr. Berndt, proceeded to 
explain why alternative solutions involving some form of legal intercommunal cooperation were 
insufficient. Working Groups were restricted to an advisory role without any authority to initiate 
or steer projects on their own. Public Law Agreements between communities (öffentlich-
rechtliche Vereinbarung) were too weak because all parties held veto power over any proposal. 
Special Purpose Associations (Zweckverband) were useful only for discrete, well-defined 
                                                
18 Minutes from the meeting between NRW Minister-President Franz Meyers and Bonn’s City 
Administration, December 20, 1961 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/214). 
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projects and not for the kind of long-range, comprehensive planning that city planners in Bonn 
envisioned for the region. Special Planning Committees and so-called Planning Associations 
(Planungsverband), which had authority to develop region-wide plans and coordinate 
transportation development, were preferable to Working Groups, Public Law Agreements, and 
Special Purpose Associations, but such associations still did not have the legal power to execute 
the plans that they developed and they required a cumbersome and expensive administrative 
apparatus.19  
 For Bonn’s leaders, it seemed that any agreement under which the city had to share 
planning authority would be either too weak or too narrowly empowered, and the only way to 
extend Bonn’s unilateral authority was by enlarging the city. On this issue, Berndt offered a 
compromise structural framework for the intended regional reorganization that Bonn hoped 
would allay its neighbors’ fears regarding the loss of autonomy. Instead of incorporation or 
annexation (Eingemeindung), Berndt proposed the creation of an overarching community with 
administrative districts, alternatively called a Gesamtgemeinde mit Verwaltungsbezirke or 
Großgemeinde. Rather than Bonn taking over Bad Godesberg or any other town, all communities 
would give up their independence in order to reform as a single municipality with a completely 
new administrative structure.20 The towns and cities would become constituent districts, keeping 
their borders and retaining some administrative autonomy, such as pertaining to cultural life, and 
thus would ostensibly be able to maintain and nurture distinct identities. Bonn could claim to be 
surrendering its sovereignty in equal measure to its neighbors for the greater good of the entire 
                                                
19 Ibid. For a more exhaustive list of the legal options available to Bonn, see Bonn City Planning 




region, and in sharing the sacrifice, the city aimed to defuse claims that its proposal was nothing 
more than a power grab. 
 In closing the meeting, Mayor Daniels endorsed Berndt’s idea and offered several 
supplementary points in its defense. First, he noted that the total population of the united 
communities would be greater than that of Bonn, and thus Bonn would not necessarily be a 
dominant force in the newly created city. This may have seemed pedantic, but proportional 
representation for Bad Godesberg, Beuel, and the other towns on the City Council became an 
important negotiating point as Bonn neared an agreement on redrawing its borders. Second, 
Daniels pointed to the expansion and reorganization of Berlin into Greater Berlin in 1920, when 
the city absorbed Charlottenburg, Neukölln, Spandau, and a host of other previously independent 
towns and unincorporated territory in the Province of Brandenburg, as a model for Bonn. 
Drawing attention to Berlin was always a risky idea in the provisional capital, but the creation of 
Greater Berlin was perhaps the best historical example of Bonn’s current proposal. Finally, the 
mayor asserted that, in its current condition, Bonn gave the impression to observers that the 
Federal Republic was incapable of establishing an appropriate capital city and thus reflected 
poorly on the Bund’s image inside and outside of West Germany. Doubling the city’s size to 
300,000 people would quickly allay doubts regarding Bonn’s legitimacy.21 Thus, Daniels 
appealed to the vanity of state representatives while also claiming a positive connection between 
the state of the capital and the reputation of the nation, a link that Bonn would continue to 
proclaim and exploit in the coming years. 
 Bonn’s first official articulation of its vision for its future was met with a barrage of 
critical reactions in the local press during the following days and months. In an interview with 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
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the Bonner Rundschau the day after his meeting with Bonn officials, NRW Minister-President 
Meyers was decidedly guarded, stating that the situation needed much more study before he 
could endorse a particular solution and insisting that Berlin was certainly not a useful 
comparison. He also pointed out that the legal bar for redrawing community boundaries was 
extremely high, requiring not only the demonstration of urgent public interest but also the 
acquiescence of the residents of the affected communities.22 Meyers’ circumspection was the 
most positive official public response that Bonn’s proposal received, but his insistence that the 
process would take time was a clear rebuke to local officials, who viewed their city as already 
beyond the crisis point and who were technically still awaiting action by the state on the 1953 
application to incorporate Bad Godesberg and Beuel.  
 In their public responses, officials at different levels of West German government—
excluding those representing Bonn—unequivocally rejected Bonn’s proposal. This 
overwhelming opposition reframed the public debate, shifting it away from efforts to solve the 
region’s pressing planning problems and constructing it in binary terms that seemed to pit Bonn 
unfavorably against the democratic principles of the FRG. Writing in the Bonner Rundschau, 
Georg Kliesing (CDU), the Bundestag member representing neighboring Siegkreis, declared that 
the difference between incorporation and Bonn’s proposition to eliminate all previous territorial 
distinctions and found an entirely new metropolis was “completely negligible” (vollig 
unwesentlich). Kliesing then defended the status quo: “[t]he maintenance of local self-
government and the preservation of the greatest possible number of small and mid-sized 
communities is of higher national political importance for the strengthening of the democratic 
                                                
22 Bonner Rundschau, “Ministerpräsident Dr. Meyers zu Fragen kommunale Neuordnung: ‘Mit 
leichter Hand anfassen,’” December 21, 1961. 
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consciousness in our people.”23 Bad Godesberg’s City Mananger Brüse also dismissed Bonn’s 
proposal as incorporation by another name, claiming that Bonn would hold a substantial majority 
of seats in the resulting city council and thus would be free to impose its will unilaterally on the 
combined city.24 Even though Bonn’s plan was structurally and legally distinct from 
incorporation and had a successful historical model in Berlin, through repetition opponents were 
able to win the semantic battle and make “incorporation” the standard term to denote any 
proposal to change municipal borders.  
 Eingemeindung was a far simpler concept than Bonn’s proposal for a Gesamtgemeinde, 
and to the extent that the former implied the complete subjugation of the community being 
incorporated, it made for an easy straw man against which to rally strident opposition. Against 
incorporation, officials posed the concept of self-government (Selbstverwaltung). In the wake of 
the National Socialist dictatorship and with an awareness of the totalitarianism of the Soviet 
Union and its satellites, West Germans viewed the right of every community to control its own 
affairs to the greatest extent possible as a bulwark against centralized autocratic rule. They 
enshrined this principle in the West German Basic Law, reaffirmed it in the Constitution of 
North-Rhine Westphalia, and further reinforced it in the Federal Building Law of 1960. With 
such a popular and unimpeachable doctrine deployed in rhetorical battle against an act that 
appeared so inimical to it, the specifics of Bonn’s circumstances and the relative merits of the 
various options on the table for ameliorating them faded from the discussion. For example, Paul 
Lücke, the Federal Minister for Housing, Urban Development, and Regional Planning 
(Bundesminister für Wohnungswesen, Städtebau, und Raumordnung), explicitly rejected 
                                                
23 Georg Kliesing, “Großgemeinde Bonn oder Planungsverband?,” Bonner Rundschau, January 
5, 1962. 
24 Bonner Rundschau, “Klares Nein gegen Bonn-Plan,” February 7, 1962. 
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incorporation, not because it was an inferior solution for regional planning problems, but because 
it violated the “… basic principle of self-government, on which our democracy rests …”25  
 With the debate confined to Eingemeindung versus Selbstverwaltung it was difficult for 
Bonn officials to gain any traction with their counterparts in neighboring administrations, the 
neighboring publics, or state officials in Cologne and Düsseldorf. The emotional resonance of 
appeals to protect political autonomy immediately blunted Bonn’s more practical arguments for 
reform, which concerned municipal service provision, land use, housing development, and 
enlarging the tax base. Underlying the aggressive assertions of political and administrative 
independence was the heartfelt concern to preserve cultural autonomy, local historical character, 
economic well-being, and the ability of a tight-knit community to continue to shape its own 
identity into the future. In rejecting incorporation, the Bad Godesberg Mayor, Heinrich 
Hopmann, described his vision for the city in largely cultural terms. He wanted to strengthen the 
city’s traditional associations as a spa town by increasing the number of spa facilities while also 
forging a new identity, based on the presence of numerous embassies within its borders, as a city 
of diplomats and international meetings and congresses.26 
 
The Grobben Plan 
 
 In March 1963, in an attempt to solve the regional planning riddle, District President 
Franz Grobben broke the stasis with the unveiling of his “Statement by the District President in 
Cologne on the Reorganization of the Bonn Region,” which quickly became known as the 
                                                
25 Quoted in General Anzeiger, “Bundeshauptstadt könnte noch erheblich wachsen,” December 
29, 1962. 
26 Bonner Rundschau, “Bad Godesberg soll kein ‘Bonner Bezirk werden,” November 10, 1962. 
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“Grobben Plan.”27 Grobben’s report and recommendations were by far the most thorough and 
detailed to be produced so far, and he appended to the main document numerous tables 
presenting the relevant demographic and economic data and trends behind his analysis, as well as 
maps representing the various options under consideration. He even included a complete draft of 
a statute for implementing his proposals. The plan was up-front in its call for immediate and 
sweeping reforms across the entire region, but it attempted to bridge the chasm between 
respecting local autonomy absolutely and Bonn’s desire for completely centralized control over 
the capital region’s planning affairs. This involved the recognition that the region’s current 
political geography was counterproductive to large-scale, long-term, and integrated planning, and 
the “Grobben Plan” included the limited redrawing of community borders and the incorporation 
of several communities into Bonn. The “Grobben Plan” represented a major step forward in 
solving the regional planning conundrum, but in trying to forge a third way, the District President 
satisfied almost none of the affected communities. Ultimately, the “Grobben Plan” failed to rally 
sufficient support, and the Bonn region’s planning problems would remain unresolved for several 
more years. 
 Grobben identified the Bund as the primary driver of the region’s unmanageable growth 
in the postwar era, but in doing so he indicated that the region had a responsibility to provide a 
functional urban site for the federal administration and parliament. The need to fulfill this 
responsibility became the basis and guiding principle behind Grobben’s regional reforms. He 
criticized the previously suggested planning organizations as too impotent (Arbeitsgemeinschaft), 
too narrow (Zweckverband), or too unwieldy (Planungsverband), but his objections to Bonn’s 
proposal to reconstruct the region as a single new municipal entity struck a very different tone. 
                                                
27 Cologne District President Franz Grobben, “Stellungnahme des Regierungspräsident in Köln 
zur Neugestaltung des Bonner Raumes,” March 8, 1963 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/186). 
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Grobben asserted that community life might suffer in the former towns with the loss of financial 
independence and that consolidation would exacerbate a growing trend towards urbanization and 
the alienation of mostly rural suburbs from a monolithic urban core, while disregarding the 
principle of self-government. Instead, Grobben emphasized Bonn’s provisional character and 
deference to Berlin as reasons to prevent the doubling of the city’s population through the 
expansion of its borders. He insisted that the creation of Groß-Bonn, and in the image of Groß-
Berlin no less, would be a direct challenge to the meaning of the erstwhile capital.28  
 Although Mayor Daniels’ reference to Berlin was the most appropriate available 
comparison, the analogy appeared to have backfired. It invited opponents to declare Bonn’s 
provisional status a relevant counterargument to consolidation, a point that had previously gone 
unmentioned. It is no coincidence that in the wake of the Grobben Plan, Bonn’s position vis-a-vis 
Berlin appeared with much greater frequency in both official discussions and press coverage as a 
justification for opposing the city’s expansion plans. Willi Weyer, the NRW Minister of the 
Interior who would ultimately become a major supporter of regional integration, put the 
provisionality argument in blunt terms: “I find it politically not credible to speak of the old 
capital city and to keep the goal of German reunification in sight while founding a kind of 
second capital city here in Bonn.”29 In its official statement on the Grobben Plan, Bad Godesberg 
devoted as much attention to accusing Bonn of attempting to usurp Berlin’s place in Germany as 
to decrying the negative effects of the city’s proposals on Bad Godesberg’s functional and 
                                                
28 Grobben, “Stellungnahme des Regierungspräsident in Köln zur Neugestaltung des Bonner 
Raumes.” 
29 NRW Minister of the Interior Willi Weyer quoted in General-Anzeiger, “Weyer: ‘Keine 
zweite Hauptstadt,” May 1, 1963. 
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political independence.30 It is no coincidence that comparisons to Berlin disappeared from 
Bonn’s subsequent appeals for regional reorganization, to be replaced by other, less 
inflammatory examples from West German regional planning. 
 Grobben based his final recommendations on a few fundamental criteria. The area to be 
included under any regional planning agreement should be no larger than absolutely necessary, 
but it should incorporate all those communities with a direct stake in the outcome, and the 
agreement should establish a limited number of equal partners capable of negotiations. Thus, 
Grobben proposed creating a unique form of Zweckverband comprising five municipalities: 
Menden, Duisdorf, Beuel, Bad Godesberg, and Bonn. Beuel and Bad Godesberg remained 
unchanged in this arrangement, but the cities of Menden and Duisdorf had to be created by 
statutes combining the independent towns within Amt Menden31 and Amt Duisdorf, respectively, 
into a Gesamtgemeinde along the same lines that Bonn was proposing for itself. Furthermore, 
Duisdorf would also see significant parts of the communities along its border with Bonn— 
Buschdorf, Ippendorf, Lessenich, Duisdorf, and Lengsdorf—separated and incorporated into the 
capital.32 
 The union comprising the five communities would not conform to the legal definition of 
Zweckverband that was already available, but would be something sui generis. Labeled a 
Regional Authority (Regionalverband), it would combine the Zweckverband’s power to carry out 
discrete, pre-defined tasks with the capabilities of a Planungsverband to create and execute 
larger-scale integrated planning measures, such as zoning and development plans and the 
                                                
30 City of Bad Godesberg, “Stellungnahme der Stadt Bad Godesberg zur Ordnung des Bonner 
Raums,” May 1963 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/186). 
31 Amt Menden borders Beuel to the east. After the reorganization of 1969, it became the city of 
Sankt Augustin. 
32 Grobben, “Stellungnahme des Regierungspräsident in Köln zur Neugestaltung des Bonner 
Raumes.” 
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coordination of transportation and schools. The group would vote on all measures, and each of 
the five members would receive votes proportional to their population. In order to guard against 
Bonn and Bad Godesberg forming a coalition with an unbreakable majority, non-members 
Siegkreis and Landkreis Bonn would also receive votes, a two-thirds super-majority would be 
required to override opposition to a decision, and Bonn’s maximum number of votes would be 
arbitrarily capped. Even Grobben acknowledged that the arrangement in his plan was extremely 
complicated, with ample potential for inefficient administrative redundancies, a questionable 
legal form, and a possibly unworkable solution to the problem of local autonomy.33 This was 
perhaps an inevitable result of Grobben’s attempt both to give Bonn a measure of consolidation 
and to preserve self-government for the most vocal opponents of integration in places like Bad 
Godesberg. 
 Although the communities acknowledged Grobben’s thoroughness and sincerity, they 
reacted lukewarmly to his hybrid plan, in ways that reflected their own preoccupations as well as 
the plan’s deficiencies. Landkreis Bonn and Siegkreis both criticized the fact that they were not 
included as members of the Regionalverband, while also objecting to the violation of the 
independence of their respective constituent communities, Amt Duisdorf and Amt Menden.34 
Duisdorf and Menden, predictably, rejected being merged, but Duisdorf pointed to the particular 
injustice of first having several of its towns carved out and incorporated into Bonn.35 Bad 
Godesberg opposed the plan for intervening too much into the affairs of independent 
administrations, and the city reiterated its preferred solution of a straightforward 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
34 Bonner Rundschau, “Grobben-Plan kritisch betrachtet,” April 4, 1963, and General-Anzeiger, 
“Nur auf Wünsch,” May 14, 1963. 
35 Bonner Rundschau, “Amt Menden will nicht,” April 25, 1963, and Rhein-Zeitung (Koblenz), 
“Soll Duisdorf eine selbstständige Stadt werden,” April 27, 1963. 
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Planungsverband that would coordinate only those planning tasks that affect more than one 
community.36  
 However, in a major shift, Bad Godesberg endorsed Grobben’s spatial arrangement, 
including the merging of Amt Menden and Amt Duisdorf, and the incorporation of part of 
Duisdorf’s territory into Bonn.37 This reflected a major step back from the city’s previous 
staunch defense of the principle of Selbstverwaltung in its opposition to Bonn’s proposal to 
merge the capital area into a single city. Bad Godesberg’s former City Treasurer 
(Stadtkämmerer), Kurt Bahlmann, hinted at the reasoning behind this substantial shift in the 
city’s position in a letter to the editor of the General-Anzeiger several weeks earlier. Bahlmann 
asserted that Bad Godesberg’s distinct history, culture, and wealth made any infringement of its 
independence unacceptable. On the other hand, Bahlmann described Beuel and, to an even 
greater extent, Duisdorf as satellite towns of Bonn without any cultural “self-will” (Eigenwille) 
or coherent identities as cities, thus rendering them logical subjects for incorporation.38  
 This apparent pivot by Bad Godesberg’s municipal officials on the issue of autonomy and 
redrawing local boundaries defused one of the most resonant counterarguments against 
consolidation and changed the complexion of the city’s ongoing opposition to Bonn’s proposed 
reorganization. Having abandoned the principled rejection of incorporation on the grounds of 
preserving Selbstverwaltung, Bad Godesberg found more specific reasons to resist Bonn’s 
overtures. On top of its accusation that Bonn was trying to expropriate Berlin’s role as the sole 
legitimate capital of Germany, Bad Godesberg now claimed that incorporation would not benefit 
itself as a city, that the issues facing each city were too distinct, and that their commercial centers 
                                                
36 City of Bad Godesberg, “Stellungnahme der Stadt Bad Godesberg zur Ordnung des Bonner 
Raums,” May, 1963 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/186). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Former City Treasuer Kurt Bahlmann, Leserbrief, General-Anzeiger, April 22, 1963. 
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were too far apart to integrate. Far from uniting the capital region, Bad Godesberg warned, a 
merger would only put them into greater competition with each other.39  
 
Bonn’s Response to the Grobben Plan 
 
 Bonn’s City Council and the municipal administration articulated their official responses 
to the Grobben Plan in a series of resolutions and public statements in the spring and summer of 
1963. In all of these responses, the city’s leaders and planners rejected Grobben’s proposal and 
reaffirmed their support for the creation of a new, larger city with semi-autonomous 
administrative districts. Support within Bonn for a Gesamtgemeinde crossed political lines, and 
the leaders of all three major parties in the City Council, Karl Gronwald (CDU), Rolf Ackermann 
(SPD), and Siegfried Sadtler (Free Democratic Party; FDP), endorsed the idea without 
reservation.40 Although the unanimity within Bonn failed to convince the city’s external 
opponents, public statements by various Council members and officials significantly shifted and 
reframed the debate. On the troublesome issues of incorporation and self-governance, Bonn’s 
provisional status, and Bonn’s function and role as a capital city, these public responses 
established a rhetorical basis on which the capital would ultimately win the argument.  
 In the city’s first resolution from May 20, 1963, Mayor Daniels addressed the issue of 
incorporation, pointing out that, far from an unusual or unnatural act, it had been a common 
method for community building in Germany. As evidence, he cited Cologne’s incorporation of 
                                                
39 City of Bad Godesberg, “Stellungnahme der Stadt Bad Godesberg zur Ordnung des Bonner 
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40 City of Bonn, “Stellungnahme der Stadt Bonn zur Frage der Neugestaltung des Bonner 
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twenty surrounding communities in 1888, Düsseldorf’s similar action in 1908, and Bonn’s own 
incorporation of the towns of Poppelsdorf, Endenich, and Kessenich in 1904.41 Daniels then gave 
perhaps the most persuasive challenge yet to those who opposed regional integration because of 
purported threats to Berlin’s status as capital. He enlisted for support none other than Klaus 
Schütz, a member of the West Berlin Senate and the representative of West Berlin in the 
Bundesrat. A week before Bonn’s resolution, Schütz made a public statement in which he 
claimed forthrightly, 
 
 [t]he question of a sensible organization in the urban center of the Bonn region has nothing 
to do with the outstanding problem of if and when Berlin can again fully exercise its rights 
as the German capital. Indeed, Berlin has great understanding for the problems that have 
emerged for Bonn through its responsibilities as the provisional federal capital. Regional 
planning must — wheresoever — always be considered from the point of view of the 
welfare of the residents of the affected territory and of a functional administration.42 
 
The implicit support of one of the most influential men in West Berlin’s administration and in 
West German politics more broadly was crucial for nullifying the relevance of Bonn’s 
provisional status in the planning debate. Afterwards, it was far easier and more convincing for 
local officials to make the claim that fixing Bonn’s problems and putting the city on surer footing 
for the future had nothing to do with replacing Berlin and would have no effect on the state’s 
commitment to reunification with East Germany. 
                                                
41 Remarkably, Mayor Daniels failed to mention that Bad Godesberg had also been the 
beneficiary of incorporation four times since 1899, including as recently as 1935, under National 
Socialism, when it incorporated the towns of Lannesdorf and Mehlem. Mayor Wilhelm Daniels 
in City of Bonn, “Stellungnahme der Stadt Bonn zur Frage der Neugestaltung des Bonner 
Raumes aufgrund der Sondersitzung des Rates der Stadt Bonn on 20. Mai 1963,” May 20, 1963 
(Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/186). 
42 West Berlin Senator Klaus Schütz quoted by Mayor Wilhelm Daniels in City of Bonn, 
“Stellungnahme der Stadt Bonn zur Frage der Neugestaltung des Bonner Raumes aufgrund der 
Sondersitzung des Rates der Stadt Bonn on 20. Mai 1963,” May 20, 1963 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 
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 Schütz’s statement allowed the city to focus on the particular merits of its proposal and to 
consider the more political question of the function and meaning of a capital city largely 
independently of Bonn’s peculiar place in West German politics. For the Mayor, this included an 
emotional plea that Bonn not be punished for serving as the provisional capital with inadequate 
and dysfunctional regional planning. In giving precedence to the interests of the Bund, Bonn had 
forgone opportunities to improve its economy through settling industrial and commercial 
concerns within its borders, but the city had received little acknowledgement of its sacrifice and 
no compensation. The Mayor implored the citizens of the neighboring towns to trust Bonn to act 
in the region’s best interests.43 For Gronwald, the Chairman of the City Council’s CDU faction, 
the Bund’s neglect of the city had made a joke out of what should be a rallying symbol for the 
Federal Republic. Gronwald gave no details about his vision for Bonn as a truly representative 
capital, but his statement built on Mayor Daniels’ earlier appeal and reinforced the idea that 
Bonn faced both political and functional demands on its space, another reason why the creation 
of a Gesamtgemeinde was the only logical course of action. Just as with the construction of an 
adequate road and rail network, turning Bonn into a symbol for the Bund was not something the 
city could do on its own.44  
 As part of the same resolution, City Manager Schmidt made the strongest and most 
detailed case for the practical necessity of a Gesamtgemeinde, basing his argument on the idea 
that Bonn and its suburbs had become so intertwined and interdependent that they were already 
effectively a single urban area. Schmidt explained that the current borders served only as 
artificial impediments to rational planning, and that enlarging the borders and integrating the 
capital region would merely bring the political geography of the area into line with its evolving 
                                                
43 Mayor Wilhelm Daniels in Ibid. 
44 Bonn City Council Member Karl Gronwald (CDU) in Ibid. 
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economic and social structure.45 Schmidt backed up this claim with statistics on transportation 
and commuting patterns, population growth and density, and land use and housing activity in the 
area.46 Still, in order to persuade opponents, Bonn needed to develop a satisfactory answer to 
accusations that its proposal was anti-democratic and an undue intrusion into the affairs of its 
smaller neighbors. 
 That federal and state laws allowed for exactly the kind of changes to municipal borders 
that Bonn had proposed was not in question. The process by which Bonn could achieve those 
changes, a statute passed by a duly elected representative body at the state level, was eminently 
democratic. However, it was also true that those same laws explicitly privileged local autonomy. 
To break this tension, Bonn attempted to reframe its proposal for a Gesamtgemeinde as 
preserving rather than violating the principle of self-government in the neighboring communities, 
and the city based this contention on a shift in the definition of community from the political 
entities within the current municipal borders to the organically integrated area around Bonn. The 
capital, along with Bad Godesberg, Beuel, and the other surrounding towns, represented a new 
community in the truest sense of the word. If they were to form a legal union as a city, that city 
would possess all of the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of independent self-government. 
In making this case, the Grobben Plan provided an apt foil, as Bonn pointed to the novel 
formulation of a Regionalverband as constitutionally objectionable. According to Bonn, 
Grobben’s proposal envisioned the removal of all planning authority to the supra-local union, 
restricting severely the ability of the members to conduct their own affairs while entailing the 
                                                
45 Bonn City Manager Franz Schmidt in Ibid. 
46 For example, a study from June 1963 by Bonn’s Employment Office found that nearly half of 
all workers from the capital’s neighbors (yet only one-fifth of those from Bad Godesberg) 
commuted into Bonn everyday for work, a situation that cost the city over one million DM in tax 
revenue each year due to tax equalization policies. General-Anzeiger, “Jeder fünfte Godesberger 
arbeitet in Bonn,” June 7, 1963. 
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costly and cumbersome duplication of municipal planning administrations. Furthermore, Bonn 
pointed to the possibility that the new authority could usurp additional local powers as long as it 
was in the name of planning.47 The Grobben Plan was a true threat to self-government, while 
Bonn’s proposal reformed and enlarged local government, augmenting its powers to deal with 
the present problems but reserving all of its authority for itself.  
 Bonn brought this case to the public in 1963, most notably in a municipally published 
brochure entitled “On Regional Planning in Bonn: Questions — Answers” (“Zur Raumordnung 
Bonn: Fragen — Antworten”). In a series of seven rhetorical questions, the city attempted to 
explain carefully and exhaustively the difference between incorporation and a Gesamtgemeinde. 
It flatly rejected the former while extolling the benefits of the latter. Bonn also attempted to 
assuage fears that it would use the newly formed city as a way to shift its oppressive debt burden 
onto its neighbors or that the previously independent cities would lose their historical and 
familiar character. In response to the latter concern, the brochure noted that the towns that had 
been incorporated into Bonn in 1904 still supported many of their local groups and clubs 
(Vereine), including singing clubs, sports clubs, and the all-important Rhenish Carnival clubs 
(Karnevalvereine).48 Along with the brochure, Bonn officials went on the offensive, demanding 
that the NRW government allow the citizens of the communities in the proposed 
Gesamtgemeinde to vote directly on whether they wanted to join with Bonn. Such a referendum 
would not be legally binding, but Bonn was confident that the result would speak strongly in 
favor of its plan.49 Mayor Daniels gave a lengthy interview to the General-Anzeiger touting the 
                                                
47 City of Bonn, Memo regarding discussion on June 25, 1963 between city officials and District 
President Franz Grobben concerning his regional planning proposal, July 27, 1963 (Stadtarchiv 
Bonn, N 61/186). 
48 Stadt Bonn, “Zur Raumordnung Bonn: Fragen — Antworten” (Bonn: Stadt Bonn, 1963). 
49 Bonner Rundschau, “Bonn fordert Volksbefragung,” May 15, 1963. 
 95 
administrative and functional benefits of a regional merger while also drawing a hard line that 
the city would not accept any compromise, such as moving forward without Bad Godesberg.50 
However, if Daniels’ aim was to convince skeptics, he did himself no favors by elsewhere 
insisting that the Gesamtgemeinde must retain the name Bonn.51   
 In spite of the flurry of activity aimed at permanently resolving the regional planning 
issue in Bonn, the various sides remained intransigent, and 1963 passed without any legislative 
action. The state administration in Düsseldorf and Cologne continued to reject Bonn’s proposal 
and support the Grobben Plan, which by August had received tentative endorsements from all of 
the other participants, including Bad Godesberg.52 Bad Godesberg remained Bonn’s most vocal 
opponent, and the town laid bare its mistrust when its City Treasurer, Helmut Schneider, accused 
Bonn’s Press aide, Paul Zurnieden, of deliberately and systematically disseminating false 
information regarding the extent to which the two communities were actually economically 
dependent on each other.53 This prompted a vigorous response from Bonn City Council Member 
Ackermann with a point-by-point refutation of the Godesberg Treasurer’s claims and the 
accusation that the town was making a routine of such baseless, politically motivated attacks.54 
While such unconcealed and personally directed acrimony between Bonn and Bad Godesberg 
was rare, the smaller town continued to maintain its absolute opposition to any erosion of its 
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54 Bonn City Council Member Rolf Ackermann, “Bad Godesberg begann mit Polemiken,” 
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municipal independence, even as it begrudgingly began to concede that dramatic measures were 
needed to solve the region’s problems.55  
 
The Bund’s Role in Regional Planning 
 
 With the debate at a standstill and tensions escalating between Bonn and its neighbors, 
the Bund turned its attention to the issue and deliberated whether or not to become directly 
involved. Federal engagement with issues of regional planning took place primarily through the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Regional Planning (Interministerielle Ausschuß für 
Raumordnung or IMARO), which consisted of representatives from each of the federal ministries 
and had met only sporadically since it was established in 1955. The IMARO first took up the 
issue of regional planning in Bonn on November 15, 1963 and decided to form two 
subcommittees, one to consider the desirability of federal participation in the organization of the 
region (Subcommittee A) and another to consider the constitutionality of the findings of the first 
(Subcommittee B). Subcommittee B would ultimately have little to discuss except for 
hypotheticals, as Subcommittee A along with the larger IMARO quickly decided that the Bund 
had no compelling interest in regional planning around the capital.  
 Only the Treasury Ministry and the Federal Ministry for Public Health 
(Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen) advocated for the Bund to adopt a policy of active 
engagement and participation in regional issues in Bonn, with the Treasury Ministry referring to 
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the issue as “urgently necessary” (dringend notwendig).56 The Health Ministry supported 
involvement on public health grounds, arguing that the Bund had a special interest in ensuring 
proper water provision and sewage facilities for all West German citizens. The Treasury 
Ministry—which along with the Federal Building Agency oversaw the planning of all federal 
building projects—gave a far more elaborate set of reasons in support of involvement, all of 
which related to improving the living and working standards of the federal workforce. First and 
foremost, the Treasury Ministry noted that Bonn and its neighbors had been receptive to federal 
building proposals only so long as they aligned with local interests, but the hardening tensions 
between communities over the regional planning issue had scrambled those interests, 
complicating the Bund’s efforts to accommodate federal authorities. Achieving a resolution to the 
regional stalemate was therefore in the Bund’s best interests because it would remove a major 
obstacle from the already trying process of housing the growing federal bureaucracy.  The 
Treasury Ministry also advocated gaining federal representation in the resulting local institutions. 
This would allow the Bund to push for more favorable zoning arrangements, better 
infrastructure, and more economical service provision. The Treasury Ministry even went so far as 
to suggest that the Bund look into using financial support for supra-regional facilities as a means 
to extend federal influence over local planning affairs.57 
 The Health and Treasury Ministries were distinctively in the minority, however. Two 
other ministries—the Federal Ministry for Housing, Urban Development, and Regional Planning 
and the Interior Ministry—took a more moderate supportive stance, arguing that the Bund should 
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maintain open lines of communication with any regional organization to facilitate coordination 
of federal and local plans. Otherwise, the ministries on the IMARO and Subcommittee A were 
resolutely against the Bund’s participation in local or regional planning organizations. Many in 
the opposition simply asserted that the existing laws were sufficient to secure the Bund’s 
interests in the Bonn region, but the Ministry of Defense and Ministry for Economics were 
particularly outspoken. In a memo to Federal Housing Minister Paul Lücke, the head of the 
Accommodations and Real Estate Department (Abteilung Unterkünfte und Liegenschaften) at the 
Defense Ministry, Heinrich Kaumann, expressed concerns that the Bund’s involvement in 
regional planning would constrain its freedom to negotiate with individual communities and 
would leave it vulnerable to demands that it share in the costs of planning and executing local 
projects.58 Such concerns betrayed an element of departmental self-interest, as the Economics 
and Defense Ministries were two of the largest federal organizations located outside of Bonn’s 
borders—they were both based in Amt Duisdorf—where they enjoyed both more space for 
expansion and more receptive local governments. With such advantageous conditions, neither 
ministry was eager to have the Bund participate in an organization that might bring the scrutiny 






                                                
58 Heinrich Kaumann, Head of the Accommodations and Real Estate Department at the Federal 
Ministry of Defense, Memo to Paul Lücke, Federal Minister of Housing, Urban Development, 
and Regional Planning, July 15, 1964 (BArch, B 106/45685). 
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The Göttingen Solution 
 
 With the Bund adopting a public stance of total non-involvement—and even 
backtracking on its previous renunciation of incorporation in favor of neutrality on the issue59—
the debate continued to drift sideways. At a public discussion in February 1965 between officials 
from Bonn, Bad Godesberg, and NRW, tensions were markedly reduced, but neither side had 
changed its position on the regional planning issue.60 Several months later, however, the CDU 
faction in Bonn’s City Council made a new proposal for incorporation that differed markedly 
from its previous approach and appeared initially as a potentially major breakthrough. Based not 
on Berlin but on a much more recent regional planning act in the much smaller city of Göttingen 
in Lower Saxony,61 the proposal from the Christian Democrats called for the city to merge with 
the surrounding Landkreis Bonn. Under this plan, Bonn would relinquish the privileges of its 
independence as kreisfrei and become similar in status to its neighbor, Bad Godesberg. The 
merger would constrain Bonn, but it would also integrate the city into a governmental structure 
where there already existed institutions and associations to deal with large and small common 
planning tasks while totally preserving the autonomy of the other communities in the Kreis. 
Once merged, Bonn and its immediate neighbors—Bad Godesberg, Beuel, and Duisdorf—would 
                                                
59 H. Feldmann, “Bund oder Land zuständig: Streit um die Raumordnung,” General-Anzeiger, 
December 12, 1964. 
60 General-Anzeiger, “Raumordnungsdiskussion in Bad Godesberg: Ist die ‘Eingemeindungsreife 
erreicht?,” February 10, 1965. 
61 The Göttingen Act went into force on July 1, 1964, merging the previously independent city of 
Göttingen with Kreis Göttingen. 
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enter into an Urban Federation (Stadtverband) that would be empowered to manage and 
administer those planning affairs related directly to the presence of the Bund.62  
 Perhaps the proposal’s greatest strength was that it received the endorsement—if only as 
a firm basis for negotiation—of the mayors of several of the neighboring towns. Bad Godesberg 
Mayor Franz Linz welcomed the idea so long as Bonn agreed to assume an equal place within 
the Kreis, revealing anxiety that even were Bonn to be bound legally into a well-established 
structure, it would attempt to dominate its neighbors. The mayor of Amt Duisdorf, Johann 
Brünker, approved of the idea provided that the rest of the Kreis would not be held liable for 
Bonn’s municipal debts.63 With similar caveats, the local public in the other surrounding 
communities approved of the plan even more enthusiastically.64 While important details still 
needed to be worked out before a final agreement could be reached, within a month the district 
chapter of the CDU in Bonn had disseminated a draft statute based on the Göttingen Act 
(Göttingen-Gesetz), and hope was building that a solution had finally been reached that would 
allow the region to address adequately its planning needs.65 
 Bad Godesberg City Manager Brüse effectively halted momentum towards a deal in 
September 1965 when he unexpectedly rejected the Göttingen model and proposed in its stead a 
merger of Bonn, Bad Godesberg, and Beuel with the immediately surrounding communities of 
Landkreis Bonn and Siegkreis to form a completely new Kreis. The new Kreis would then be 
                                                
62 Ernst Geis, “Grünes Licht für Raumordnung: Bonns Eingemeindungspläne sollen endgültig zu 
den Akten,” Bonner-Rundschau, June 24, 1965. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Bonner-Rundschau, “Bürger sind einig: Fusion Bonns mit dem Landkreis hilft allen,” June 25, 
1965. 
65 Bonner-Rundschau, “Kommunalpolitiker gingen neue Wege: Stadt und Landkreis künftig 
‘Kreis Bonn,’” July 22, 1965. 
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subdivided into three administrative districts based around the three largest communities.66 In 
announcing his new plan during a meeting of Bad Godesberg’s City Council, Brüse gave 
virtually no explanation for why it represented a more effective regional planning solution, and 
representatives from Bonn immediately denounced the proposal.67 Bonn and Bad Godesberg 
were once again backing opposing plans for reorganizing the area, and the conflict over regional 
planning seemed once more at a deadlock. 
 
A Piecemeal Approach 
 
 As the prospects for a comprehensive regional planning deal faded again, the individual 
communities involved began exploring a variety of smaller scale actions that were at times 
complementary and other times at odds with each other. Duisdorf entered talks with several other 
towns in Amt Duisdorf about forming a new Gesamtgemeinde called Hardtberg. This integration 
would eventually come to pass as part of the Bonn Act in 1969—with the communities of 
Duisdorf, Lengsdorf, and Hardthöhe68 combining to form the administrative district of Hardtberg 
within Greater Bonn—but at the time in 1965-66, many Amt officials saw this step toward 
greater integration within their district as the most effective way to stave off the “hungry Bonn 
lion” (hungrige Bonner Löwe).69 Beuel, as the largest community in Siegkreis, sought to 
establish a local Working Group tasked with coordinating responses to regional planning 
                                                
66 Bonner-Rundschau, “Godesberg: Landkreis in drei Verwaltungsbezirke aufteiluen,” September 
22, 1965. 
67 General-Anzeiger, “Keine Dreiteilung der Bundeshauptstadt!,” September 23, 1965. 
68 By the mid-1960s, the Ministry of Defense’s sprawling campus occupied the entire area of 
Hardthöhe. 
69 Amt Representative Müller from Lengsdorf quoted in Bonner-Rundschau, “Anschluß an Bonn 
einmütig abgelehnt,” November 16, 1965. 
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problems and set up a Planning Association to organize and steer future development. The 
proposal received the backing of the Kreis and member communities because it strove for 
increased cooperation on the right bank of the Rhine while preserving local independence and 
autonomy. It was necessary, according to Beuel’s draft document describing the Working Group, 
“in case Bonn does not deviate from its current stance.”70 Although these proposals by Bonn’s 
neighbors addressed regional planning issues, they were also tactical maneuvers aimed at 
preempting or discouraging any future attempts by Bonn to incorporate or merge surrounding 
communities.  
 Bonn perceived these proposals and actions—particularly those advanced by Duisdorf—
as a threat to its own planning interests, and responded in kind by opening direct negotiations 
with individual neighboring communities over incorporation. Amid setbacks in Bonn’s effort to 
unite the entire capital region under its auspices, it seemed to adopt a piecemeal strategy of 
peeling off some of its smaller and more pliable neighbors to strengthen its position and gain 
space for development. The city’s Director of Building (Baudirektor) Günter Schubert even 
indicated that if Bonn successfully concluded such smaller scale integration, their would be no 
more objection to entering into a Regionalverband along the lines suggested years earlier in the 
Grobben Plan.71  
 Bonn crafted its proposal along the lines of the Göttingen model that appeared to preserve 
local self-government and historical character, and targeted its offer to the nearby communities 
of Röttgen, Ippendorf, Lessenich, and Buschdorf (Figure 46). The communities would maintain 
their directly elected councils and mayors, which would receive a discretionary budget. Although 
                                                
70 “falls die Stadt Bonn nicht von ihrer bisherigen Haltung abweichen” quoted in Bonner-
Rundschau, “Der erste Schritt ist getan: Beuel und Siegkreis Arm in Arm,” October 20, 1966. 
71 Bonn Director of Building Günter Schubert, Memo regarding the results of a meeting of Bonn 
officials, July 26, 1966 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, B 61/186). 
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Bonn left undefined the precise division of powers and responsibilities between the smaller 
district administrations and the larger municipal government, it asserted that the communities 
could retain control over their libraries, pre-schools, playgrounds, sports facilities, and 
cemeteries, and would have input at the municipal level on budget issues, planning, public 
facilities, and property taxes. Negotiations advanced most quickly with Röttgen, a community on 
Bonn’s southwest border that was notable for its relatively large size (26.48 square kilometers) 
and tiny population (2,814),72 as most of its area was occupied by the protected Kottenforst 
nature preserve. Röttgen’s identity was inseparable from its natural scenery and the recreational 
activities that it afforded, and Bonn promised to protect both. In all incorporated communities, 
Bonn would establish liaison offices to help manage a five-year transitional period, during which 
time tax rates would remain the same and Bonn would agree to fulfill their concrete investment 
demands.73 
 By the end of 1966, Bonn was on the verge of completing territorial modification 
contracts (Gebietsänderungsvertrag) with Röttgen and Ippendorf. Röttgen’s local Council voted 
15-3 to approve the community’s incorporation into Bonn,74 and a majority of both the residents 
and administration in Ippendorf expressed support for merging into Bonn. Ippendorf’s Mayor 
Peter Ohlenhardt explained at a public discussion on the issue that he had previously been firmly 
against incorporation for Ippendorf. However, now that Ippendorf was faced with a choice 
between joining the other towns of Duisdorf as Stadt Hardtberg and joining Bonn, the latter 
                                                
72 Statistics taken from City of Bonn, “Zur Raumordnung Bonn: Fragen — Antworten” 
73 See Bonn City Manager Wolfgang Hesse, Briefing Presentation for meeting of Bonn officials, 
July 11, 1966 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/186), and Bonn City Planning Office, Memo with 
negotiating points for a final redistricting contract with Röttgen, July 7, 1966 (Stadtarchiv Bonn 
N 61/186) 
74 Bonner-Rundschau, “Gemeinderat beschloß Eingliederung zu Bonn,” December 20, 1966. 
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suddenly appeared as the “lesser evil” (kleineres Übel) because its proposal went much further in 
maintaining the city’s independence.75 
 Unfortunately for supporters of these particular regional reforms, late 1966 was also 
extremely tumultuous for state politics in NRW, even as one of the outcomes of the upheaval in 
Düsseldorf would prove critical for Bonn’s aspirations to integrate the entire metropolitan area 
around the capital. As the “Economic Miracle” of West Germany’s first decade in existence 
ebbed in the mid-1960s, NRW experienced its first recession since the founding of the FRG. 
State elections in July 1966 saw the CDU lose a substantial share of its seats in the Landtag to 
the SPD, although not enough to give the Social Democrats an outright majority. After a short-
lived coalition in Düsseldorf between the CDU and FDP and a tense few weeks of negotiations 
between all three major parties, the SPD voted to form a government in association with the FDP 
under Minister-President Heinz Kühn.76 Willi Weyer would retain his position as the state’s 
Interior Minister,77 but the position of District President in Cologne would fall to Heinrich 
Stakemeier, an expert on regional and urban planning who had previously written about Bonn’s 
planning issues. His predecessor, Franz Grobben, had actually left the post in June, nominally for 
“health reasons,” after being arrested in a police raid on a public facility in Cologne that was a 





                                                
75 Bonner-Rundschau, “Ippendorf wählt Bonn als kleineres Übel,” December 29, 1966. 
76 The CDU would remain in the opposition in the NRW Landtag until 2005. 
77 Weyer had been removed from the post for the final week of Minister-President Franz Meyer’s 
administration but was quickly reinstated by Minister-President Kühn. 
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The Stakemeier Plan 
 
 Heinrich Stakemeier of the center-right FDP was District President for only a few 
months—he left in February 1967 to become State Secretary (Staatssekretär) in the NRW 
Ministry for Economics, Small Business, and Transportation (Ministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Mittelstand und Verkehr)—but he would have an outsized influence on the regional planning 
debate. Shortly after taking office, Interior Minister Weyer commissioned him to conduct a study 
of the Bonn region and make a proposal for a planning solution. What Stakemeier delivered 
several weeks later was the most thorough and detailed consideration yet of the origins of Bonn’s 
planning problems, the needs of the region as a rapidly growing conurbation, and the city’s role 
as the provisional capital of the FRG. Stakemeier came to the completely opposite conclusion of 
his predecessor, Franz Grobben. Placing greatest emphasis on the growing gap between the 
functions that a capital city must serve for a nation and its national government and Bonn’s 
capacity to fulfill those functions, Stakemeier determined that the communities of Duisdorf, 
Beuel, and Bad Godesberg should be united with Bonn into a Großgemeinde.  
 Stakemeier based his analysis on a straightforward comparison of Bonn with the former 
German capital in Berlin along with other European capitals. From this common-sense exercise, 
Stakemeier defined a capital city’s primary function as providing space and accommodations for 
a nation’s highest governmental authorities, international diplomatic delegations, and 
representative national symbols. Furthermore, he found that a capital city should also be the seat 
of political party headquarters and host to representatives from corporate, scientific, 
humanitarian, and cultural organizations. With such a concentration of national and international 
institutions, a capital city should exercise special domestic political influence and serve as a 
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model and leader for other cities in the country.78 This basic definition may seem obvious, but 
Stakemeier was one of the first observers and certainly the first significant public official to 
address Bonn’s planning problems by first establishing a functional model for a capital city 
against which to measure Bonn. Stakemeier’s moment of clarity came late, but such a definitive 
connection between local planning and Bonn’s federal role was unthinkable during the 1950s 
when the capital’s provisional status still controlled the planning discourse. The influence of that 
status waned only gradually during the 1960s, eroded through the kind of intense debate in which 
Stakemeier was participating.  
 The implications of Stakemeier’s line of reasoning spoke overwhelmingly in favor of 
regional consolidation. The so-called “Stakemeier Plan” (Figure 47) recognized that the efficient 
and independent operation of the august national institutions entrusted to Bonn—above all the 
Federal Republic’s parliament as its democratic nerve center—depended on much more than a 
reliable supply of available real estate, and that ensuring suitable working conditions for the tens 
of thousands of federal employees in the city required more than simply providing a minimum of 
office space. Government ministries and agencies should be distributed based on their political 
and functional relationships with each other and with the elected bodies of the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat. Whether they were transient foreign delegates, parliamentarians with homes in 
faraway districts, or permanent civil servants, members of the federal workforce required 
adequate housing, reasonable commutes via private or public transportation networks, good 
schools for their children, and attractive cultural, recreational, and other leisure facilities. Finally, 
Stakemeier asserted that in the face of the city’s enormous and unavoidable responsibilities as 
the West German capital, the FRG’s prominent political and economic position in world affairs, 
                                                
78 Cologne District President Heinrich Stakemeier, “Regional Planning Proposal,” December 8, 
1966 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/186). 
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and the persistent uncertainty surrounding reunification, Bonn’s provisional status should be all 
but irrelevant. The city’s capital functions were paramount and must be guaranteed.79 
 Without assigning blame beyond the mere presence of the federal government and 
official efforts to adhere to the spirit of the provisional, Stakemeier then laid out the ways in 
which Bonn was failing as a capital city. A lack of space from the very beginning forced federal 
planners to improvise, and with a mandate early on to create as light a footprint as possible in the 
city, there was little impetus to craft a long-range development plan. This led federal government 
offices and related national and international institutions to end up haphazardly scattered and 
fragmented across the region. Bonn may have been the seat of the highest powers in the 
Bundestag, Bundesrat, and Federal President and Chancellor, but it could only accommodate 
fewer than half of the federal ministries and a small fraction of diplomatic missions. From its 
inception as the FRG’s capital, Bonn could only satisfy a portion of its basic function of housing 
a national government. The remaining obligations increasingly fell to neighboring municipalities, 
especially Duisdorf and Bad Godesberg. Stakemeier pointed out that Bad Godesberg, as home to 
fifty-two embassies, was already playing a substantial role in West German diplomatic affairs—
traditionally a prerogative for a capital city. Moreover, Stakemeier’s analysis of the over fifty 
million Deutschmarks in federal grants between 1959-66 allocated for local building projects 
necessitated by the presence of the federal government revealed that over half the funds went to 
Bonn’s neighbors, with a full third going to Bad Godesberg alone. These funding patterns 
strongly indicated that the Bund was already treating the entire area as more or less a singular 
                                                
79 Ibid. 
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capital city, but they also revealed that Bad Godesberg had a high level of financial self-interest 
in blocking any merger with Bonn.80 
 The Stakemeier Plan did not speculate about the deleterious effects that the distribution 
of the capital city’s functions across numerous adjacent communities might have had on the 
performance of the federal government. However, it did claim that the informal role outlying 
communities were playing as host to central government functions was violating the basic tenets 
and definition of a capital city. The plan also decried the negative impact of this splintered and 
uncoordinated federal sprawl on government workers and the communities in which they lived. 
The varying financial and administrative capacities of the towns had exacerbated disparate and 
unequal local conditions in schools, housing, services, and facilities, with the smaller villages 
totally overwhelmed by the demands of their recently inflated populations. Housing scarcity near 
the major administrative centers in the region had contributed to a high-traffic commuting zone 
in the area. Despite rapidly growing numbers of daily commuters both into and out of Bonn, no 
regional public transportation authority existed to coordinate routes and tariffs across municipal 
lines. Deficiencies in public transportation prompted many workers to commute in private 
automobiles, leading to highly congested roads that were neither good for the environment nor 
conducive to the wellbeing of the commuters.81 
 All of these problems would remain intractable and likely deteriorate further as long as 
the individual municipal governments so jealously guarded their independent planning authority 
under the guise of local autonomy. Any solution that left the current political map intact would 
inevitably fail to solve this problem, because the scale of any potential fix virtually guaranteed 
that at least one community would have to subordinate its parochial interests and compromise on 




its right to self-administration for the good of the larger region. None of the towns, though, had 
shown any willingness to sacrifice their own interests, particularly when it involved suffering on 
behalf of Bonn. Bonn and Duisdorf’s attempts at smaller scale consolidation only shifted the 
fault lines. The only way to ensure the affairs of the Bund and improve the lives of the region’s 
inhabitants was the unification of Bonn with Bad Godesberg, Beuel, and Duisdorf into a single 
city with central control over urban planning, transportation, housing, building codes, schools, 
culture, recreation, and services. Above all, this amalgamation would unify all of the highest 
federal authorities and foreign delegations into a single seat of government, thus providing the 
FRG with a proper capital city.82 
 The Stakemeier Plan made its author the highest ranking official to date—and the first 
official above the local level—to openly endorse the approach that Bonn’s leaders had been 
urging for over a decade: the comprehensive redrawing of the city’s borders as the proper 
solution for the region’s planning problems. Even though Stakemeier would leave the District 
Presidency within a few months, the Stakemeier Plan represented a critical inflection point in the 
regional planning debate, after which momentum amongst key government officials, local and 
state legislative bodies, and the general public built steadily towards the final passage of the 
Bonn Act and the creation of a Gesamtgemeinde. The writing appeared on the wall almost 
immediately after Stakemeier’s report was made public, in an informal poll conducted by a local 
paper, General-Anzeiger. The poll found that nearly two-thirds of residents in the communities 
of Amt Duisdorf supported merging with Bonn.83 
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General-Anzeiger, December 23, 1966. 
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 The usual sources still strongly opposed any fusion of the surrounding towns with Bonn, 
but overall, 1967 saw the last gasps of major resistance to unification. NRW Interior Minister 
Weyer—one of Stakemeier’s nominal superiors, who had long rejected Bonn’s proposals for 
regional integration—stressed that the Stakemeier Plan was “merely a suggestion” (nichts als ein 
Vorschlag).84 Predictably, Beuel and Bad Godesberg also immediately rejected the plan, and the 
latter staged an exhibition in its community center (Stadthalle), titled “A City Plans for its 
Citizens” (“Eine Stadt plant für ihre Bürger”), that aimed to counter Stakemeier’s arguments. 
Accompanied by a brochure defiantly titled “Bad Godesberg: Independent City or Suburb of 
Bonn?” the show and publication portrayed Bad Godesberg as the ideal small German city, a 
healthy community with a resourceful, responsive, and responsible government and a place 
secure in its physical beauty, modest history, and bright future. To support these claims, Bad 
Godesberg included quotes from officials, planners, and experts at every level of government—
including former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer—explaining why Bad Godesberg’s independence 
should be inviolable. The city also exhibited models for a proposed renovation of its historic 
center with the implicit assumption that such local improvement projects, along with all that was 
worthwhile about Bad Godesberg, would be placed in extreme jeopardy were Bonn to assume 
control of the region’s planning functions.85 
 The Stakemeier Plan, however, also gave Bonn the impetus to campaign more openly on 
its own behalf. Bonn’s City Council unanimously endorsed Stakemeier’s recommendations in 
July 1967, and it asked the local governments in the neighboring communities and the state 
government in Düsseldorf to act by the end of the year to make the plan a reality. The new sense 
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of urgency came from recognition that, as much as the lack of coordination and unity in the 
region had created the current planning problems, the uncertainty that now surrounded the 
region’s planning future was starting to exacerbate the issue.86 Bonn supported its position with 
its own publication, a large format illustrated book that took the Stakemeier Plan as its point of 
departure and embellished it with a flood of statistics detailing the region’s growth in terms of 
population and population density, as well as an emphasis on the extreme disparities between 
communities in the effects of that growth. Bonn also documented the city’s loss of tax revenue, 
totaling 8.7 million Deutschmarks per year, due to business and industry leaving the city because 
of a critical lack of space.87 Most helpfully, the book also included a series of maps of the city, 
each with a multi-color transparent overlay that illustrated a different aspect of its development. 
These graphical representations—depicting population shifts (Figure 48), commuting patterns 
(Figure 49), transportation networks (Figure 50), and the distribution of housing, cultural 
institutions, and federal authorities—paint a convincing portrait of a region that was already 
deeply integrated by the presence of the national government. Bonn echoed Stakemeier’s 
proposal to make de jure what was already a de facto capital city, and thereby empower it 
financially and administratively to tackle its many planning problems. 
 
Momentum Builds for Regional Consolidation 
 
 Meanwhile, 1967 saw numerous endorsements for the creation of a unified administration 
in the Bonn region from individuals and groups that had either previously resisted the idea or 
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remained neutral. In February, the former State Secretary of the Federal Ministry for Housing,88 
Hermann Wandersleb—one of the central architects of Bonn’s selection as the capital in 1949 
and a widely respected public servant in West Germany—publicly announced his support for a 
Gesamtgemeinde for the capital.89  Internally, the current Federal Ministry for Housing and 
Urban Development declared its backing for the consolidation of Bonn with its nearest 
neighbors.90 At the local level, April saw the Town Councils of Buschdorf and Lessenich, 
communities in Amt Duisdorf on Bonn’s northern and western borders, respectively, follow the 
examples of Röttgen and Ippendorf and vote in favor of incorporation into Bonn.91 Like those 
other two communities, Buschdorf and Lessenich’s populations were relatively small, but each 
defection to Bonn’s cause put even more pressure on the other neighboring communities. Shortly 
thereafter, Bonn received a far more consequential ally in the city’s Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (Industrie- und Handelskammer), which represented the interests of a large swathe of 
private economic interests in the area.92 With business demanding the “broadest possible 
solution” (möglichst großräumige Lösung), followed soon thereafter by the support of the 
University of Bonn93—one the city’s largest landowners and employers besides the Bund—the 
politics of regional planning were quickly coalescing in Bonn’s favor. 
 Developments were also unfolding at the state level, where in early 1967, Interior 
Minister Weyer charged his under secretary (Ministerialdirigent), Paul Eising, with forming a 
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traveling commission for the purposes of investigating the state of regional planning and the 
prospect of redrawing borders across all of North Rhine-Westphalia. The existence of the 
commission all but presumed its ultimate conclusion that NRW required such reforms in order to 
create a more modern and effective administration in the state. The state’s demographics also 
spoke strongly in favor of change; of 2,345 independent communities in NRW, 1,901 had fewer 
than five thousand residents, and 565 had fewer than five hundred. Many of the smaller 
communities no longer maintained their own schools or streetlights.94 Consolidating such small 
communities with their larger neighbors was the best way to ensure that all residents were 
effectively served by their local governments. To that end, Eising held meetings with local 
governments and residents around the state, and although he encountered opposition at every 
turn, his position was always clear: a given area that relies on shared common institutions and 
facilities should control them cooperatively and communally, as a single community.95  
 Eising conducted his meetings in Bonn and neighboring communities over the course of 
several months in the spring and summer of 1967. While the responses from each community 
were largely predictable, Eising’s commission boosted Bonn’s prospects for achieving its 
regional planning goals. First, Eising asserted that reforming the region’s administrative 
organization would have ultimately become necessary in Bonn even without the presence of the 
federal government; the Bund only accelerated an organic process of growth and integration.96 
Second, the commission’s statewide scope placed the changes sought by Bonn in the context of 
much broader political and geographic revisions. This blunted criticism of Bonn’s demands as 
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controversial or illegitimate, and refuted efforts to malign the city as an aggressor attempting to 
seize its neighbors’ land, authority, and tax revenue for itself. The Eising Commission placed 
considerable pressure on its instigator, the Interior Minister, to support its recommendations, 
which would mean reversing his long-held opposition to the merger of Bonn with its neighbors. 
However, as a member of NRW’s cabinet and as the leader of the ministry whose portfolio 
included matters of administrative organization and local affairs in the state, Weyer’s support 
was essential for any changes to Bonn’s political geography. 
 
The Weyer Plan and Final Success for Bonn 
 
 Weyer’s support finally arrived in a dramatic reversal, with the public announcement of 
the “Weyer Plan” in March 1968. The plan, which had the approval of NRW’s cabinet, 
represented the end game for the regional planning debate in Bonn. With a few minor tweaks, 
Weyer’s scheme would become law, although not as quickly as he hoped. The plan was both 
more and less ambitious than its predecessor, the Stakemeier Plan. Weyer called for slightly 
fewer communities to be included in the new Gesamtgemeinde, but the major parties—Bonn, 
Bad Godesberg, Beuel, and the better part of Amt Duisdorf—remained constant.97 The proposal 
for the surrounding Kreis, on the other hand, was both more expansive and more logical. After 
removing Bad Godesberg and Duisdorf from Landkreis Bonn, all that was left of the remaining 
county was an incapacitated fragment that was too small to stand on its own. Stakemeier had 
proposed to solve this by incorporating the remainders of Landkreis Bonn into its other 
                                                
97 Bonn’s Municipal Press Office republished the Weyer Plan as a brochure: NRW Interior 
Minister Willi Weyer, “Zur kommunalen Neuordnung des Bonner Raumes: Vorschlag des 
Innenministers des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen vom 6. März 1968 (Weyer Plan),” March, 1968 
(Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/186). 
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neighbors, Landkreis Köln and Landkreis Euskirchen.98 This solution added new complications 
by entangling the counties to the north of Bonn, which were in powerful Cologne’s sphere of 
influence. To avoid this obstacle, Weyer—relying on a suggestion from a subordinate in the 
Interior Ministry—proposed uniting the remaining parts of Landkreis Bonn and Siegkreis across 
the Rhine into a new entity, Rhein-Sieg-Kreis. Such an arrangement would create a unified 
periphery encircling the newly unified core, and presumably facilitate cooperation between the 
two on common interests, such as by bringing catchment and drainage into the Rhine under a 
single authority.99 
  In his plan, Weyer appeared to justify his reversal of opinion on the issue of enlarging 
Bonn by noting that, despite the many attempts—which he had supported—to achieve 
cooperation on planning issues, unbridgeable differences and guarded self-interest had caused 
them all to fail. Weyer also gave location-specific reasons for the inclusion of each community in 
the plan. For Duisdorf, the primary rationale was that the various towns did not have the 
administrative or financial capacity to cope with the growth that they had experienced in the 
previous two decades. Beuel would become sufficiently fused with Bonn—especially once the 
planned bridge across the Rhine came online—to be considered an organic part of the city, and 
as such it offered an ideal complement to the dense urban center by offering expansion space for 
industry and housing. Regarding Bad Godesberg, Weyer emphasized the extreme extent to which 
it had already become intertwined with Bonn, and contended that excluding Bad Godesberg from 
the consolidation would almost certainly lead to constant tension between the two cities in the 
future due to growth and competition. Surprisingly, given his previous support for the city’s 
                                                
98 Siegkreis was apparently large enough to function on its own even without Beuel. 
99 The recommendation came from Friedrich Wilhelm von Loebell, an assistant in the Interior 
Ministry. Bonn City Manager Wolfgang Hesse, Memo regarding von Loebell’s proposal for 
restructuring the Bonn region, March 20, 1968 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/186). 
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desires, Weyer lightly admonished Bad Godesberg for selfishness amid the planning debates, 
stating that although the city may have been capable of governing itself, the merger was about 
improving the administration of the entire region. Notably, the Weyer Plan did not address the 
issue of preserving as much local autonomy as possible for the incorporated towns. Rather, as a 
final guarantee against Bonn’s domination of its neighbors, Weyer proposed dividing the new 
Groß-Bonn into twenty-four legislative districts and allotting only eleven of these to Bonn, thus 
ensuring that it could not unilaterally impose its will on the other communities.100 
 After publicly switching sides by coming out with a plan to reorganize and integrate the 
Bonn region, Weyer’s support was unwavering and he became a critical force behind the passage 
of the Bonn Act in the NRW Landtag. His proposed timeline for the law’s enactment proved 
overly ambitious, but only by eight months—a relatively brief period considering Bonn had been 
agitating for expanding its borders for close to a decade. Weyer gave the affected communities 
until the middle of May 1968—around two months—to render their formal opinions on the plan, 
approve it, reject it, or request amendments. Weyer would then revise the plan based on the 
feedback and render it into a draft law for consideration by the Landtag after its summer 
vacation. If approved, Weyer hoped that the plan could take effect as early as January 1, 1969. 
The ultimate goal was to implement all of the changes to city and regional borders before the 
local elections due in 1969.101  
 In this, Weyer and his allies succeeded; the Bonn Act went into effect on August 1, 1969, 
and local elections were held that November. However, the final months leading up to its 
adoption, and even the first months afterword, were rife with tension. The Weyer Plan already 
had the support of NRW’s senior administration when it was made public, and Bonn’s City 
                                                
100 Weyer, “Zur kommunalen Neuordnung des Bonner Raumes.” 
101 Bonner Rundschau, “Bonn wird Großstadt mit 300.000 Einwohnern,” March 7, 1968. 
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Council approved it unanimously on May 30, 1968.102 Furthermore, many of the smaller 
communities in the surrounding region had previously voiced support for the mergers and 
consolidation that Weyer called for in the proposed establishment of Rhein-Sieg-Kreis.103 When 
the SPD members of the Landtag—who constituted the senior faction of the ruling coalition in 
Düsseldorf and had a near outright majority with ninety-nine out of two-hundred seats—
expressed approval for Weyer’s proposal during a party conference, it became immediately clear 
that there was little remaining in the way of it becoming reality.104 As it turned out, support for 
Bonn in the Landtag extended to all three factions. This development was revealed in the body’s 
first procedural action on reorganizing the Bonn region, a vote on October 2, 1968 to send the 
draft of the regional planning law based on the Weyer Plan to the Landtag’s Committee on 
Administrative Reform (Ausschuß für Verwaltungsreform).105 
 However, as the machinery of government finally began to take official action on the 
issue of redrawing boundaries around the West German capital with salutary prospects for Bonn, 
the opposition also intensified efforts to thwart it by taking official actions at the local level. The 
debate continued to rage in town halls and the local press, following basically the same contours 
of geographically-based opposition and support that it had since Bonn first made its controversial 
proposal. Bad Godesberg led the resistance with declarations that its independence should be 
inviolable and that it would never submit to Bonn, while Bonn continued to counter with the 
claim that it, too, would be relinquishing a measure of its independence for the greater good of 
                                                
102 Bonn City Council, “Ja zum Weyer-Plan. Gegen Konkurrenzdenken und paradoxe 
Verwaltungsgrenzen,” Minutes from a special session of the Bonn City Council, May 30, 1968 
(Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/186). 
103 General-Anzeiger, “Zehn Gemeinden für den Zusammenschluß,” January 12, 1968. 
104 General-Anzeiger, “SPD-Abgeordnete für Weyer-Plan,” May 27, 1968. 
105 General-Anzeiger, “Alle Landtagsfraktionen befürworteten zügige Lösung des Bonner 
Raumproblems,” October 3, 1968. 
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the region. There was a subtle escalation in the rhetoric that Bad Godesberg deployed, as it 
substituted the broader and loftier concept of “independence” (Selbstständigkeit) for the more 
narrowly applicable and practical terms of “self-administration” or “self-government” 
(Selbstverwaltung),106 but otherwise there was little room left for novel arguments in each side’s 
position.  
 As Bad Godesberg and Beuel discovered, there were a host of activist, legal, and 
procedural avenues remaining to combat what they saw as the impending loss of their 
communities. A group of citizens in Bad Godesberg founded the Free Godesberg Action 
Committee (Aktionskomitee Freies Godesberg), which planned to publish and distribute anti-
reform pamphlets, initiate poster campaigns around the city (Figure 51), and coordinate a protest 
in Düsseldorf on the occasion of the law’s introduction into parliament, including presenting the 
president of the Landtag with a petition signed by all Bad Godesberg residents demanding the 
preservation of their city’s autonomy.107 Likewise, citizens in Beuel founded the “Independent 
Beuel Initiative” (Aktion Selbstständiges Beuel), which cited an obscure paragraph of NRW’s 
state constitution to demand a statewide referendum on regional planning in Bonn, a move that 
ironically would have effectively put Beuel’s fate as an independent city in the hands of non-
Beuelers.108  
 In their official rejections of the Weyer-Plan, Bad Godesberg and Beuel’s City Councils 
began laying the groundwork for legal challenges through the state courts, asserting that enacting 
the plan would be a flagrant violation of the NRW’s constitutional guarantees of local 
                                                
106 See for example, General-Anzeiger, “Linz: Bad Godesberg will weiterkämpfen,” September 
6, 1968. 
107 Friedrich Georg Wendel, “Bürger gründeten Aktionskomitee Freies Godesberg,” Bonner 
Rundschau, May 18, 1968. 
108 Bonner Rundschau, “Die Wähler von NRW sollen über Beuels Schicksal abstimmen,” 
October 4, 1968. 
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autonomy.109 With the Landtag’s final passage of the Bonn Act on May 13, 1969, the 
consolidation plans went into action, and the law’s opponents challenged it in the state’s 
Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgericht) located in Münster. There were multiple, separate 
appeals and little time for the court to consider them before the law was originally scheduled to 
go into effect on July 1, so the court granted a stay that would delay implementation of the law 
by one month.110 In the end, this small delay would be the only legal success for Bad Godesberg 
and its allies. The Constitutional Court, granting wide deference to the state’s political process 
and legislative decision, sided with the state and upheld the law.111 The court handed down its 
final decision on the matter in April 1970, eight months after the law had gone into effect. By 
that time, however, the enlarged city and its citizens had mostly moved on to challenging and 
trying to redefine their relationship with a federal government that had until that point taken little 
responsibility for the problems it was creating in the region. 
 Regardless of one’s view of the law, however, its passage in the Landtag meant that 
preparations for the change had to begin and the public had to be informed about what to expect 
from life in the newly formed “metropolis” (“Metropole”).112 Until fresh local elections would be 
held in November, local councils and administrations were disbanded. To manage the transition 
period, Interior Minister Weyer tapped former NRW Minister-President Franz Meyers to serve 
as Groß-Bonn’s “commissioner” (“Kommissar”), with powers roughly equivalent to the city 
council and mayor combined. In addition, Weyer appointed Bonn’s current City Manager, 
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Wolfgang Hesse, to continue to serve in his capacity as chief administrator for the city. Hesse 
wisely began filling the ranks of his office with officials from throughout the region, including 
Bad Godesberg, Beuel, and Duisdorf, thus ensuring a high degree of integration and continuity 
when the municipal merger took effect.113 Even though NRW’s current Minister-President, 
Heinz Kühn, was a member of the SPD, it was important that both appointees be members of the 
CDU, reflecting the former political leadership of the communities for which they were acting as 
temporary stewards.114 State leaders also created a council consisting of thirty members drawn 
from the political party associations of the local communities that were to be merged into Greater 
Bonn to support and advise Meyers. However, Meyers was not bound to abide by the council’s 
decisions and could act unilaterally in governing the city.115 
 The local press took on the task of explaining to the public the more prosaic effects of the 
municipal reorganization. Most aspects of residents’ day-to-day lives would remain unchanged. 
All taxes and fees would remain constant for three years before being equalized across the new 
city. Trash collection and mail delivery continued as before, although addresses changed slightly. 
For example, Beuel and Bad Godesberg became Bonn-Beuel and Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 
respectively.116 As a way to ease the transition and ensure consistent development across all of 
the formerly independent towns and cities, including Bonn, Günter Heidecke—who succeeded 
Heinrich Stakemeier as the District President in Cologne—demanded that the new city perform 
certain tasks on behalf of each community. For example, Beuel would receive a proper sewage 
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disposal facility for the northern part of the city, the renovation of Bad Godesberg’s historic 
downtown would proceed according to plans that had been in development for some time, and 
tiny Röttgen would receive new street lights and a new playground. Furthermore, the new city 
would create local councils in Bonn, Bad Godesberg, and Beuel to represent their particular 
interests to the larger municipal administration and City Council.117 Finally, on the first day of 
Groß-Bonn’s existence, Meyers and Hesse circulated a brief brochure with that day’s 
newspapers introducing themselves, announcing the coming city-wide elections on November 9, 
and giving the addresses and contact information for the new district administrative offices in the 
city. The brochure ended with an optimistic exhortation for “cooperation” 
(“Zusammenarbeit”).118 
 With the November elections, Wolfgang Hesse remained the City Manager, but Bonn’s 
Mayor Daniels, who had been a divisive figure during the reorganization debate, left his position 
to mount an unsuccessful campaign to fill the seat in the Bundestag that had been vacated with 
former Chancellor Adenauer’s death in 1967. Daniels’s successor, Peter Kraemer, although a 
native of Bonn, proved to be far more conciliatory toward the formerly outlying communities, 
and the relationships between Bonn and its freshly integrated suburbs proceeded smoothly. As a 
reconstituted city of nearly 300,000, Bonn could now pivot to tackle the root cause of its 
planning problems and the ultimate impetus behind the city’s campaign to redraw its borders: the 
presence of the Bund. The relationship between the federal government and its seat had 
continuously deteriorated over the course of the 1960s as the Bund increased the pace of its 
                                                
117 Bonner Rundschau, “Elf Gebote für Groß-Bonn,” May 14, 1969. 
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development and paid little more than rhetorical heed to the city’s desires and problems, refusing 
to assume greater responsibility for the health and condition of its capital city.  
 A good deal of Bonn’s powerlessness to approach the Bund as an equal negotiating 
partner stemmed from the fact that it did not have legal or administrative control over the land on 
which the Bund was intending to build. With the creation of Groß-Bonn in 1969, the city finally 
gained control over sufficient territory to force the Bund to provide material support to the city in 
the form of annual cash grants and to enact extensive reforms in the federal planning process to 
guarantee transparency and more substantial local input. The concrete legal and political 
consequences of the Bonn Act established the necessary basis for the city’s successful assertion 
of control over its planning destiny and urban identity in the following years. However, the 
contentious, decade-long debate that preceded the Act precipitated a conceptual and discursive 
shift in the capital that was equally important for the city’s planning and identity: the dramatic 
de-emphasis of Bonn’s provisional status and the acceptance of the fact that Bonn could serve as 
a more permanent capital without threatening Berlin’s rightful place. This opened the door for 
the initiation of comprehensive, integrated development in the city by eliminating a major excuse 
for the Bund’s previous improvisation and neglect. Finally, the Bonn Act had the effect of 
empowering a city and its public and opening a window for protest at the precise moment in 
1969 when dissatisfaction with the results of federal projects in Bonn had reached a tipping 
point. The public outcry at a federal complex of high-rises in Bad Godesberg, which were now 
squarely in the middle of Bonn, would be the final catalyst in triggering a moratorium on federal 
building in the capital and a total reset in the federal-municipal relationship. 
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Chapter 3: Making “Brasilia am Rhein”: Egon Eiermann’s Parliamentary Tower and 
Federal Planning in Bonn in the 1960s 
 
 At the same time that Bonn was engaged in increasingly tense negotiations with its 
neighbors and with state officials in Düsseldorf and Cologne over expanding its municipal 
borders and taking direct control over a larger metropolitan area, the city was also trying to 
defend its interests against the federal government, which during the 1960s began an aggressive 
campaign to address its need for more office space to house an expanding bureaucracy. The 
Bund’s efforts resulted in an intense but short-lived building boom in the second half of the 
decade, capped by major construction projects in Bonn and Bad Godesberg. In Bonn, Egon 
Eiermann designed Langer Eugen, the parliamentary high-rise (Abgeordnetenhochhaus) 
nicknamed after the its most unwavering supporter, Bundestag President Eugen Gerstenmaier. At 
115 meters, it was one of the tallest buildings in West Germany upon completion in 1969. In a 
city where few buildings rose above the tree line, Langer Eugen was the federal government’s 
most prominent architectural statement, the most conspicuous marker of its presence, and the 
dominant feature of Bonn’s urban space (Figure 52).  
 The history of Langer Eugen’s conception and development reveals a planning process 
that, while well defined in law and grounded in democratic principles, pitted Bonn against the 
Bund. However, in this contest, there were substantial disparities in resources, irreconcilable 
agendas, and differing senses about the stakes involved in the negotiations. In the early 1960s, 
office space preoccupied federal building officials in Bonn. For the Bund, the issue of space was 
serious and increasing every year. According to a draft of a cabinet presentation from May 1964 
by Treasury Minister Werner Dollinger, of the 256,000 square meters of space that the Bund 
required, it currently occupied only 219,000 square meters, of which 16,000 was in emergency 
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temporary accommodations. The 53,000 square meter shortfall and the federal government’s 
attempts to fill it substantially through rentals (46,000 square meters) resulted in the payment of 
spiraling rents to private developers and fragmented federal departments that threatened the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the federal work force.1 This cabinet-level presentation was part 
of a larger sales-pitch, led by the Treasury Ministry’s Building Department and supported by the 
leadership of the Bundestag, to convince the entire federal government that it should support a 
more robust land acquisition and building program in Bonn. 
 The Bund’s lack of office space was an increasingly urgent practical problem, but solving 
it proved to be an even more delicate political task. During the fall of 1956, the Bundestag—in a 
moment of pro-Berlin optimism that a thaw with the East and reunification were close at hand—
passed the Baustopp. The complete prohibition against any new federal construction in Bonn was 
technically still in effect. By the early 1960s, this law had started to crumble, but even with such 
large projects as the Defense Ministry’s complex in Duisdorf, the location on the outskirts of 
Bonn kept them under the radar. Irrespective of the legal prohibition, many politicians remained 
averse to new development in more central locations, an apprehension that was often expressed 
as misgivings about financial costs. As part of the same cabinet presentation, Minister Dollinger 
addressed both sets of concerns directly, first emphasizing that “the execution of construction 
projects is always decided with special consideration for urgency and economic conditions,”2 
and adding in an attachment to the presentation that “the critical basic principle for federal 
planning is not to build a permanent capital city….”3 Deference to Berlin, even if only rhetorical, 
                                                            
1 Treasury Minister Werner Dollinger, Cabinet Presentation Draft, May 1964 (BArch, B 
134/7487), 154-155. 
2 Ibid, 162. 
3 “Überlegung zur Verbesserung der Unterbringung der Bundesbehörden und zur weiteren 
Entwicklung des Grossraumes Bonn”, attachment to Treasury Minister Werner Dollinger, 
Cabinet Presentation Draft, May 1964 (BArch, B 134/7487), 172. 
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was a prerequisite for the federal officials tasked with pushing an ambitious planning agenda 
through an unsympathetic political environment. Nevertheless, for Eiermann’s high-rise, which 
was only a piece of a much larger planned expansion and renovation of all Bundestag facilities, 
the Bund paid 98.5 million Deutschmarks just to acquire the 13.8-hectare piece of land on which 
the project would be built. This was an enormous sum for the Bund, and it intensified debate 
within the federal government because it legitimized accusations of irresponsible profligacy by 
the project’s opponents in the Bundestag and the public. 
 Even with an advantageous political alignment, the normal course of legislative business 
was simply not conducive to the swift approval and execution of large building projects. As 
much as federal building officials stressed the urgency behind the federal space crisis, the 
Bundestag project was delayed over and over again, as its supporters worked to fulfill the 
technical, legal requirements of the planning process. From the start, building officials had 
detailed estimates of the amount of space that the Bundestag needed in order to accommodate all 
of its members and their staffs, but such exercises were little more than academic when it came 
to satisfying the project’s various stakeholders. These included the budget hawks and Berlin 
activists but also encompassed every member of parliament. In the case of the Bundestag, the 
body was the nominal client and also had final approval of any building proposals through the 
appropriations process. In addition to the client, the administrators in the Federal Building 
Agency and the Treasury Ministry’s Building Department found themselves having to mollify an 
ambitious and imperious architect, as Egon Eiermann asserted authority over virtually every 
detail of the building’s design. Although Eiermann’s demands often seemed timed to cause the 
greatest possible disruption, they also displayed a far greater sensitivity to the local context and 
awareness of the potential political ramifications of building a modernist skyscraper in the heart 
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of Bonn. In the end, however, his reservations did not prevent him from accepting the 
commission to design exactly such a building. 
 When federal officials determined early in the planning process that any significant 
expansion of the Bundestag would require the acquisition of a sizable piece of land from the city, 
Bonn instantly became the party with the greatest stake in the process’s outcome. For municipal 
planning officials and members of Bonn’s city council, the question of the FRG’s commitment to 
aid the city was far more pressing than the erstwhile capital’s place in the national political 
discourse. The city’s mounting debt and overtaxed roads, schools, and other facilities, all of 
which were more or less directly attributable to the presence of the federal government, 
threatened the proper functioning of basic services, but the Bund’s considerably greater financial 
resources were an important potential source of assistance. This made the city receptive to 
proposals from the federal government, as they represented opportunities to force the Bund to 
redress Bonn’s growing budget shortfalls and infrastructure problems while also steering future 
development in a way that supported healthy, rational urban planning. In the course of the 
negotiations between the Bund and Bonn over the Abgeordnetenhochhaus, the city’s demands 
grew more extensive, eventually encompassing almost the entire scope of its planning 
predicament, and the relationship between the two sides became increasingly strained.   
 The very different legal, political, and financial constraints on the planning authority of 
the municipal and federal administrations forced difficult and sometimes lopsided compromises. 
This mismatch led to overreaching by both city and federal representatives throughout the years-
long negotiations. The legitimate concessions, honest mistakes, and shrewd manipulations of the 
parties became embodied in the final form of the 30-story tower, which immediately became a 
lightning rod for criticism. Unfortunately, the structure solved none of the problems that it was 
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intended to address while provoking controversy on multiple political fronts. For the Bund, the 
high-rise failed to make a significant dent in its space problem, as the Bundestag, its committees, 
and its staff, which were never the most urgently in need of space to begin with, had already 
outgrown the building by the time it was completed. Meanwhile, the building’s scale stamped 
Bonn more clearly than ever as the de facto, permanent capital of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, making it as much a statement about West German policy towards division as a 
symbol of domestic democratic politics.  
 On the more local level, Bonn failed to win any significant material concessions from the 
Bund, financial or otherwise, in exchange for the land and planning approval for the building. 
Instead, the city accepted a set of guarantees that the Bund would continue to develop the so-
called Parliament and Government Quarter (Parlaments- und Regierungsviertel) surrounding the 
new high-rise and that it would continue to explore ways in which to help the city improve its 
precarious financial position. Eiermann’s building exposed the volatile fault lines in the most 
sensitive planning debates in the capital, and a substantial portion of the local public saw the 
high-rise as nothing but a total loss for Bonn, aesthetically and functionally. For these citizens, 
the tower represented the worst aspects of the federal government’s presence in the city, and to 
add insult to injury, the Bund almost immediately retreated from fulfilling its promises, turning 
its attention once again to a project outside of Bonn’s boundaries and thus beyond its authority. 
Dissatisfied citizens turned their anger towards the same development, and in the fall of 1969 a 
favorable alignment of continued pressure from local officials, strident public protest, and the 
redrawing of Bonn’s political borders to include Bad Godesberg came together to bring federal 
development to a sudden halt and force federal officials to make and keep major commitments in 
support of the capital.  
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The Federal Planning Council and the Beginning of Large-Scale Federal Planning in Bonn 
 
 The Bundestag’s approval of Eiermann’s tower in 1965 marked the de facto end of the 
Baustopp, but the building’s origins several years earlier took place amidst receding political and 
emotional sentiment surrounding Bonn’s status and a growing pressure for more space. The 
construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 ushered in a period of détente between West and East, 
but it also made the prospects for near-term reunification and the return of the capital to Berlin 
increasingly remote. Against this backdrop, federal planners quietly went back to work, and they 
began to approach their task in a far more comprehensive fashion, taking into account both the 
long term needs of a growing federal government and the coordinated integration of their plans 
into the surrounding urban fabric of Bonn.  
 To this end, in 1962, the head (Leitender Regierungsbaudirektor) of the Federal Building 
Agency in Berlin, Carl Mertz, created a Planning Council (Planungsrat), inviting the 
participation of three of West Germany’s most distinguished architects: Egon Eiermann (1904-
1970), then a professor of architecture at the Technical College of Karlsruhe; Sep Ruf (1908-
1982), a professor at the Technical University of Munich; and Paul Baumgarten (1900-1984), a 
professor at the College of the Arts in Berlin. Initially, Mertz and the architects met informally 
with other federal planning officials, but Mertz soon formalized the group, which came to 
include, along with Eiermann, Ruf, and Baumgarten, the head (Ministerial Direktor) of the 
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Treasury Ministry’s Building Department (Bauabteilung), Johannes Rossig, and Bonn’s City 
Planning Director (Stadtbaudirektor), Ludwig Marx.4  
 The contract between the Bund and the architects enumerated the Council’s goals as the 
expansion of the Bundestag building (Bundeshaus), a new building for the upper-chamber, the 
Bundesrat, an expansion for the Press and Information Office (Presse- und Informationsamt), a 
new building for the Treasury Ministry, and “additional, extensive building projects that arise for 
the highest federal authorities in Bonn and Bad Godesberg.”5 Within the Council, the architects 
were primarily responsible for contributing “urban planning studies related to federal building 
projects in the Government Quarter and in the area of southern Bonn and Bad Godesberg, with 
particular attention to overall urban planning intentions and transportation planning in Bonn.”6 
The architects would also assist in the development of preliminary plans, as well as their 
execution should they advance to that stage. For all of these duties, along with attendance at 
twice-monthly meetings, each architect would receive a monthly stipend of 3000 Deutschmarks.7  
 For the architects, the Council also served to cement long-running relationships between 
themselves and the Bund, making them the architects most closely affiliated with the West 
German federal government during the middle part of the Bonn Republic. Eiermann had the 
                                                            
4 The three architects in the Council informally agreed to participate in a letter dated March 20, 
1962 to Carl Mertz at the Federal Building Agency, and regular Council meetings began 
immediately. Letter from Egon Eiermann, Sep Ruf, and Paul Baumgarten to Carl Mertz, head of 
the Federal Building Agency, March 20, 1962 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). However, 
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6 Ibid. 
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earliest direct engagement with the Bund via an ambitious but unsuccessful submission to the 
1951 competition for the Foreign Office building in Bonn (Figure 53), but it was Ruf who 
executed more buildings in the capital during the 1950s, albeit for a different national client. He 
played a major role in 1950, along with Otto Apel and several others, in planning the massive 
headquarters building for the Allied High Commission (HICOG) in Bad Godesberg (see Fig. 38) 
that would subsequently serve as the Embassy of the United States. With the same group of 
architects he also helped plan several large housing developments (Siedlungen) in 1951-52 in 
Bonn and Bad Godesberg on behalf of HICOG and the United States. In 1953, the German 
Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) hired Ruf to design their headquarters 
in Bonn (Figure 54), and in 1955 Ruf won a competition to design the representative office for 
his home state of Bavaria (Landesvertretung) (Figure 55). During this same period, Ruf designed 
a house in Gmund am Tegernsee, south of Munich, for Economics Minister and future 
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard (Figure 56), with whom he had forged a friendship in the 1930s. A 
decade later, this friendship would lead to Ruf’s most well-known building in Bonn, also for 
Erhard, the Chancellor’s Residence and Reception Building, the so-called Kanzlerbungalow 
(Figure 57).8  
 In 1957, the Federal Republic commissioned Ruf and Eiermann to collaborate on the 
design for the West German pavilion at Expo 58, the 1958 World’s Fair in Brussels, Belgium 
(Figure 58). Ruf and Eiermann’s austere and elegant glass and steel buildings contained West 
Germany’s first major declaration of its political and economic resurgence to an international 
public, and it resolutely aligned the Federal Republic with the streamlined forms of postwar 
Modernist design. The West German pavilion was a huge critical and popular success, and it led 
                                                            
8 For a complete record of Sep Ruf’s career and oeuvre, see Winfried Nerdinger and Irene 
Meissner, Sep Ruf, 1908-1982: Moderne mit Tradition (Munich: Prestel, 2008). 
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directly to the federal building authorities engaging Eiermann to design a new embassy building 
for the Federal Republic in Washington, D.C. (Figure 59).  
 Paul Baumgarten’s first project for the federal government came in 1961 with his 
winning entry in the competition to renovate the Reichstag building in Berlin (Figure 60).9 While 
Baumgarten’s renovations were not completed until 1969, the plans received strong support from 
Bundestag President Gerstenmaier and Treasury Ministry officials, which contributed to the 
government commissioning the architect directly for the design of a new complex for the Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), which, pursuant to West Germany’s founding 
principles of federalism and decentralization, was based in the southern city Karlsruhe (Figure 
61).10 
 When Ruf, Baumgarten, and Eiermann assembled in Bonn as urban planning and design 
consultants, they were already familiar, personally and by reputation, to the federal planning 
officials trying to reshape the city into a functional capital. The minutes from the Federal 
Planning Council’s meetings reveal the participants as serious about their obligations, and with 
such broad language in the contract, their activities and output were expansive and ambitious, but 
also thorough and detailed. As early as May 1962, the Council had assigned individual tasks to 
the architects. Eiermann received the Bundestag commission while the Council delegated the 
new Bundesrat building to Ruf and new facilities for the national press to Baumgarten. The 
                                                            
9 The idea to rehabilitate the former parliamentary building and prepare it to house the Bundestag 
at some point in the future first emerged in 1955 as part of the same events and atmosphere that 
also led to the building freeze in Bonn. Baumgarten’s designs stripped away virtually all of the 
ornament from the interior and exterior of Paul Wallot’s original designs and modernized and 
rationalized the floor plans. The most striking feature was the glass curtain wall that Baumgarten 
placed just behind the columns on the western facade. 
10 Baumgarten had also recently won a competition to rebuild the Badisches Stadttheater on the 
same site before the city of Karlsruhe transferred it to the federal government. For a complete 
record of Paul Baumgarten’s career and oeuvre, see Barbara Volkmann, ed., Paul Baumgarten: 
Bauten und Projekte 1924-1981 (Berlin: Akademie der Künste, 1988).  
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expansion of the Treasury Ministry was assigned to the Federal Building Agency in cooperation 
with the so-called Planning Group (Planungsgruppe), an official sub-group of the Planning 
Council. The Planning Group consisted of six young architects recommended by and associated 
with —either as former students or employees—the Council’s senior members.11 Present for 
almost every Planning Council meeting, the Planning Group assisted on several federal projects, 
and after the Council disbanded in 1967, the group formed a private firm that continued to 
receive large federal commissions, including the ill-fated ministerial complex in Bad Godesberg 
(see Chapter 4) and the new Federal Chancellery near the Palais Schaumburg.  
 The scope and scale of the Council’s proposals meant that they held little chance of 
receiving unfettered approval from either the Bundestag or Bonn’s City Council, and the 
Planning Council’s lack of success in moving projects beyond conception is indicative of the 
substantial barriers to development that the federal government faced during the 1960s, in spite 
of its extraordinary need for space. Of the buildings specified in the Council’s contract, the Bund 
only executed projects for the Bundestag and the Treasury Ministry, and Eiermann’s 
Parliamentary high-rise was only an isolated fragment of a much larger plan. The Council 
continued to consider seriously Ruf’s plans for the Bundesrat and Baumgarten’s ideas for the 
Press Office, but neither came close to being implemented. Thus, in contrast to the specific tasks 
laid out in its contract, the Council’s primary function for the Bund appears to have been 
providing a wealth of planning alternatives from which officials could select feasible and 
indispensable projects to promote and push through the various bureaucratic, political, and 
budgetary gauntlets. Under this arrangement, the completion of a project was as much a matter 
                                                            
11 The six members were Manfred Adams, Günther Hornschuh, Peter Türler, Georg Pollich, and 
two individuals for whom first names were unavailable, Nitschke and Brandel. Building 
Department of the Treasury Ministry, Memo regarding Planning Council meeting at the Treasury 
Ministry in Bonn, May 4, 1962 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
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of the political clout and personal persistence of its supporters as a rationally determined 
hierarchy of need amongst government ministries.  
 
The Bundestag Complex and Eiermann’s Tower 
 
  Eiermann’s tower emerged from the Council’s proposals to expand the Bundestag’s 
space and create a new building for the Bundesrat, all of which involved a sprawling new 
complex and the dramatic alteration of the area around the former Pedagogical Academy and 
Hans Schwippert’s increasingly outdated Bundestag plenary chamber. Initial progress was 
remarkably swift, but the Council was not starting entirely from scratch. Appended to the 
architects’ contracts was a set of documents summarizing work that federal officials had already 
done for expanding the Bundeshaus. These included a detailed study of which functions and how 
many members the current buildings could accommodate and a proposal for the expansion 
broken down to the type, number, and size of each additional room. They also included 
preliminary ground plans and elevation drawings for the Bundeshaus (Figure 62) based on the 
studies. The drawings reveal an expansion plan that was far more modest than the one Eiermann, 
Ruf, and Baumgarten would develop on behalf of the Bund in the following months. It is based 
only on enlarging current buildings or appending new wings to them, and the elevation shows the 
height of the additions exceeding that of the existing structures only by a few stories. 
 At one of its earliest meetings in February 1962, the Council outlined two potential 
solutions for the Bundestag complex, one which distributed the various parliamentary functions 
— plenary chamber, committee rooms, and members’ offices — in distinct but connected 
buildings around the given site, and one which called for a single structure with the plenary 
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chamber at its center. Neither yet called for a high-rise. Johannes Rossig, the most senior 
government official at the meeting, also pushed for a realistic approach, stating that “the plans 
must be determined by circumstances, and for the time being, only such plots of land as are 
actually available should be planned.”12 However, that realism did not extend to the planning 
timeline, and by May the Council was discussing which firms to select for various building tasks, 
including structural engineering, elevators, and acoustics.13  
 The Council proceeded over the next few months with the option that distributed the 
Bundestag across several buildings, and by June a high-rise for members of parliament had 
emerged as an indispensible component of the discussion. Indeed, it was now one of three 
proposed high-rises that Sep Ruf called “visually necessary” (optisch notwendig) for the overall 
composition of the Government Quarter.14 In a letter to Egon Eiermann dated September 12, 
1962, Rossig abruptly declared that he was dissatisfied with the Council’s solutions thus far. 
Rossig claimed that they were too concerned with demonstrating contemporary design principles 
and not sufficiently attentive to the existing city- and landscape or the functional and 
representational needs of parliament, and he urged the architects to come to the next meeting 
with new ideas.15 This was a rare instance of reflection about the Planning Council’s purpose and 
approach and a more comprehensive regard for other aspects of the group’s designs beyond the 
technical and practical details that had often dominated its meetings.  
                                                            
12 Federal Planning Council, Minutes from Planning Council meeting at the Treasury Ministry in 
Bonn, February 2, 1962 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
13 Federal Planning Council, Memo regarding May 19, 1962 meeting by the Planning Council’s 
Planning Group, May 23, 1962 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
14 Federal Planning Council, Memo regarding June 15, 1962 meeting by the Planning Council, 
June 27, 1962 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
15 Rossig also sent a copy of the letter to Ruf and Baumgarten. Johannes Rossig, head of the 
Treasury Ministry’s Building Department, Letter to Egon Eiermann, September 12, 1962 (SAAI 
EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
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 At the Council meeting on January 17, 1963, the group arrived at the core components of 
the development plan that would culminate in Eiermann’s 30-story skyscraper. First, the Council 
agreed on the construction of a high-rise for the members and committees of the Bundestag. 
Details such as its final height and size were left to be determined, but they proposed that the 
tower would comprise the first phase of an expansion plan for the Bundestag that would also 
include new buildings for the plenary chamber and house the offices of the Bundestag’s political 
factions (SPD, CDU, and FDP) and library. Second, the Council acknowledged that, in order to 
accommodate all of this construction and a new building for the Bundesrat in a manner that 
satisfied broader urban planning imperatives of traffic regulation, parking, and municipal 
infrastructure, the Bund would have to incorporate the adjacent, city-owned land, known as the 
Gronau (Figure 63).16  
 In the course of the next few Council meetings, the group received feedback on the plans 
from federal and municipal representatives. The parliamentary leadership suggested that the 
faction and library building should be the priority,17 and while both Chancellor Adenauer and 
Federal President Heinrich Lübke expressed informal approval for the plans, they also voiced 
concerns about their potential political effects. Bonn’s City Planning Director, Ludwig Marx, 
presented the proposals to a closed meeting of the City Council, and although they received 
preliminary support, the City Council insisted that the Bund make every effort to contain its 
development to land that it already owned before it expanded into the Gronau and threatened the 
popular sports and recreation center that then occupied the space.18  Against this pushback, the 
                                                            
16 Federal Planning Council, Memo regarding January 17, 1962 meeting by the Planning 
Council, February 1, 1963 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
17 Federal Planning Council, Memo regarding February 19, 1963 meeting by the Planning 
Council, March 1, 1963 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
18 Federal Planning Council, Memo regarding March 8, 1963 eeting by the Planning Council, 
April 4, 1963 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
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parliamentary project received a major boost when Bundestag President Gerstenmaier endorsed 
the overall plan (Gesamtkonzeption) and expressed his desire to move forward with the 
development of the high-rise by appropriating the first financing installment in the 1964 federal 
budget.19  
 Because of his political clout in the Bundestag, Gerstenmaier’s support would be a major 
factor in winning final approval for the project, but his backing of the high-rise also curtailed any 
further investigation into possible alternative designs. Changing course might have risked losing 
the Bundestag President’s backing, but Gerstenmaier’s eagerness to engage with the budgetary 
process also forced the Council to settle on the high-rise and very quickly left little room for 
revision. According to the Reich Financial Regulation (Reichshaushaltsordnung), a Weimar era 
budget act that still regulated the FRG’s financial affairs, federal architectural projects could only 
be included in the budget if plans and cost estimates could be made available for consideration 
by both chambers of parliament.20 This meant that the Council needed to develop plans and 
determine costs for the high-rise to a level of detail and finality that it had not previously 
considered and expose the plans to the general public in parliamentary debate, something which 
it was not yet prepared to do.  
 
Initial Public Reaction 
 
 This reticence regarding public disclosure is apparent from the very first report in the 
local press on the Bund’s plans for a new parliamentary complex. In articles appearing on 
                                                            
19 President Gerstenmaier’s remarks are relayed in Federal Planning Council, Memo regarding 
the May 31, 1963 Planning Council meeting at the Federal Building Agency’s offices in Berlin, 
June 10, 1963 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
20 Reichshaushaltsordnung, December 31, 1922, § 14, Reichsgezetzblatt, 1923 II, Nr. 2 (January 
16, 1923): 18. 
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February 21, 1963, the Bonner Rundschau reported the Bonn’s press aide (Pressereferent) as 
“wanting neither to deny nor confirm” that the Bund was planning a 23-story high-rise on the 
current sport park in the Gronau,21 and the General-Anzeiger reported Bundestag President 
Gerstenmaier declining to release any plans because they were still too preliminary.22 With little 
information to go on, Bonn’s local officials responded quickly with overwhelming skepticism, 
objecting to the location of the proposed high-rise in the Gronau, the size of the proposed 
building, and the apparent insult that it represented to Berlin’s place as the true German capital.23  
 At the same time, the plans garnered some initial national attention with an April story in 
an unlikely and unfriendly venue, the celebrity magazine Revue. The article heavily criticized the 
proposals for usurping Berlin’s position and violating the West German government’s promise 
that reunification was the highest priority of all national policy.24 To drive home its point about 
the Bund’s profligacy, the article included some of the first published images of the federal 
proposals: a photograph of a model of the complex and a schematic site plan of the of the entire 
area of Bonn between the Altstadt and Bad Godesberg (Figure 64). The images depict a city 
transformed, but they are also unattributed, supported by little explanation, and difficult to 
reconcile with each other, as the model does not appear to correspond to any part of the site plan. 
They likely represent proposals then being exchanged by federal and local officials as part of 
early negotiations about acquiring and rezoning the necessary land for the Bundestag project, but 
these discussions moved away from such sweeping plans immediately after they were presented. 
The Revue images were already obsolete when they were published. 
                                                            
21 Bonner Rundschau, “Bonns höchstes Haus ersteht an der Gronau,” February 21, 1963. 
22 General-Anzeiger, “Bundestag will Europas modernstes Parlament bauen,” February 21, 1963. 
23 The fact that none of the early press reports agreed on the size of the tower, reporting it 
alternately as 23, 25, and 26 stories, indicates how little information the Bund made available. 
General-Anzeiger, “Bedenken gegen Gronau-Pläne im Stadtrat,” February 22, 1963 
24 Revue, “Endgültige Hauptstadt Bonn?” April 14, 1963, 10-16. 
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 Nevertheless, the negative public response was clear and relentless, manifesting in the 
form of published letters to the editors of Bonn’s two major daily newspapers. Thus, the Bund 
was forced to disclose and defend its plans in greater detail in June 1963. In a televised 
interview, Bundestag President Gerstenmaier revealed a model of the parliamentary complex 
(Figure 65) and addressed the primary public concerns with two claims — that the development 
would not initially threaten the sports park and that negotiations with the city could not begin 
until the building freeze was lifted — neither of which would turn out to be true.25 Later, as the 
plans came closer to realization and other federal projects began to materialize in the 
Government Quarter, the lack of transparency and misleading statements surrounding the plans 
and planning process would become a major point of contention for local officials and citizens. 
At the outset, the secrecy helped establish an environment that was hardly favorable to a positive 
reception by local press and politicians and an inauspicious start for the impending negotiations 
with the city over the sale and zoning of the land. 
 Gerstenmaier’s appearance on national television to defend the Bund’s plans in Bonn 
made him the public face of the project that would ultimately bear his name. The model that 
Gerstenmaier used, which the local newspapers published the next day, shows the Planning 
Council’s concept for the Government Quarter in basically its final form. It shows the proposed 
high-rise and other new buildings for the Bundestag and Bundesrat, including new plenary 
chambers, smaller office buildings for the political parties and the Bundestag President, and a 
hotel for members and guests, all in relation to the existing Bundeshaus. The Council would 
develop alternative models over the next few years, but the primary components of a new 
plenary chamber for the Bundestag, a high-rise office building for Bundestag members, and a 
new building for the Bundesrat, all grouped along the Rhine would remain the same. 
                                                            
25 General-Anzeiger, “Keine Umgehung des Baustopps in der Gronau,” June 29-30, 1963. 
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Architectural details are not included in the model, but the simple, rectilinear forms are 
indicative of the Bund’s vision of building a thoroughly modernist parliament. While it is far 
smaller in scope than what had been reported several months earlier in Revue, to a resident of 
Bonn, the model would have made it immediately clear how the Bund intended to change the 
existing street plan in the area and encroach substantially on the existing Gronau sports park. The 
fragmentary nature of the model, furthermore, elides and minimizes the impact of the high-rise 
on the surrounding landscape (Figure 66). 
 In spite of the press’s initial negative reaction to the Bund’s stilted revelations of its 
planning activity, the Planning Council plowed on through most of 1963, refining its proposal for 
a new Bundestag complex and continuing to discuss the other projects on its agenda. In 
November the development process appeared to have enough momentum that Rossig, in a letter 
to Eiermann, suggested that the Council had achieved it objective and no longer needed to meet 
every month.26  Rossig’s recommendation quickly proved to be premature, however, as the 
Bundestag project became bogged down in the legislative process and unexpectedly complex 
negotiations with the city. Less than a month later Rossig’s assistant, Wolfgang Leuschner, a 
senior building official in the Treasury Ministry (Oberregierungsbaudirektor), wrote again to 
Eiermann with concerns that the “political constellation [was] unfavorable” in the upcoming 
Bundestag debates about federal planning in Bonn, and expressed hope that the Planning Council 
would assemble in the new year.27   
                                                            
26 Johannes Rossig, Head of the Treasury Ministry Building Department, Letter to Egon 
Eiermann in Karlsruhe, November 25, 1963 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
27 Wolfgang Leuschner, Treasury Ministry Building Department, Letter to Egon Eiermann in 
Karlsruhe, December 11, 1963 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
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 In the same letter, Leuschner also references frequent attacks on the Chancellor’s house.28 
The recent change at the top of the federal administration — Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had 
finally and reluctantly yielded his position to his long-time Economics Minister, Ludwig Erhard, 
on October 16, 1963 — had little effect on the Bundestag project, as all of the key officials 
remained in place, but Erhard brought his own architectural controversy in the form of a new 
residence and reception building (Wohn- und Empfangsgebäude), the Kanzlerbungalow (See Fig. 
57). Under strict secrecy, Erhard had already consulted with Sep Ruf, his hand-picked architect, 
about designs in May 1963, and citing extraordinary need, the Chancellor bypassed the normal 
budgeting process to begin construction in early November, only weeks after taking office. The 
public and the press initially criticized the building as unnecessary and wasteful, especially in 
light of Erhard’s renowned fiscal conservatism. As details of the plan became clear, the 
criticisms turned to attack the building’s severely Modernist aesthetic as inadequately stately for 
a contemporary head of state. More than anything, the Bungalow’s Modernism represented the 
dramatic difference in personal tastes between the culturally conservative Adenauer and the more 
cosmopolitan Erhard.29 
 The controversy surrounding Erhard’s new residence in late 1963 only increased the 
skepticism in parliament towards federal building projects at the exact moment that the 
Bundestag’s budget committee (Haushaltsausschüß) was set to begin deliberations on the first 
phase of the parliamentary complex. In this context, Rossig’s suggestion that the Planning 
Council could reduce its activity, which effectively put it on an indefinite hiatus, removed from 
                                                            
28 Leuschner, Treasury Ministry Building Department, Letter to Egon Eiermann in Karlsruhe, 
December 11, 1963 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
29 For a more thorough history and analysis of the Kanzlerbungalow, see Andreas Schätzke and 
Joaquín Medina Warmburg, Sep Ruf, Kanzlerbungalow, Bonn (Stuttgart and London: Edition 
Axel Meges, 2009) and Wüstenrot Stiftung and Stiftung Haus der Geschichte der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Kanzlerbungalow (Munich: Prestel, 2009). 
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the picture some of the most ardent proponents of large-scale federal development. Over the 
course of almost two years of monthly meetings, the members of the Council, in particular the 
three core architects, had understandably become convinced of the necessity of their proposals 
both for the Bund and the city of Bonn. The architects’ sense of ownership of the plans, which 
was technically included in the contract,30 also fostered by the Council’s collaborative working 
method, only intensified such feelings of entitlement. 
 Furthermore, although they claimed otherwise, Eiermann and his colleagues could likely 
sense the threat to potentially lucrative and prestigious commissions, and as the Planning 
Council’s inactivity stretched into 1964, they began to pressure federal building officials to bring 
them back into the planning discussion. In a meeting in February 1964 between Eiermann, 
Baumgarten, and the head of the Federal Building Agency, Carl Mertz, the architects expressed 
their regret at the idling of the Council but insisted that their displeasure had nothing to do with 
financial concerns. Rather, Eiermann and Baumgarten were chiefly concerned that members of 
the Council’s Planning Group, all of whom were associates of the architects and on secondment 
to the Federal Building Agency, were continuing to work on plans without the input and 
supervision of the Council. Mertz relayed the complaint to Rossig at the Treasury Ministry and 
recommended that the Planning Council be reinstated as soon as possible on its original terms 
and that the Bund complete separate contracts with each architect for the design and execution of 
individual building projects.31 
                                                            
30 The contract states that the architects and the government share rights to the plans developed 
by the Planning Council. Contract between the Federal Republic of Germany and the architect 
Egon Eiermann, August 10, 1962 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
31 Mertz’s discussion with the architects and his recommendation are both described in Carl 
Mertz, Head of Federal Building Agency, Memo to Johannes Rossig at the Treasury Ministry’s 
Building Department in Bonn, February 2, 1964 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
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 Rossig acceded to Mertz’s suggestion, and the Planning Council began meeting again in 
March 1964, but a shift had taken place. Rossig had been correct in his pronouncement that the 
Council had mostly served its purpose in developing the preliminary concepts for the 
accommodation of the Bund’s growing workforce. The Council would continue to meet, albeit 
more sporadically, over the next several years, but it was no longer the focal point of federal 
planning that it had been in its first months. With the parliamentary high-rise having been singled 
out as the first phase of construction in the proposed Bundestag complex, federal officials turned 
their energies to clearing the practical and political hurdles that stood in the way of this more 
discrete but still monumental task. The Council’s other projects intended for the Government 
Quarter — Ruf’s design for a new Bundesrat building and Baumgarten’s design for a new Press 
and Information Office — remained on the agenda at Council meetings, but they took a backseat 
to executing the high-rise and ultimately were cancelled entirely in the wake of the public 
backlash in October 1969.  
 
Eiermann Takes Command and Questions the Suitability of a High-Rise 
 
 With the design of the high-rise moving into the foreground, the Council’s role receded 
into one of consultation and support rather than inspiration and origination. Eiermann began to 
assert himself more forcefully as the lead architect on the project. In the absence of monthly 
Council meetings, this meant a dramatic increase in the volume of his correspondence with 
Mertz and Rossig. With a mixture of graciousness and petulance, but also savvy and tenacity, 
Eiermann pressed his interests, becoming both a crucial champion for the Bundestag project but 
also at times a tremendous thorn in the side of the federal building officials tasked with 
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safeguarding their client’s best interests. For most of 1964, Eiermann directed his efforts 
primarily towards taking total control of the project. The architect flatly demanded that he either 
be allowed to take over the entire design process for the Bundeshaus or that the Federal Building 
Agency assume responsibility for the project.32 Eiermann struck a more magnanimous tone in his 
next letter to Mertz, claiming “the work on the Bundestag high-rise is so advanced that [he] must 
intervene with or without a contract.”33 However, the lack of a clear contract to lead the design 
of the Bundestag project clearly still bothered the architect, and in May he wrote again, this time 
to Mertz’s superior, Rossig, protesting that he had been working on the Bundestag practically for 
free while neglecting his other, presumably paying, projects.34  
 Eiermann’s combative approach continued into the summer when, without warning, he 
asked to be released from the Bundestag project altogether. His stated reason was not financial 
but rather that his work on the designs had come to a halt without any apparent prospect of 
restarting in the foreseeable future.35 As Rossig was on vacation, his assistant, and Carl Mertz’s 
predecessor at the Federal Building Agency, Undersecretary (Ministerialrat) Franz Sales Meyer, 
wrote a frantic reply to Eiermann, urging him to be patient, at least until October when there 
should be decision about whether to include money for the project in the 1965 budget. With 
                                                            
32 Egon Eiermann, Letter to the head of the Federal Building Agency, Carl Mertz, February 24, 
1964 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
33 Egon Eiermann, Letter to the head of the Federal Building Agency, Carl Mertz, March 2, 1964 
(SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
34 Egon Eiermann, Letter to the head of the Treasury Ministry’s Building Department, Johannes 
Rossig, May 2, 1964 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
35 Financial considerations were nevertheless on Eiermann’s mind, for in asking to be dismissed, 
he also asked to be paid for his time from December 1963 through June 1964 at the same rate as 
his work for the Planning Council (DM 3000 per month). Egon Eiermann, Letter to the head of 
the Treasury Ministry’s Building Department, Johannes Rossig, and the head of the Federal 
Building Agency, Carl Mertz, July 17, 1964 (BArch, B 157/4240). 
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financing in place, the design process would continue.36 This already represented more than a 
year’s delay over Bundestag President Gerstenmaier’s enthusiastic pronouncement of May 1963 
and demonstrated how easily the FRG’s political processes could frustrate and defer the plans of 
federal officials. Rossig explained this situation in detail when he finally responded to Eiermann, 
emphasizing that the highly politicized nature of the Bundestag project in Bonn made it 
particularly susceptible to delays.37 
 Rossig’s appeal for patience seems to have worked but also may have been unnecessary, 
as Eiermann’s response reveals an older, familiar, and still-festering complaint as the source of 
his aggravation. In plain contradiction to his earlier letter, Eiermann asserted that he was not 
concerned with whether or not the Bundestag project would ever be executed. Rather, the 
architect again protested that the Federal Building Agency had continued to work on the 
Bundestag without his input since the Planning Council was initially disbanded in November 
1963. According to Eiermann, his continued marginalization in the process was particularly 
intolerable because Bundestag President Gerstenmaier had now linked him with the project in 
public press conferences. Eiermann declared again that he needed total control, or he could not 
be involved. This was the only distinction that was important to him, and about this there could 
be no compromise. In spite of this ultimatum, Eiermann promised to continue attending Planning 
Council meetings.38 The architect’s persistence paid off several months later when, in a meeting 
with Mertz, the two men agreed that Eiermann would take control of the “artistic supervision” 
                                                            
36 Undersecretary Franz Sales Meyer, Treasury Ministry’s Building Department, Letter to Egon 
Eiermann, July 28, 1964 (BArch, B 157/4240). 
37 Johannes Rossig, the head of the Treasury Ministry’s Building Department, Letter to Egon 
Eiermann,  September 9, 1964 (BArch, B 157/4240). 
38 In explaining his position, Eiermann cited his former teacher, Hans Poelzig, as once having 
warned the younger architect to expect that only two percent of his designs would ever be 
realized. Egon Eiermann, Letter to the head of the Treasury Ministry’s Building Department, 
Johannes Rossig, September 14, 1964 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
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(künstlerische Oberleitung) of the Bundestag project with the Planning Group assisting with the 
detailed planning and design work. To ensure clear and continuous communication between the 
design team and its leader, Eiermann would designate one member of the Group as his primary 
contact, and the entire team would meet every Monday.39 
 Even though Eiermann would not receive his official contract to design the Bundestag 
high-rise until August 1965, he now had the role he desired, and he did not wait long to attempt 
to assert his control. On February 24, 1965, Eiermann dispatched three letters, including identical 
messages to Sep Ruf and Paul Baumgarten and the third to Johannes Rossig. Eiermann had 
independently developed an alternative design concept for the Bundestag expansion, and he was 
going to introduce it in the upcoming Planning Council meeting on March 8. The lynchpin of the 
new design was a dramatic reduction in height of the high-rise from twenty-eight stories to 
eleven and a corresponding increase in the building’s footprint to compensate for most of the lost 
square-meters. In the letters to Ruf and Baumgarten, which were clearly aimed at ensuring their 
support for the plan, Eiermann claimed first that his smaller building would save over ten million 
Deutschmarks relative to the original plans and second that it had always been his opinion that 
such a high-rise was too alien a form for the Bonn landscape.40  
 At the Council meeting, Eiermann further justified his proposal by proclaiming that “the 
new design would make the significance and grandeur of parliament more clearly visible than the 
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anonymous high-rise.”41 Unaccompanied by specifics, Eiermann’s statement was vague, but it 
was also one of the only instances during the planning process leading up to the building’s 
construction in which either architect or federal officials explicitly raised the issue of the 
parliamentary building as a representation of the institution that it housed. However, Eiermann 
immediately undercut his claims for the revised design’s superior representational quality by 
asserting that another one of its advantages was its suitability for other uses, such as by the 
University of Bonn, should the government return to Berlin.42 Appealing to this emotional issue 
was certainly a shrewd gesture on Eiermann’s part, and the practical ability to reuse federal 
buildings after reunification was a point of significant concern for federal and local officials in 
Bonn. However, the suggestion that the same buildings could house a legislative body and an 
institute of higher learning suggested further the anonymous character of the high-rise Eiermann 
had just disparaged.  
 Eiermann did not take into account that the timing of his about-face was potentially 
disastrous for the project. Only a week before Eiermann sent his letters, on February 17, 1965, 
the Bundestag had formally approved two million Deutschmarks for the first phase of 
construction. This appropriation, the Bund’s first concrete financial commitment to the building 
measures, was based on distinct plans for a high-rise office tower and was the subject of a long 
and highly contentious parliamentary debate. The revisions that Eiermann was proposing would 
have voided the earmark and required federal building officials to resubmit plans and restart 
negotiations almost from scratch. Even though Undersecretary Meyer and Federal Building 
Agency President Mertz explained these circumstances at the Planning Council meeting, along 
with the fact that Bundestag President Gerstenmaier was expecting construction to begin by the 
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end of the year, the meeting still ended with a resolution to continue to consider Eiermann’s 
alternative while also moving ahead with the high-rise as planned.43 Far from being persuasive, 
Eiermann seemed only to aggravate the officials for whom he ostensibly worked, as their 
predicament effectively precluded them from doing anything beyond merely discussing 
significant design alternatives, regardless of how strong the case for them may have been. 
 In the time between meetings, a still-exasperated Mertz wrote a long letter to Eiermann, 
reiterating that changing course threatened to invalidate hard-won legislative battles at the 
federal level and pleading with him to reconsider his decision. Mertz added that Eiermann was 
putting Bundestag President Gerstenmaier, who had publicly and forcefully backed the project, 
in a precarious political position and compromising the ongoing and sensitive discussions at the 
local level over land acquisition and use.44 These political barriers appeared insurmountable, but 
Mertz also defended the high-rise on architectural grounds and strongly criticized Eiermann’s 
alternative. If well executed, Mertz argued, the high-rise “can achieve an impressive, spirited, 
maybe even transparent form, like the Seagram’s [sic] Building in New York, which for me is 
absolutely the expression of the modern Gothic.”45 The allusions to the Gothic and comparisons 
to Mies van der Rohe betray a combination of pride and fantasy in Mertz’s ambitions for the 
West German parliamentary complex and serve as a response to Eiermann’s claim that the high-
rise inadequately reflected the significance of the Bundestag. He also likely intended to flatter 
Eiermann, tending to the architect’s ego just before the official described the shorter alternative 
as a “massive pile” (“massiver Klotz”) completely ill-suited for the Rhine landscape and the 
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surrounding neighborhood.46 In attempting to use Eiermann’s criticism — that the building was 
inappropriate to its context — against the architect, however, Mertz undermined his own 
argument. His invocation of the Seagram Building did not acknowledge the urban context: one 
amongst numerous skyscrapers along Park Avenue in New York City. 
 In his response to Mertz on March 17, 1965 and in a letter to Rossig a day later, 
Eiermann staunchly defended his proposal and issued a prescient warning. He foresaw the folly 
in building a high-rise on the Gronau and contended that the public would almost certainly reject 
it, requiring the Planning Council to provide an alternative. Eiermann then addressed Mertz’s 
claims, repeating his belief that high-rises were not suitable for an open landscape and explaining 
that the new proposal balanced horizontal and vertical accents in a way that was in tune with the 
site and the surrounding hills.47  To Rossig, Eiermann elaborated on his position, but he framed it 
in more calculated political terms. Eiermann argued that siting a high-rise that close to the Rhine, 
“one of the most beautiful landscapes in Germany, could represent an act of foolhardiness,” 
because it risked raising the ire of the entire German populace.48 Therefore, he felt compelled “to 
offer a serious alternative, which even if it were hopeless, would free [the Planning Council] 
from the accusation of having neglected something that had been part of [its] responsibility to 
investigate and recommend.”49 That this alternative proved to be, in Eiermann’s opinion, a better 
solution than the high-rise meant that it deserved serious consideration. 
 Eiermann succeeded in at least forcing the Planning Council to consider his proposal, 
which dominated the discussion at the Council’s meeting on March 29. Eiermann recapitulated 
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his argument for the lower building, but in a politically and professionally astute move, he also 
finally emphasized that he would stand by the high-rise if the Council determined that it could 
not shift planning directions. The federal officials present then mounted the most cogent 
architectural defense of the high-rise since they had settled on that form over two years earlier. 
Against Eiermann’s proposal, Undersecretary Meyer argued that the high-rise could be more 
easily expanded to incorporate other parliamentary functions should the next phases of the 
overall Bundestag project not be constructed. Meyer also countered Eiermann’s concerns about 
the high-rise’s representational function by pointing out that it would more likely be the new 
plenary chamber that carried the responsibility of being the “Parliament Building” 
(Parlamentsbau).50 
 Next, Wolfgang Leuschner of the Treasury Ministry addressed the issue of the high-rise’s 
situation in the landscape, one of Eiermann’s most consistent criticisms. Leuschner asserted that 
the high-rise, when considered in the context of the area around it, including the high-rise being 
constructed by the Allianz corporation on an adjacent site and north Bad Godesberg, where the 
Planning Council and Bund intended to build a series of towers, “should be and should remain 
the architectural and spiritual center of the future Government Quarter.”51 Thus, the high-rise 
would perform a representational function, visibly marking, even from a great distance, the 
location of the heart of West German democracy. Leuschner also noted that jettisoning the high-
rise in favor of Eiermann’s proposal would inevitably lead to building more expansively 
horizontally, contradicting one of the Council’s earlier considerations to preserve as much green 
space as possible.52 
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 At the end of the debate, the Council decided to move ahead with the high-rise while 
keeping the alternative on the table just in case it became necessary. For Eiermann, the issue 
appeared to be settled, and on August 10, 1965, exactly three years after signing the first 
Planning Council contract, he signed a contract to design a high-rise, which clearly enumerataed 
his complete managerial authority over process and personnel.53 Eiermann’s last-minute proposal 
to alter the design had forced the federal building officials to justify the construction of a high-
rise. They responded that the prestige attached to the high-rise form, its flexibility, the presence 
or planned presence of other high-rises in the vicinity, the limitations of the site, and the desire to 
maintain green space all pointed to the suitability of their choice. However, no federal official 
had an answer to Eiermann’s prediction that the public would never accept a one-hundred-meter 
tall building in the Gronau, and ultimately, none of their explanations mattered in the face of the 
political obstacles and certain delays involved in budgetary negotiations in the Bundestag.  
 
Eiermann’s High-Rise and the Legislative Process 
 
 Those negotiations began at Gerstenmaier’s instigation among the Bundestag’s 
leadership (Vorstand) soon after the convening of the Planning Council. Gerstenmaier sought 
and failed to include ten million Deutschmarks for construction and another ten million for land 
acquisition in the Bundestag’s 1963 budget primarily because he could not yet submit the 
concrete plans and cost estimates that were required by the Reich Financial Regulation. The next 
year, however, Gerstenmaier took a slightly less ambitious tack and successfully inserted an 
empty placeholder (Leertitel) into the budget under the heading “New Buildings for the Purposes 
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of the Bundestag Including Preliminary Facilities.” No funds were appropriated, and the 
Bundestag did not debate the issue, but the existence of the line item would facilitate the process 
in the following year and it sent a clear signal about the leadership’s intentions. Furthermore, 
even though negotiations with Bonn over the purchase price and conditions of sale were still 
ongoing in the spring of 1964, Gerstenmaier also convinced the Bundestag’s Budget Committee 
to include in the same budget fifteen million Deutschmarks for land acquisition in the Gronau. 
Crucially, the budget item had the highly generic title, “Precautionary Land Acquisition for the 
Purposes of the Federal Government,” and was drawn not from of the Bundestag’s section of the 
budget but rather from the General Financial Administration (Allgemeine Finanzverwaltung) 
section.54 This section also included West Germany’s financial support for West Berlin, a sum 
that approached 1.5 billion Deutschmarks in 1964. The relative magnitude of the Bund’s budget 
commitments to Berlin and the sensitivity of the issue of support for the embattled former capital 
effectively deflected any attention and potential controversy away from the expenditure on land 
in Bonn. The final purchase price for the land of 98.5 million Deutschmarks (see below)—over 
twice as much as the proposed 48.5 million Deutschmark budget for the high-rise itself—elicited 
objections from FDP members in the Bundestag Budget Committee,55 but they could not stop it 
from passing. Subsequently, there was virtually no debate within the larger Bundestag over 
appropriating the funds from the same division of the budget.56 
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 The 48.5 million figure for the high-rise emerged in a meeting between building officials 
from the Treasury Ministry and the Bundestag leadership in November 1964, in which the 
officials presented formal plans for a twenty-three-story high-rise. Complete plans and costs 
estimates, even though they were still labeled as drafts, allowed Gerstenmaier to press ahead 
with a request for twelve million Deutschmarks in initial funding in the 1965 budget with the 
hope that construction could be well under way by the end of the year. The Budget Committee 
subsequently reduced the number to two million,57 but even this small sum became the subject of 
vigorous debate once it reached the full Bundestag in February. The most strident objections 
came from members of the Free Democrat Party, who cited both financial concerns and its 
potential negative impact on the West German commitment to Berlin. Bundestag Member 
Wolfgang Rutschke (FDP), speaking in support of a motion by his party to halt the project, even 
pointed to the Berlin Reichstag building as evidence for both the fiscal and political arguments. 
The Paul Baumgarten-designed renovations of the Reichstag were currently in progress for a 
total projected cost of 95 million Deutschmarks, and Rutschke asked his colleagues why, if it 
were so important to restore functionality to the former parliament in Berlin, were they also 
committing to such permanent and large changes to the current one in Bonn.58  
 The FDP also questioned the premise behind the high-rise project, that the Bundestag 
faced a critical shortage of space that could only be solved through new construction. Instead, 
members of the party suggested that organizational reforms within parliament would be more 
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effective and more economical solutions.59 However, for the broad group of members upon 
which Gerstenmaier relied for the building’s approval, the lack of space was a serious issue that 
was increasingly impeding their ability to perform their legislative tasks. Gerstenmaier 
convinced these politicians to back a single high-rise as the most pragmatic architectural solution 
at the time. Nevertheless, they expressed the same misgivings as their more anti-development 
colleagues towards the Bundestag President’s well-publicized larger ambitions to create an entire 
federal district around the Bundesrat and Bundestag based on the Planning Council’s plans.60 
Thus, they were eager to assert that their immediate support for the 2 million Deutschmarks for 
the high-rise should not be construed as support for the entire complex. Here, the relatively small 
amount of the earmark worked in Gerstenmaier’s favor, as it allowed him to make a plausible 
claim that he was advancing the project incrementally and that the Bundestag could change 
direction the following year if necessary.61 However, with definite funding in place, construction 
could begin, and once the Bund broke ground, it was highly unlikely that the Bundestag would 
pull the plug on the high-rise’s funding even if it refused to approve the larger complex around it. 
 The following year, with the land deal successfully concluded but construction not yet 
begun, Gerstenmaier again asked for only the relatively small sum of 3 million Deutschmarks for 
the office tower. Unlike the previous year, there were no objections within the Budget 
Committee (Haushaltsausschuß), and the debate by the full Bundestag was far less contentious 
than the previous year and involved half as many participants. Members from the Free Democrat 
Party recapitulated their objections, but there was a perfunctory quality to them, and no members 
                                                            
59 See Hermann Dürr’s (FDP) statement to the Bundestag, ibid, 8132-8133. 
60 See statements by Hermann Conring (CDU/CSU) and Johann Baptist Gradl (CDU/CSU), ibid, 
8134-8135, 8137-8138. 
61 See statement by Bundestag President Eugen Gerstenmaier, ibid, 8138-8139. 
 154 
filed a formal motion to try and reverse the funding.62 The federal elections in the fall of 1965 
also played a role in muting opposition, as they saw the share of FDP seats in the Bundestag drop 
from sixty-seven to fifty. By the time the 1967 budgetary debates got underway the tower’s steel 
skeleton was rising quickly, and even though the requested appropriation rose from 3 million to 
15 million Deutschmarks, the topic disappeared from parliamentary debates.63 The appropriation 
of federal funds for the Bundestag project was perhaps the single checkpoint in the planning 
process for which there could be no contingency, no “Plan B.” Gerstenmaier’s success in 
securing majority support for the project, which involved no small amount of public promotion 
and private arm twisting, led to him being so thoroughly identified with the finished building that 
it became eponymous with him.  
 However, approved funding also meant that Rossig, Mertz, and the federal planning 
bureaucracy were stuck. Focused on accommodating a growing federal workforce and alleviating 
an emerging space crisis that together were wreaking havoc on Bonn’s urban infrastructure and 
the city’s planning capacity, the Planning Council made a quick, early decision that set the Bund 
on the path of high-rise construction. Functional and economic issues dominated that choice, and 
the project’s supporters overlooked the public’s potential reaction to such a dramatic change in 
the city’s appearance and space as a point of concern. In light of the building freeze and the 
lingering skepticism towards large federal building projects in Bonn, federal officials rightfully 
viewed the construction of the high-rise as a major victory, but as the debate shifted from 
Planning Council meetings to the Bundestag and City Hall, a disregard for local concerns 
persisted amongst federal decision makers. Even though there was already evidence for a 
                                                            
62 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll, 5. Wahlperiode, 41. Sitzung, May 17, 1966, 1855-
1878. 
63 The Bundestag unanimously approved the budget in 1967 without debate. Deutscher 
Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll, 5. Wahlperiode, 111. Sitzung, June 7, 1967, 5267. 
 155 
negative public reaction after the disclosure of the Bund’s plans in February 1963, by the time 
Eiermann attempted to insert local reception as a significant factor in his design concept, the 
legislative process had advanced beyond the point of no return.  
 
The Sale of the Gronau 
 
 That Gerstenmaier pushed for funds for a building intended for land that was at that point 
still owned by the city is emblematic of the disconnect between federal and local planning goals 
and assumptions. Although they had been brewing in local press columns and in government 
offices since the Bund’s plans had first been disclosed, the tensions between Bonn and the Bund 
materialized as concrete disagreements during the negotiations that led to Bonn’s sale of a 13.8 
hectare section of the Gronau. Acquiring the land was the last major hurdle before construction 
could begin, but it forced the Bund to engage in direct negotiations with its municipal host right 
at the moment when the city was beginning to experience more acutely the accumulating stresses 
and strains — urban, structural, and financial — of serving as the capital. A news report from 
September 1965 put the Bund’s role in Bonn’s problems in stark numerical terms, revealing that 
each federal employee ultimately cost the city between 100 and 200 Deutschmarks per year.64 A 
formal recommendation from the City Council’s City Planning Committee on June 24, 1965 put 
these desires most broadly and succinctly; in order for the city to be able to satisfy its own needs, 
it wanted a binding statement from the Bund about its long term plans for its own facilities and 
financial support for the city.65 
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 Local Bonn officials also clearly felt that they had an obligation to the Bund to facilitate 
the accommodation of federal authorities,66 so the task for the city was to arrive at a settlement 
that satisfied both local and national interests. As the negotiations wore on well into 1965, 
municipal representatives began to raise serious questions about the feasibility of the Bund’s 
plans, which, parliamentary approval notwithstanding, always involved far more than a single 
high-rise, as well as its overall intentions with regard to Bonn’s future development. Technically, 
the West German Federal Building Law of 1960 gave Bonn, as both the owner of most of the 
land in question and as the final authority over municipal zoning decisions, all of the leverage it 
needed to extract significant concessions from the Bund. At the very least, Bonn sought to have 
the Bund’s obligations to the city reflected in an inflated sales price for the property. However, 
Bonn ultimately only extracted vague promises from the Bund that it would indeed follow 
through with its larger objectives for the federal district.  
 For hundreds of years before the 20th century, the area of the Gronau was primarily 
agricultural land. This began to change in the 19th century with the construction of the railroad, 
the settlement of some industry in the area, and the gradual construction of numerous villas 
scenically situated along the Rhine. The most prominent of these were the Palais Schaumburg 
and Villa Hammerschmidt, which were occupied by the Federal Chancellor and the President, 
respectively, after 1949. In the wake of World War I and in the midst of increasing national 
interest in physical fitness and outdoor recreation, the city built sports facilities on the land. After 
a brief interlude as potato fields during the depths of World War II’s food shortages, Bonn’s City 
Council reestablished the athletic facilities with a soccer pitch and running track (see Fig. 63).  
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 Despite the proposed site’s proximity to the newly established Bundeshaus and other key 
parts of the federal administration, the Bund initially disavowed any interest in the land because 
it sat within the Rhine’s floodplain.67 In 1960, the city began making plans to renovate and 
expand the sports facilities to better serve a population that had grown substantially since 1945. 
However, the work of the Planning Council in the early 1960s quickly changed federal planners’ 
opinions about the Bund’s needs for land, and as city officials became aware of the Council’s 
proposal for a greatly expanded Bundestag and Bundesrat complex, it was immediately clear to 
them that the loss of the Gronau was likely a foregone conclusion. In a June 1962 memo from 
Bonn’s City Planning Office, the Director of Building Günter Schubert acknowledged the likely 
loss, and even framed it in terms of the city’s obligation to work with the Bund in 
accommodating of federal agencies. He also did not let the Bund off the hook, noting its track 
record of neglect for local urban planning concerns and suggesting that federal designs in the 
Gronau were an opportunity to put more pressure on the Bund to assist the city.68 
 Later that same month, the Federal Building Agency submitted its official application to 
rezone the Gronau as an area for the exclusive purposes of parliament and federal authorities. 
This first application, however, came without information on federal construction plans for the 
area, and it also included over one hundred parcels of private land without respect for their 
boundaries.69 It was only after Gerstenmaier and federal planning officials presented the 
Planning Council’s preliminary ideas for a Bundestag complex in the Gronau to the city in early 
1963 that the municipal administration authorized negotiations with the Bund over the use of the 
                                                            
67 Bonner Rundschau, “Finanz-Stadt Komplex ‘saniert’ den Bonner Norden,” December 18, 
1954. 
68 Director of Building Günter Schubert, Memo from the Bonn City Planning Office, June 5, 
1962 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N61/165). 
69 Bonn City Planning Office, Memo in response to the Federal Building Agency’s application to 
rezone areas of the Gronau, July 4, 1962 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N61/165). 
 158 
land. In these initial exchanges, Bonn’s City Planning Office was highly critical of the federal 
plans, describing them as fragmented, disorderly, and not well integrated into the surrounding 
neighborhoods, many of which would remain residential.70 When federal planners raised the 
issue of Bonn’s provisional status, asserting that they did not want to leave the city with a 
collection of unusable buildings once the capital returned to Berlin, the City Manager, Franz 
Schmidt countered that Bonn would be best served by unified, long-term planning rather than the 
aimless and provisional schemes that the Bund had thus far proposed.71 
 Federal officials countered these criticisms with a proposal that was far greater in scope 
and ambition. They proposed the creation of an expansive greenbelt that would extend south 
along the Rhine from the Bundestag campus to the northern part of Bad Godesberg, where the 
Bund already had eyes on establishing a second federal complex. Federal buildings would be 
loosely arranged within this green space, and the city’s major transportation routes, including the 
federal train lines, would be buried underneath.72 This scheme involved a transformation of the 
city that went far beyond merely purchasing 14 hectares of the Gronau and expanding 
parliament, and it is likely the scheme that came under such harsh criticism in Revue (see Fig. 
64). For officials in Bonn’s City Planning Office, the Bund’s more comprehensive vision for the 
city appeared to anticipate and address many of their urban planning concerns, including 
replacement sports facilities, improved transportation infrastructure, and abundant green space, 
but that very scale drew the criticism that the plans were unrealizable.73 Nevertheless, the 
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apparent willingness of federal planners to engage in such extensive planning exercises was a 
satisfying enough concession for the city that it moved forward on negotiations over the more 
constricted plans to expand the Bundestag’s facilities. When politics at the federal level quickly 
whittled even those more discrete plans down to a single high-rise, the city viewed the retreat as 
confirmation that the Bund was unwilling or unable to plan for itself while also addressing local 
interests. 
 By the middle of 1964, both sides had formalized their demands surrounding the Gronau, 
and they came quite close to concluding a deal. The Bund wanted to purchase and have rezoned 
for its exclusive use a 14.4 hectare plot of land along the Rhine just to the south of the current 
Bundeshaus. The Bund would use the land to construct a Parliamentary District based on the 
Planning Council’s suggestions and closely approximating plans and models previously 
disclosed by Gerstenmaier and other federal building officials. It would comprise new structures 
for the Bundestag and Bundesrat, including the high-rise tower, expanded facilities for the 
Federal Press and Information Office, and auxiliary services, such as a restaurant and hotel. 
Bonn’s initial conditions for allowing the Bund to proceed with these plans were the purchase of 
the necessary land from the city and any private owners, the satisfaction of legal zoning 
requirements, the assumption of costs for any necessary infrastructure, such as water, sewer, and 
electrical lines, and the creation of replacements for all of the facilities — sports park, stadium, 
municipal water works, public restrooms, public parking, and several others — that would be 
displaced by the new Bundestag and Bundesrat buildings.74 The monetary price for the land was 
a token sum of 6.8 million Deutschmarks, and Wolfgang Leuschner, who was the lead federal 
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negotiator with the city indicated that the Bund would agree to these terms.75 With Gerstenmaier 
pushing strongly for funds in the 1965 budget, Leuschner and his colleagues had an ambitious 
development schedule in mind that began with the successful acquisition of the land. Once it 
owned the land, the Bund could initiate the legal planning process, over which Bonn’s City 
Council, with additional oversight by state officials in Cologne, had final say. Leuschner 
envisioned completing this process, which included a month-long public feedback period, in 
early 1965 and starting construction on the high-rise by April 1. The high-rise would be followed 
immediately by a new plenary chamber for the Bundestag and new Bundesrat building.76 
 However, local politics intervened, and local elections in 1964 ushered in a new city 
administration and with it a new City Manager. Negotiations were put on hold during the 
transition, but when they restarted at the end of the year, Wolfgang Hesse, the new City Manager 
struck a far more confrontational tone. The most consequential shift in the talks was the 
decoupling of the city’s conditions from the specific circumstances of building a high-rise in the 
Gronau. The most contentious new request from the city was a blanket statement of political and 
financial support from the Bund for Bonn’s future urban development. Gerstenmaier personally 
appealed to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to accept such a condition so as not to prolong 
negotiations and delay construction.77 The Bundestag, however, determined that the Basic Law 
already guaranteed compensation to the city for any expenses incurred by the federal 
government’s presence and activities, and any additional payments would be unconstitutional,78 
as they would constitute special treatment of one city over others. The city countered this by 
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arguing that its function as the provisional capital made it a special case deserving of special 
treatment and increased support. In a Building Department memo, Leuschner acknowledged the 
constitutional issue, but seemed to side with Bonn, concluding that, for both political and 
functional reasons, it served the Bund’s interests to support healthy urban growth in the capital.79 
 At the first direct meeting between Hesse and the Bund in February 1965, the new City 
Manager sharpened the demand for federal support for Bonn by quantifying it. Hesse claimed 
that the city administration could demonstrate that the financial burden due to the presence of the 
Bund had cost Bonn 25 million Deutschmarks per year, and he asked that the federal government 
give an equal sum to the city for the next ten years for its unrestricted use. Hesse insisted that this 
money come in addition to the purchase price for the Gronau land, as well as to any funds 
required to upgrade the infrastructure and replace the municipal facilities on the site. It could not 
replace the financial assistance that the city already received through the established channel 
outlined in the Basic Law. This last funding mechanism required the city to apply to multiple 
federal departments for reimbursement for each municipal project individually, and Hesse argued 
that the process was too complicated, time consuming, and ultimately inadequate to help correct 
Bonn’s extensive planning issues in areas such as schools, roads, or fire protection services. 
Finally, Hesse made agreeing to this support a precondition for any resolution to the exchange of 
the land, and he asked for a meeting with the Federal Ministers of Finance, the Treasury, and the 
Interior, expressing confidence that he could convince them in person.80 
 Three months later, Hesse was granted a meeting with Treasury Minister Werner 
Dollinger and Finance Minister Rolf Dahlgrün. He came armed with a legal memo produced by 
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municipal lawyers that asserted that the kind of global financial grants that Bonn sought were 
legal under the Basic Law, but he still failed to convince the ministers to reverse their opposition. 
Dollinger and Dahlgrün argued that, constitutional issues aside, such a policy would set an 
untenable precedent for the federal government’s relationship with other cities and that it was 
politically infeasible so late in the legislative session. The first 2 million Deutschmarks had been 
approved for construction over strenuous objections in the Bundestag, and returning to ask for 
another 25 million was out of the question. In the same meeting, Hesse also disclosed the city’s 
price for the use of the Gronau. Rather than a sale, Hesse proposed a leasehold arrangement, 
under which the Bund would gain control of the Gronau site for ten years at a price of 1.8 million 
Deutschmarks per year plus an additional 56.5 million to cover the costs of transferring existing 
facilities and preparing the land for development.81 
 Six weeks later, in June 1965, Gerstenmaier met with Hesse and negotiated a tentative 
deal for the Gronau that totaled 308 millions Deutschmarks, broken down as a 1 million 
Deutschmark nominal purchase price for the land, 56.5 million for the transfer of facilities and 
site preparations, and 250 million as reparations for the costs incurred by Bonn as the provisional 
capital. Gerstenmaier, who desperately wanted to prevent any further delays and preserve the 
hard-won federal funds for the project, argued that the one-time lump some of 250 million would 
ultimately be the cheapest alternative, and Finance Minister Dahlgrün even suggested that in 
light of such a high price, the Bund could extract more value from the land by also adding 
buildings for federal ministries.82 The agreement was extremely short lived, however, as the 
reparation payment remained an insurmountable barrier, due as much to principle as to its size. 
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The Finance Ministry thus proposed a counter-offer that attempted to get around the issue. The 
Bund would offer Bonn the full appraised value of the site, 36.5 million Deutschmarks, plus the 
56.5 millions for the transfer and replacement costs, and a one-time payment of 25 million, 
which was framed as compensation for the loss of the Gronau, but stood as a form of reparations, 
albeit much smaller than what the city thought it deserved.83  
 At the same time, Gerstenmaier crafted an offer that took a somewhat different tack, 
linking the purchase of the Gronau to the amelioration of an unrelated but longstanding urban 
planning conundrum in the city. In a letter to Chancellor Erhard, Gerstenmaier proposed that in 
exchange for the Bund’s use of the Gronau, the federal government should agree to finance and 
execute the burial of the federal rail lines that through the heart of Bonn. These lines, constructed 
at grade based on King Friedrich Wilhelm IV’s royal decree, bisected the city awkwardly, cutting 
off the Altstadt from the neighborhoods to its west and south with only a handful of pedestrian 
and car crossings. Burying them would greatly ease movement around the most congested part of 
the city and unify the university’s campus, but it was a prohibitively costly undertaking for an 
already indebted city. Gerstenmaier’s offer would thus give Bonn something of great financial 
and functional value, but something that would bypass the constitutional issue while allowing the 
Bund to retain control of the funding for the project.84 
 Gerstenmaier would float this idea a few more times, but a consensus was forming 
amongst federal officials that the best deal would be found in offering Bonn the full purchase 
price for the land plus replacement costs for the facilities and a token sum to compensate the city 
for its loss of the site.85 Thus, it appeared that a deal was close at hand when Hesse met secretly 
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on July 12, 1965 with Hans Clausen Korff, the Finance Ministry’s Budget Director, and 
essentially agreed on a compromise along those lines. From that point, negotiations proceeded 
quickly over the next several weeks, as the two sides ironed out the sticking points: price, money 
for reparations, leasing versus purchasing, and the extent of federal development in the Gronau. 
On each of these issues, Hesse capitulated almost entirely to the Bund’s position. Korff and 
Hesse arrived at a deal in which which the Bund would lease the Gronau for ten years at 1.8 
million Deutschmarks per year and pay a lump sum of 80 million that included transfer costs and 
any notional additional compensation for a total value of 98 million Deutschmarks.86 Johannes 
Rossig, the head of the Treasury Ministry’s Building Department, however, objected to leasing 
the land, even when Hesse lowered the lump some to 70 million, asserting that a lease would 
only set the stage for more conflict ten years later. Hesse countered with a sales offer that raised 
the total amount to 125 million because it included 30 million in compensation for the city’s 
prior capital investment, i.e. reparations. The Bund immediately rejected this, and Hesse finally 
agreed to a purchase price of 98.5 million, 36 million for the land and 62.5 for transfer, 
replacement, and site preparation costs.87 
 With the price settled, the Bund revealed that it wanted to expand its program, adopting 
Finance Minister Dahlgrün’s earlier suggestion to include additional buildings for federal 
ministries, specifically three fifteen-story and four eight-story buildings (Figure 67). This 
represented a far more intensive development of the Gronau than Bonn had envisioned, and the 
city argued that the change undermined the agreement, which was negotiated under a 
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dramatically different set of assumptions.88 Federal planning officials responded to the objection 
with a slightly scaled back version of the idea that reduced the number of new buildings by one, 
but Bonn insisted that the only valid plans for the Gronau were those for the high-rise and 
buildings for the Bundestag and Bundesrat.89 However, Bonn had to be careful with its pushback. 
City and federal officials had previously agreed that in the immediate transaction, in order to 
limit delays and potential opposition, only the land required to build the high-rise would be 
included in the zoning and development applications.90 This was yet another concession by the 
city to the Bund’s preferences, as Bonn very much wanted the Bund to submit detailed 
development plans for the entire Gronau along with a binding commitment to complete them. 
Although it stopped short of a binding pledge, the Bund was offering something close to a long-
term, comprehensive vision, but the content was unacceptable. Bonn’s opposition successfully 
forestalled any plans to fill the Gronau with mid-rise office buildings, but the consequence was 
that the Bund backed away from any commitments in the Gronau except for “Langer Eugen.” 
 The Bund’s obligations in the Gronau were formalized in the official sales contract, 
which was finalized and signed on October 18, 1965 after a long and contentious debate in a 
special closed session of Bonn’s City Council. Bonn would receive 98.5 million Deutschmarks in 
exchange for the land, but the only recognition of Bonn’s larger city planning concerns was 
contained in clauses that required the Bund to develop the land within ten years or return it to the 
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city and coordinate this development with Bonn’s city planning office.91 This was a far cry from 
the detailed, comprehensive planning commitment that Bonn sought, and it delayed any 
consequences of federal intransigence for a decade, which amounted to an eternity in the context 
of the precarious nature of Bonn’s provisional status. During the Council debate, Hesse justified 
his concessions to the Bund as tactical. He asserted that if the city refused to make a deal, the 
Bund would merely shift its development activities outside of Bonn’s borders, where the city 
would have little control but would still be left with the negative consequences.  
 Johannes Rossig, representing the federal government’s interests in the debate, appeared 
to confirm Hesse’s contention that the Bund would engage in such opportunistic hair-splitting 
between building activity in Bonn versus the neighboring communities. Rossig claimed that the 
only new construction in Bonn had been the Foreign Office Building and the additions to the 
Husaren-Kaserne for the Finance Ministry. When a City Council member mentioned the obvious 
Ministry of Defense in Duisdorf, Rossig replied that it did not count because it was not 
technically in Bonn.92 The apparent disingenuousness of this exchange portended the steadily 
increasing tension between local and federal administrations in the coming years. Hesse already 
showed his insecurity about the Bund’s intentions in a letter to Rossig written the day after the 
conclusion of the Gronau contract. The City Manager implored the head of the Treasury 
Ministry’s Building Department to keep the Bund’s promise and not leave the Gronau as the site 
of a single and disconnected high-rise. In doing so, he invoked the local citizens of Bonn, who, 
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having just witnessed a prized piece of their city being sold, deserved to know what to expect 
with the completed development.93  
 Even with the land successfully purchased, the Bund would not start construction on the 
tower for another year, and Bundestag members would not occupy the building until early 1969. 
Ironically, Eugen Gerstenmaier would never get to use the building that took his name, as he was 
forced to resign in January 1969 amid controversy surrounding his compensation. City and 
federal officials had to push the plans through the legal planning process, which raised a number 
of minor issues, such as satisfying local and state-level requirements for landscape and nature 
protection because of the tower’s proximity to the Rhine and its flood zones. Federal planners 
also needed to wait for the Bundestag to appropriate a second installment of funding and for 
Eiermann to finalize his designs. In the meantime, federal planners continued to insist to their 
municipal counterparts that they would develop the Gronau as a parliamentary district in a way 
that fulfilled the city’s planning desires even as they pursued their own agenda of meeting the 
federal workforce’s growing space needs and consolidating the fragmented federal authorities 
into one of only several federally-owned sites. To that end, Rossig reintroduced the idea of 
adding ministry buildings to the Gronau plans — this time only two — and proposed 
constructing high-rises for both the Foreign Office and the Postal Ministry on their current sites 
just to the north of Villa Hammerschmidt and Palais Schaumburg.94 For Rossig, the seemingly 
constant reformulation of federal building plans represented his attempts to meet his obligations 
while adapting to a political landscape that was more open than ever to large-scale building in 
Bonn but still contained vocal skeptics and numerous budget hawks. For Hesse and Bonn, 
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however, the ever-evolving proposals appeared as a stubborn unwillingness to commit to the 
kind of long-term planning and support that the city needed in order to prepare for its own needs. 
 
Public Reaction to the Sale of the Gronau and the Construction of the High-Rise 
 
 Wolfgang Hesse and Bonn failed in the Gronau negotiations to gain concessions from the 
federal government that came anywhere close to addressing the city’s growing planning 
problems and financial burdens. What they received instead were mere promises of future 
considerations that would never be fulfilled. The Gronau was thus a missed opportunity to 
resolve some of the developing tensions between the federal government and its municipal hosts, 
and these tensions found expression in routinely negative coverage in the press that reflected, in 
turn, growing public dissatisfaction with the federal government’s effect on the city. Nationally, 
the press had always directed its criticism at the development’s cost, which many thought the 
country could ill afford, as well as the disruption to Bonn’s provisional status and, by extension, 
Berlin’s place as the rightful capital, that the building seemed to represent. With revelations that 
the Bund wanted to build multiple ministry buildings in the Gronau, the national news magazine 
Stern published an image of the working model under the headline, “Bonn itself does not plan on 
any savings,” and compared a maximal image of the project with all of West Germany’s more 
pressing social needs (Figure 68).95 One epithet that proliferated early and that aptly captured 
both the public’s anxieties about wasteful government spending and the legitimacy of a new 
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capital city, while tapping into a broader cultural aversion to modernist architecture, was 
“Brasilia am Rhein” (Figure 69).96 
 The local public shared many of the concerns expressed in national outlets, but as the 
tower began rising, the criticism intensified and sharpened. Throughout the building’s 
construction, the local press passed up no opportunity to reveal cost overruns and apparent 
extravagances such as imported teak for wood trim on the façade.97 When local papers published 
images of Eiermann’s final model for the building in the days before the first foundations were 
laid, they branded it a “silo,” a pejorative term for the severe, rectilinear form of the 30-story 
tower98 that alluded to the clichéd anonymous modernist skyscrapers that were filling postwar 
urban skylines around the globe.99 Thus, along with “Brasilia am Rhein,” “Manhattan am Rhein” 
and its close variation, “Bonnhattan,”100 began appearing frequently as sobriquets for the 
Bundestag high-rise, offering sensationalized visions that tapped directly into local fears about 
the transformation that the federal government appeared to be trying to impose on Bonn and its 
effect on Bonn’s urban space. 
 In reality, the city was in no danger of obtaining the canyon effect of midtown 
Manhattan’s avenues, nor did the Bund give its selected planners anything like the tabula rasa 
that Lúcio Costa and Oscar Niemeyer received on Brazil’s Central Plateau. However, by the end 
of 1966, between Eiermann’s building, which was now under way, the Allianz building nearing 
completion nearby, and the numerous models that the Bund had disclosed, Bonn’s citizens had 
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legitimate reasons to be concerned that the development threatened to spoil the city’s relationship 
to the surrounding natural landscape and disrupt Bonn’s established urban space and well-worn 
patterns of life. As the tower’s steel skeleton rose into the air and the effects of its height on the 
surrounding landscape became concrete, it only confirmed those fears. Jürg Straßberger, Bonn’s 
Commissioner for Nature Protection and Landscape Conservation (Naturschutz- und 
Landschaftpflege), described the impact in the most disaparaging manner, asserting that the high-
rise “degraded into molehills” the Siebengebirge mountains that formed the city’s treasured 
natural backdrop (Figure 70).101 
 For a large swath of the local public, the sale of the Gronau to the federal government for 
the purposes of a high-rise was, at best, a dubious exchange with vague and questionable benefits 
for the city. Gerstenmaier remained a constant source of statements extolling the virtues of the 
building for the Bundestag and its members,102 but the primary justification for its construction 
was thrown into doubt when the legislators began moving into their new offices, and it became 
clear that, as large as it was, “Langer Eugen” would not be large enough to house all Bundestag 
members with adequate room for their staffs and secretaries.103 Furthermore, at a meeting on 
February 22, 1967, less than two years after the sale of the Gronau, federal building official 
Leuschner forthrightly admitted that his department had no further plans on the table for the 
Gronau and that the next federal buildings would be placed in Bad Godesberg, where 
negotiations with city officials were proceeding smoothly.104 Later that year federal officials 
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publicly acknowledged that they would not be able to complete the development of the Gronau 
within the ten-year period stipulated in the sales agreement.105 The fears that had driven 
Wolfgang Hesse to give away so much in the Gronau deal had come to pass despite his efforts. 
 For Bonn, it seemed, the Gronau deal was a total loss. The entire process, however, had 
set several important precedents that would prove valuable when citizens turned their attention 
and their ire to the next flashpoint, the Bad Godesberg development. First, the return of large-
scale federal building in the heart of the city signaled the de facto end of the Baustopp, which in 
turn heralded a substantial turn away from a view of Bonn as a merely provisional capital in the 
eyes of planners, lawmakers, and the public. This paralleled and augmented the conceptual and 
discursive shift that was simultaneously taking place within the context of Bonn’s campaign to 
expand its borders. Second, Hesse’s negotiating tactics set the crucial example of linking federal 
development in Bonn to demands that the Bund address broader local planning concerns that 
might only be tangentially related to any particular building project. In 1965, Hesse may not 
have had sufficient leverage to force the Bund to make substantial material commitments to the 
city, but the city’s realization that the Bund had unmet responsibilities in its capital and Hesse’s 
initial effort to press that awareness on federal officials and legislators would find ultimate 
success later in the decade. Third, the planning and construction of Eiermann’s high-rise 
provided the city with an almost ideal example of a process that seemed to give the Bund free 
reign while giving nothing to the city in return and established a potent counter-example against 
which to formulate demands for change. The Planning Council, out of which the entire scheme 
originated, met in semi-secret without the foreknowledge or the input of municipal officials, and 
the Council assigned architectural responsibilities to its members, and in the case of Eiermann 
signed a formal contract, without the slightest mention of an open competition. In a liberal 
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democracy that prized political transparency and unambiguously gave power over planning to 
local authorities, Bonn’s public viewed the process that resulted in a skyscraper on the banks of 
the Rhine as necessarily deficient. 
 Finally and most importantly, the appearance of Langer Eugen dominating Bonn’s 
skyline served to galvanize public opinion, both broadening and deepening skepticism towards 
federal development in the city. The Bundestag’s tower emphatically marked Bonn as the 
national capital. The city and the country may have been growing more and more comfortable 
with that idea, but local residents were dismayed to find that a single building threatened to 
eclipse millennia of urban history and the cherished traditional identities that had accrued from 
it, supplanting it with a monolithic, new, and resolutely modernist identity as the West German 
capital. To compound the problem, the only options that the Bund seemed to offer to the city for 
future development involved either leaving the Gronau high-rise as a lone giant or surrounding it 
with many more office “silos.” Thus, when the next opportunity presented itself in the form of 
the federal proposal to install multiple high-rises in Bad Godesberg, Bonn’s residents seized it. 
Bearing a sharp sense of aggrievement and a blunt set of demands borne out of the Gronau 
episode, they took advantage of West Germany’s legal planning process and a political landscape 
that was in flux at both the local and national levels to force the Bund to suspend indefinitely its 
building plans in the city. In the hiatus, Wolfgang Hesse, his team of local planners, and the City 
Council reasserted the city’s prerogatives with profound results for its physical landscape.  
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Chapter 4: Unmaking “Bonnhattan”: The Kreuzbauten and the Collision of Public 
Opinion and Federal Planning in 1969 
 
 The single most important moment in Bonn’s postwar urban planning history since it was 
chosen to serve as the Federal Republic’s provisional capital in 1949 occurred almost exactly 
twenty years later, on November 28, 1969, when the newly elected Federal Chancellor, Willy 
Brandt, declared an immediate halt to all new federal construction in the city. The primary target 
of this second Baustopp was a massive federal development at the northern edge of Bad 
Godesberg. Although Brandt’s decree allowed for the completion of two high-rises that were 
already well under way, it put an end to plans to construct up to five more towers on the same 
site. The protests that caused the indefinite building freeze were spearheaded by a local group 
that called itself the Bonn City-Forum Citizens’ Initiative (Bürgerinitiative City-Forum Bonn) 
and received support from the national architectural professional association, the Association of 
German Architects (Bund Deutscher Architekten, BDA). Founded by a local art historian named 
Roland Günter, the Citizens’ Initiative forcefully criticized the proposed development on 
aesthetic, functional, and procedural grounds. 
 At its maximum, the proposed Bad Godesberg development consisted of seven towers 
(Figure 71), which ranged from a modest eleven stories to a more imposing twenty-seven stories, 
and all of which bore a similar cruciform footprint, garnering them the nickname “Kreuzbauten” 
(literally, “Cross-buildings”). All of the structures were designated for federal ministries, and 
altogether federal planners intended the campus to serve as the core of a new Government 
District, a counterpart to the Parliamentary District that planners still hoped would coalesce 
around Egon Eiermann’s office tower for Bundestag members and committees only a couple 
kilometers to the north (Figure 72). Like the Bundestag development, the Godesberg plans 
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emerged from the Federal Planning Council that Johannes Rossig convened in the early 1960s to 
develop solutions to the Bund’s quickly growing space shortage (see previous chapter). Rossig’s 
ultimate goal was to provide office space for the entire federal workforce in Bonn and end the 
Bund’s costly and inefficient use of leased office space. The space problem, which emerged 
within months of Bonn becoming the capital, was only getting worse, as an ever expanding 
federal workforce stretched the organic limits of commercial real estate in the Bonn area and ran 
up against the first federal Baustopp passed by the Bundestag in 1956.  
 The Bund’s lack of space and dependence on leases left many federal ministries and 
agencies splintered and scattered around the city and its suburbs. According to an account 
compiled by Rossig’s office in 1964, out of twenty federal ministries, fifteen relied on at least 
some rented space, and five were housed exclusively in rented quarters.1 Thus, a secondary 
objective of the Planning Council was to consolidate as much of the federal bureaucracy as 
possible within several discrete districts in and around the city. To that end, in its very first 
meetings in the summer of 1962, the Planning Council identified two such areas in which to 
concentrate development: one around the current Bundeshaus, encompassing the Gronau, the 
Villa Hammerschmidt and Palais Schaumburg, and the Foreign Office and Postal Ministry 
buildings to their north, and the other on the northern edge of Bad Godesberg. By the mid-1960s, 
Rossig’s Building Department would add a third site, the area around the Ministries of Defense 
and Economics building in the town of Duisdorf just to the west of Bonn, giving the Bund a 
trifocal presence in the region. Of the three, the Bad Godesberg site was the only one without 
any federal presence already in place. The area along the border between Bonn and Bad 
Godesberg still had an essentially rural character, and the large expanse of undeveloped land 
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with easy traffic links to the Parliament District to the north was a major point of attraction for 
federal planners. That it was also technically outside of Bonn’s borders, thus bypassing an 
increasingly fraught relationship with the city and remaining just outside the central battleground 
of the 1956 building freeze, also spoke in favor of the site. 
 On one hand, a drastic reduction in the number of locations around the city occupied by 
federal agencies stood to shrink the Bund’s footprint in Bonn. On the other hand, the 
consolidation of the federal bureaucracy into several distinct campuses ensured that its presence 
would become far more visible. When the Planning Council enthusiastically opted for high-rises, 
which it justified on the grounds of reducing construction costs, maximizing office space, and 
preserving green space, the resulting federal architectural profile seemed to spell the end of 
Bonn’s two-thousand year history as a scenic city on the Rhine with a skyline defined by church 
towers. Federal planners and their supporters in the Bundestag won approval for the first phase 
of the Parliamentary District, the 30-story office building for Bundestag members and 
committees, after ignoring objections, including those from the building’s architect, and out-
negotiating the city’s administration to acquire the land and requisite zoning changes with almost 
no strings attached. Although the major debates around the planning and design of that tower had 
occurred during or before 1965, the delays in beginning construction meant that its physical 
effects on the city and landscape only became apparent in 1967, just as the Bund was disclosing 
final development plans for the first phase of construction in Bad Godesberg. The public’s 
discontent with the outcome of the Bundestag project would form the emotional core and driving 
force behind efforts to halt development in Bad Godesberg. 
 The sudden end to a project that represented years of work and careful negotiations came 
as somewhat of a shock to federal planners. However, the emphatic public stand against the Bad 
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Godesberg plans was hardly a sudden occurrence. This conflict represented the culmination of 
several trends in the politics of federal architecture and urban planning in Bonn that had been 
gradually developing since the 1950s. Nevertheless, the Citizens’ Initiative’s triumph depended 
on the timely coincidence of several key events in late 1969, including the particular 
circumstances of the Bund’s plans, the local transition to Groß-Bonn through the city’s 
incorporation of its neighbors, including Bad Godesberg, and the transition to the administration 
of Willy Brandt, West Germany’s first SPD Chancellor. With that conjunction in place and 
against a backdrop of simmering public disaffection with the changes to the city wrought by 
twenty years of the Bund’s neglect of local needs and concerns, Günter and his collaborators 
took advantage of a provision in West German planning law to make their case directly to local 
and federal planning officials. They were loud and persuasive enough to force Chancellor Brandt 
to suspend federal plans pending a comprehensive review of the planning process and the needs 
of the federal administration. 
 
The First Development Contract for the Bad Godesberg Government District 
 
 The federal plans that finally precipitated the crisis in 1969 were actually the second 
phase of the Bad Godesberg project, the first phase having officially commenced in May 1967 
with a development contract between the city and the Bund. The prehistory of that agreement can 
be found in the earliest meetings of the Planning Council, where discussion of plans for northern 
Bad Godesberg occupied equal space on the agendas with the Parliamentary district. The 
Council’s early projections, seven high-rise office buildings along with numerous low-rise 
subsidiary buildings for five federal ministries, were quite close to the final proposals submitted 
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to Bad Godesberg officials, and the Council’s sub-group, the Planning Group, constructed scale 
architectural models (now lost) of different ideas for comparison and critique by the larger 
group. Few design details were worked out at this early stage, but Johannes Rossig cautioned the 
group to avoid the “excessive scale in the proportions of the high-rises” for which Brasilia had 
gained recognition.2 Rossig did not elaborate on the point, but the Council’s subsequent rejection 
of a concept that included a twenty-seven-story tower as politically untenable in Bad Godesberg 
and its recommendation to cap the height of any building at fifteen stories suggest that height 
was the primary objection.3 
 The Planning Council’s decision to execute Eiermann’s Bundestag tower as the first step 
toward its larger development goals shifted the planners’ attention to the specifics of that 
project’s design, the parliamentary approval process, and negotiations with the city, and the 
activities of the Council itself slowed markedly after 1964. However, the battles surrounding 
Langer Eugen did nothing to remove the Bad Godesberg project from the federal building 
agenda nor reduce its scope and ambition, and within months of signing the sales agreement for 
the Gronau, members of Rossig’s Building Department at the Treasury Ministry had begun 
negotiations with Bad Godesberg’s City Manager Fritz Brüse over the control of a large piece of 
land along the city’s northern border. Eighteen months later those negotiations resulted in an 
agreement, codified in a contract ratified on May 26, 1967, in which Bad Godesberg would 
rezone the land for the exclusive use of the federal government and make the necessary 
preparations for it to be developed. For its part, according to the agreement, the Bund would 
                                                            
2 Federal Planning Council, Summary minutes from the July 6, 1962 Planning Council Meeting, 
July 13, 1962 (SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
3 That the buildings would be designed for easy vertical expansion at a later date, however, 
shows that planners never gave up on height as a desirable means for creating space. Federal 
Planning Council, Summary minutes from the Planning Council Meeting, March 20, 1964 
(SAAI EE, Abgeordneten-Hochhaus). 
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assume all of the expenses for this preparation, which included the construction of a new access 
road and linking the site to the municipal water and sewer networks. The Bund also agreed to 
assume all of the costs and legal responsibilities of acquiring the land from its current owners, 
the largest of which at the time was a horticultural research institute. The contract further 
specified that it covered only the first stage of development in the area, comprising office 
buildings for two federal ministries, which are not enumerated but were understood to be the 
Ministry for Scientific Research (Bundesministerium für wissenschaftliche Forschung), then 
divided among ten different locations around Bonn, and the Ministry of Justice, which was less 
splintered but still eccentrically located in the Rosenburg, a villa on the top of the Venusberg in 
Bonn’s western precinct of Kessenich.4 
 Subsequent phases of the development would require their own contracts, and this 
piecemeal approach, favored by the Bund because it allowed the flexibility to adjust plans based 
on functional needs and political and financial circumstances, was one of several clauses in the 
agreement that reflected a negotiation process that was dramatically different from that with 
Bonn. Whereas Bonn repeatedly tried to pressure the Bund into creating a binding development 
plan for the entire Gronau site rather than just for the Bundestag office tower, Bad Godesberg’s 
planners explicitly asked that the site be developed in stages, and they made no demands that 
their federal counterparts provide specifics for their long-term building plans. Although dividing 
the development of the Bad Godesberg Government District into stages would prove to be the 
Achilles’ heel of the Bund’s ambitions, seeing eye to eye on the issue made for a far less 
contentious relationship between municipal and federal officials. It also helped that unlike with 
the Gronau in Bonn and its popular public recreation facilities, there was no municipal land at 
                                                            
4 City of Bad Godesberg and the Federal Republic of Germany, Contract concerning the first 
phase of development of land in Bad Godesberg-Nord, May 26, 1967 (BArch, B 126/42724). 
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stake in the Bund’s plans for Bad Godesberg, which removed a major source of tension and a 
potential flashpoint in public opinion. Furthermore, Bad Godesberg—a city with just under half 
the population of Bonn in the 1960s5—never made financial demands of the Bund beyond those 
specifically linked to the measures necessary to transform and prepare the site for a large office 
complex.6 The most radical request made by Bad Godesberg was that the Bund help pay for the 
city to acquire a new fire engine for its municipal fire department, but this was easily 
accommodated by an already well-defined and uncontroversial process in West German law for 
reimbursing localities for expenses incurred as a result of the federal actions. In this case, City 
Manager Brüse could point to state and local ordinances that stipulated that numerous new large 





 From the 1967 contract, the next step was the creation of building plans, for which the 
Bund contracted a newly-formed architectural firm, known at that point as Planning Team 
(Planungsgruppe) Adams-Hornschuh-Türler after its three principle architects, Manfred Adams, 
                                                            
5 In 1961, Bonn’s population was 143,850 while Bad Godesberg’s was 65,119. Edith Ennen and 
Dietrich Höroldt, Vom Römerkastell zur Bundeshauptstadt: kleine Geschichte der Stadt Bonn. 
Bonn: Stollfuß Verlag, 1985, 365. 
6 The negotiations between the Bund and Bad Godesberg and the official and unofficial 
agreements between the parties that they precipitated are described in two memos by Bad 
Godesberg City Planning Official, Walter Viktor, both of which were appended to the final May 
26, 1967 development contract. Walter Viktor, Bad Godesberg City Planning Official, Memo to 
Treasury Minister Kurt Schmücker, February 27, 1967; and Walter Viktor, Bad Godesberg City 
Planning Official, Memo to Treasury Minister Kurt Schmücker, March 31, 1967 (BArch, B 
126/42724). 
7 Bad Godesberg City Manager Fritz Brüse, Letter to Finance Minister Franz Josef Strauß and 
Treasury Minister Kurt Schmücker, April 19, 1967 (BArch, B 126/42724). 
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Günther Hornschuh, and Peter Türler, all of whom were members of the Planning Council 
subgroup. On April 3, 1968, just over a year after the first development contract, the Bad 
Godesberg City Council approved the firm’s designs for two cruciform high-rises, one twelve 
stories and the other fifteen, each intended to house an entire ministry and all of its sub-agencies 
(see Fig. 9). The cruciform shape is immediately reminiscent of Le Corbusier’s urban designs 
from the 1920s for the Ville Contemporaine (1922; Figure 73) and the Plan Voisin for Paris 
(1925; Figure 74), but there were more immediate justifications for its use in Bad Godesberg 
than emulation of a great architect, and its selection was not entirely the decision of the Adams-
Hornschuh-Türler team. The basic plans for the entire complex had come out of a two-day long 
Planning Council meeting in 1967, where the members set forth the city-planning rationale and 
design principles for the site. At the behest of representatives from Bonn, the group solicited the 
participation from two other prominent West German urban planners, Max Guther from 
Darmstadt and Rudolf Hillebrecht from Hannover. Together with the Council the planners 
agreed that a government district in Bad Godesberg comprising a series of high-rises for 
ministries would provide an ideal functional and visual counterpoint to the parliamentary high-
rise in the Gronau. Such a solution would inscribe the different functions of the federal 
government — legislative and administrative — into the urban plan and skyline of the capital 
and allow the Bund to reserve the entire Gronau site for the purposes of the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat, while the greater height of the Gronau tower would clearly reflect the importance of 
parliament. The choice of cruciform towers allowed for greater office space in a smaller footprint 
and thus more open pedestrian space surrounding the structures, while also providing a formal 
accent that further differentiated the two government districts.8 
                                                            
8 Federal Planning Council, Minutes from the Council Meeting at the Treasury Ministry, Bonn, 
August 31-September 1, 1967 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/162). 
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  The Kreuzbauten were the first commission for Planungsgruppe Adams-Hornschuh-
Türler, which in 1969 would add Georg Pollich and become Planungsgruppe Stieldorf. In spite 
of the firm’s seeming lack of experience, it was an easy choice for the Bund even as it opened a 
major source of criticism for the development’s critics. When Johannes Rossig and Carl Mertz 
originally convened the Planning Council in 1962, it asked the architect members, Egon 
Eiermann, Paul Baumgarten, and Sep Ruf to recommend a set of younger architects that would 
form the subordinate Planning Group. Working under the auspices of the Mertz’s Federal 
Building Agency, this group was responsible for developing and executing the conceptual ideas 
of the Planning Council in greater detail in the form of architectural drawings and models. Sep 
Ruf brought his former students from Munich, Manfred Adams and Peter Türler. Günther 
Hornschuh had studied architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts in Berlin during the same 
period that Paul Baumgarten taught at the school. Georg Pollich, who studied under Egon 
Eiermann in Karlsruhe and worked in his studio, only intermittently attended the Planning 
Group’s meetings, as he quickly became preoccupied with work for Eiermann on “Langer 
Eugen,” and his boss ultimately seconded him to the Federal Building Agency in Bonn for the 
duration of the project in order to ensure that the project was carried out to the architect’s 
specifications. 
 In selecting Adams et al., the Bund hired a group of architects who had been present and 
engaged during the project’s entire pre-history and thus would have been familiar with the 
relevant government personnel and with their client’s functional requirements and aesthetic 
predispositions. The architects on the Planning Council had solidified an association between 
West German government architecture and certain principles and formal traits of mid-century 
High Modernism, notably the high-rise form itself. At a superficial level, the Stieldorf team’s 
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adoption of a metal grid motif overlaid on the façade of the Kreuzbauten to articulate the 
buildings’ interior vertical and horizontal divisions imitates a similar element on Eiermann’s 
parliamentary high-rise (Figure 75), not to mention numerous other of his and Sep Ruf’s 
buildings. In urban planning terms, the establishment of separate districts for Parliament and the 
ministries, linked via a transit network and marked architecturally to communicate their function 
and status, reflected a distinctly High Modernist preference for segregating different functional 
elements into distinct parts of the city. 
 Distaste for the formal austerity and overbearing scale of these particular strains of 
modernism undergirded a significant part of the public’s growing discontent with the federal 
government’s designs for Bonn. However, the choice of the architectural firm itself also quickly 
emerged as an issue, as the myriad advantages that seemed to recommend Planungsgruppe 
Stieldorf for the project could not make up for the problematic manner in which it received the 
commission. The Bund sought no alternative designs or competing bids, and there certainly was 
nothing close to an open competition. Federal planners were well within their rights in handling 
the project in such a closed way, but to outside observers, especially other architectural 
professionals, it certainly appeared counter to the principles of transparency and democracy 
espoused by the government whose highest authorities were to be housed in these buildings. 
Furthermore, it appeared to confirm a secretive trend in federal building during the 1960s, which 
began with the convening of the Planning Council itself and gained some high-profile attention 
with Chancellor Ludwig Erhard’s new residence, the Kanzlerbungalow, the controversy around 




The Second Development Contract for the Bad Godesberg Government District 
 
 By the time that Bad Godesberg had approved the Adams-Hornschuh-Türler designs on 
April 3, 1968, the city and the Bund were already well into negotiations over the second, ill-
fated, phase of the federal development. For this stage, the Bund projected five more cruciform 
high-rises on the immediately adjacent land and earmarked them for the Federal Ministry of 
Labor; the Federal Ministry for Food, Agriculture, and Forests; and the Federal Ministry of 
Transportation (Figure 76). For the design of this phase, the Bund turned to two far more 
established West German architects, Joachim Schürmann and Fritz Bornemann, who cooperated 
on the plans in the context of a planning collective (Planungsgemeinschaft). However, along 
with the increased size of the project, Schürmann and Bornemann’s assignment also expanded 
beyond the architectural design of the buildings to include larger urban planning considerations, 
including traffic connections to the site, its integration into the surrounding parts of the city, and 
its relationship to the nearby Rhine landscape, as well as to the other federal development sites 
just to the north.  
 Both staunch modernists, Schürmann and Bornemann’s ideas and designs for the site 
hewed closely to the principles that the Planning Council had laid out in 1967.  Like the Adams-
Hornschuh-Türler design, they would raise the structures on piers, leaving the ground level open 
for public pedestrian traffic and unobscured views across the space (Figure 77). They also 
proposed to minimize the isolation of the buildings by creating multi-use spaces at ground level 
and establishing as many connections as possible to the surrounding area, especially to a 
proposed public park between the government’s land and the Rhine. They adhered to the 
cruciform ground plan, creating a unified ensemble of buildings, but to avoid a completely 
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monotonous appearance, they introduced variation amongst the buildings through different 
heights and widths and through different treatments of the facades. Schürmann and Bornemann’s 
most dramatic suggestion, and one which directly contradicted earlier decisions by the Planning 
Council, was to increase the height of one building to compete directly with the parliamentary 
high-rise, a change, they argued, that would create a stronger affinity between the two districts. 
Schürmann and Bornemann made a strong theoretical case for their choices, one based on 
functional, economic, and aesthetic considerations. However, nowhere in their analysis of their 
designs do they reflect on local desires, nor potential objections to such massive development, 
which members of the public had been forcefully articulating in the local press since at least the 
first disclosures of federal plans for the Gronau in 1963.9  
 Across the board, the Bad Godesberg proposals seemed to raise little controversy among 
government planners and legislators at the local or national level. In the first half of 1969, at the 
same time that federal and local officials were closing in on an agreement for the second phase 
of the Bad Godesberg development, the first phase was moving swiftly through the Bundestag’s 
appropriation process. In a sign of how far the politics of federal building in Bonn had shifted in 
the half decade since the debates over the Bundestag office tower, the 1969 budget included a 
first installment of thirteen million Deutschmarks for construction of the Kreuzbauten, and the 
West German legislature approved it without discussion.10 
 Neither was there substantial resistance to the Bund’s proposals from Bad Godesberg’s 
planning office and City Council, and the negotiations between city and nation over the second 
phase proceeded along a path similar to that of the first. The main difference was that in the 
                                                            
9 Joachim Schürmann and Fritz Bornemann, Press Release regarding the planning process for the 
second phase of federal buildings in Bad Godesberg-Nord, September 19, 1969 (Stadtarchiv 
Bonn, N 61/165). 
10 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll, 5. Wahlperiode, 224. Sitzung, March 26, 1969, 12338-
12340. 
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second phase, the development contract and the site plan that was the object of the contract were 
created in tandem rather than sequentially in an attempt to minimize delays. In early May 1969, 
the Urban Planning Committees (Bauausschuß) of both Bad Godesberg and Bonn’s City 
Councils gave their approval of the site plan11. Bad Godesberg’s full City Council endorsed the 
second development contract on May 9, approving the site plan several weeks later. Again, the 
city’s primary concerns were that the Bund provide for infrastructure and services that were 
adequate for a development comprising multiple new high-rise office towers. Bad Godesberg 
would be the responsible authority for executing any such measures, conducting the survey work 
and hiring the engineering firms, and it would technically own the infrastructure, but the Bund 
would reimburse the city in full for all costs related to this development. There was some 
discussion regarding the precise dimensions of the necessary infrastructure and regarding its 
timing—in particular whether the Bund could occupy the new buildings prior to the completion 
of all of the required work—but such differences were far more easily overcome than Bonn’s 
demands for tens of millions of Deutschmarks in unrestricted grants.12  
 In conjunction with the deliberations of the local Urban Planning Committees, Bad 
Godesberg also publicly disclosed the proposal in the form of an architectural model, photos of 
which were published in the local press (Figure 78). The final version of the development 
contract stipulated the construction of only two new administrative buildings in the second 
                                                            
11 The consent of the neighboring community’s City Council’s planning committee — although 
not its full City Council or planning office — was required for development plans but was 
generally given pro forma. The discussion within Bonn’s Urban Planning Committee reveals 
overwhelming support for Schürmann and Bornemann’s solution with only mild concern about 
the building’s effects on the landscape. Urban Planning Committee of the Bonn City Council, 
Minutes from the 57th meeting, May 6, 1969 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/165). 
12 The terms of the second contract were worked out over the course of three meetings on 
February 28, March 28, and July 26, 1968. The first two meetings are described in Ministerialrat 
Reich, Treasury Ministry memo, April 3, 1968; and the third meeting is described in 
Ministerialrat Reich, Treasury Ministry memo, August 1, 1968 (BArch, B 126/42724). 
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phase,13 but the model revealed Schürmann and Bornemann’s full proposal for five high-rises. 
The model included the two high-rises designed by Adams-Hornschuh-Türler, for which 
excavations would begin in June 1969, but those structures were dwarfed by their neighbors, 
particularly the proposed twenty-seven-story tower intended to complement Eiermann’s 
parliamentary tower. The consequences for the surrounding cityscape were profound. Schürmann 
and Bornemann arranged the five towers in a rough circle around lower subsidiary buildings, 
effectively creating a miniature city in hinterlands of Bonn and Bad Godesberg that had 
previously been almost rural in character. There was immediate criticism, with one local editorial 
attacking the design in terms that called into question the underlying assumptions of the 
architects and their federal clients. Where Schürmann and Bornemann envisioned the successful 
union of expressive variety with function and economy, Hartmut Palmer, a local political 
journalist and frequent critic of the Bund’s building plans, saw the accumulation of similar high-
rises as evidence of the “exponential tedium” (“potenzierte Stumpfsinn”) of architecture and 
worried that the monotony threatened the well-being of the occupants and, by extension, the 
operation of the ministries for which they worked.14  
 
The Consequences of Bonn’s Regional Consolidation on the Bad Godesberg Government 
District 
 
 Any criticism existing in May 1969 was quickly cut short, as local political developments 
of far greater and more immediate impact on the citizens of Bonn and Bad Godesberg eclipsed 
any debate over federal construction. On May 13, 1969, North Rhine-Westphalia’s Landtag gave 
the green light to Bonn’s petition to redraw its municipal boundaries, incorporating the 
                                                            
13 City of Bad Godesberg and the Federal Republic of Germany, Contract concerning the second 
phase of development of land in Bad Godesberg-Nord, May 9, 1969 (BArch B 126/42724). 
14 Hartmut Palmer, “Potenzierter Stumpfsinn,” Bonner Rundschau, May 8, 1969. 
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previously independent communities of Bad Godesberg, Beuel, and several smaller towns on its 
western border. The change would be effective as of August 1, and the newly created Greater 
Bonn would instantly double the capital’s population to nearly 300,000. Although the news 
displaced discussions of federal construction plans, the repercussions of the reorganization for 
the Bund in Bad Godesberg were immediate and ultimately crippling. A few weeks after the 
reorganization, Johannes Rossig acknowledged the consequences in a letter to Wolfgang Hesse. 
With new local planning authorities, the plans for the second phase, which Bad Godesberg had 
passed without objection only a few months before, were now invalid, and crucial steps in the 
approval process would have to be repeated.15 Rossig and his subordinates in the Building 
Department at the Treasury Ministry had long been aware of this possibility, and in the months 
leading up to the signing of the second development contract with Bad Godesberg, Building 
Department officials expressed a clear sense of urgency. In light of the local political situation, 
they sought to accelerate the Ministry’s timeline for the Government District in an attempt to 
clear all of the regulatory and legislative hurdles before the regional restructuring became 
reality.16  However, federal planning officials could not have predicted that restarting the 
planning process within the context of the newly formed Greater Bonn would lead not only to the 
end of the Bad Godesberg project but also a total overhaul of the relationship between the federal 
government and its capital city. 
 The protests that stopped the Bad Godesberg development in October and November of 
1969 did not take the form of the disruptive marches or public demonstrations characteristic in 
the United States and Europe in the late 1960s. Rather, Bonn’s citizens achieved their goal 
                                                            
15 Johannes Rossig, Head of the Treasury Ministry’s Building Department, Letter to Bonn City 
Manager Wolfgang Hesse, August 19, 1969 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 1990/74). 
16 Otto Casser, Treasury Ministry Building Department, Internal Treasury Ministry Memo, 
March 5, 1969 (BArch, B 126/42724). 
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through persistent and pointed criticism of the federal plans entirely within the framework of the 
legal city planning process, which in the FRG was governed by the Federal Building Law of 
1960. In the case of the federal government’s plans for multiple high-rises in Bad Godesberg, 
two provisions in the Building Law would ultimately function in tandem to allow for the 
proposal’s undoing. The first provision required that local authorities disclose all development 
plans to the public for comment. Specifically, they had to make the plans and any necessary 
explanatory materials available for public inspection for a period of one month and solicit the 
public’s objections and suggestions. The authorities then had to consider the public commentary, 
adjust the plans accordingly, and any public concerns that were not specifically addressed had to 
be appended to the plans with an explanation.17 Communities most often fulfilled this legal 
requirement in the form of an exhibition of blueprints, drawings, and models at city hall. This 
effectively meant that at any given time after 1960 across West Germany, there were scores of 
small architectural exhibitions—exhibitions with which the public was invited to engage directly. 
There is no survey of these shows, the public’s reactions to them, nor of the kinds of changes that 
the public was able to achieve through participating in the process, but it appears that in the vast 
majority of cases, the public comment phase of planning rarely, if ever, resulted in derailing a 
project entirely.  
 Had the Bad Godesberg Council and administration been able to advance the 
Government District proposal through this public comment step in the summer of 1969 prior to 
the incorporation of Bad Godesberg into Bonn, the plans would have become legally binding and 
closed to further review. However, partially due to the distractions and uncertainties caused by 
the impending reorganization, Bad Godesberg was forced to delay the process, and it became 
subject to another crucial provision of the Federal Building Law. The law stated unambiguously 
                                                            
17 Bundesbaugesetz vom 23. Juni 1960, § 2 (6), Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil 1 (June 29, 1960): 345. 
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that responsibility for urban planning, particularly the preparation and approval of development 
plans, rested solely with local authorities.18 With the creation of a new city in Greater Bonn, 
responsibility and authority for urban planning technically shifted as well, except that in the 
changeover, Wolfgang Hesse retained his position as City Manager, thus ensuring a certain 
continuity in planning priorities and attitudes towards federal architectural projects. Thus, 
building plans that had been legitimately developed in cooperation with the smaller, more pliable 
suburb now had to face an interim municipal administration and a much larger populace that, by 
1969, already felt betrayed by federal planners and had become extremely skeptical of large-
scale federal projects. 
 The uproar over the Bad Godesberg towers is especially striking in contrast to the near 
silence surrounding another series of federal high-rises of similar height then in development or 
under construction elsewhere in the region. In the late 1960s, the Ministry of the Interior—still 
headquartered in the Düppel-Kaserne in northern Bonn—received a twelve-story building behind 
the converted barracks (see Fig. 35) while the Ministry for Economics—based in the Gallwitz-
Kaserne (see Fig. 33) in Duisdorf—received a fourteen-story addition on its site (Figure 79). 
Both structures have a simple square ground plan and facades composed of alternating bands of 
concrete and glass. The local press paid little attention to these projects, and they did not appear 
in the complaints lodged by the Citizens’ Initiative or the BDA. Their absence from the debate 
shows that the Bund could successfully expand its space significantly without angering the local 
public as long as certain criteria were met. First, the buildings for the Interior and Economics 
Ministries were designed entirely in-house by the Federal Building Agency, and they were 
constructed on federally-owned land. Thus, they required no external input nor approval from 
local authorities, and the public had no official forum in which to object. Second, they were built 
                                                            
18 Ibid, § 2 (1). 
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on large campuses with numerous existing structures, which literally shielded them from the 
public eye, and unobtrusiveness was a key factor in avoiding controversy. 
 
Public Protest: the Bund Deutscher Architekten and the Citizens’ Inititative 
 
 In the absence of a functioning City Council in the months after the reorganization, Franz 
Meyers exercised caretaker authority as Commissioner for the new city. In September 1969, he 
gave the Government District plans, which had only recently been approved by Bad Godesberg’s 
now defunct City Council, the green light to proceed with the public disclosure period. Wolfgang 
Hesse, as the official in charge of implementing the planning process, wasted little time, and a 
model of the plans was unveiled in Bonn’s town hall on October 7, 1969 (Figure 80). The 
official model differed from the one disclosed to the public the previous spring in one crucial 
aspect. Rather than representing all five cruciform office towers designed by Schürmann and 
Bornemann, which the Bund ultimately intended to build, the model only included the two 
towers that were explicitly mentioned in the second development contract with Bad Godesberg. 
This difference went unnoticed in the press, but the more modest vision made no difference to 
the outcome of the public’s consideration. An internal document, produced by the city after the 
month-long exhibition had ended, summarizes the public response to the Government District 
plans and records forty-six written responses supported by eighty-nine signatures. While the 
numbers may not suggest an extremely widespread movement, the uniform negativity of the 
responses and the intensity and clarity with which they are articulated makes it immediately clear 
why Chancellor Brandt and his cabinet shut down the development several weeks later. The 
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comments attack the project from almost every conceivable angle and make it clear that the only 
satisfactory way forward was for the Bund to start over entirely.19  
 Many of the comments came from local individuals. For example, an “M. Günter” 
suggested that the building plans were inadequate for any other future use in the event of German 
reunification and the relocation of the federal government to Berlin.20 The demand that 
government buildings in Bonn be designed with a secondary use in mind had been an important 
consideration in determining how to build in a provisional capital. Federal planners believed that 
buildings that could easily be transferred to such large institutions as Bonn’s university, a 
hospital, or local government when the federal government vacated the city would be more likely 
to gain City Council and Bundestag approval. Such flexible designs would not leave post-capital 
Bonn with a profusion of abandoned, unusable buildings. However, construction on the scale of 
Langer Eugen or the Kreuzbauten seriously strained the credibility of the federal government’s 
seriousness in approaching that problem just as they belied any remaining rhetoric insisting on 
Bonn’s provisional status. Nevertheless, they raised the specter of a future Bonn full of empty, 
deteriorating skyscrapers.  
 Another local citizen, Friedrich Brink, assailed the cumulative effect of the high-rises on 
the surrounding landscape. Specifically, he lamented the potentially unflattering contrast of the 
rectilinear concrete and steel boxes with two of the area’s most important local symbols: the 
Drachenfels and the Godesburg. Obstructing or detracting from the view of either would be an 
aesthetic loss for the citizens of Bonn, but the Drachenfels, with its enduring associations with 
The Song of the Nibelungs, had been a major tourist destination in Europe since the Romantic 
                                                            
19 Bonn City Planning Office, Internal memo summarizing the public’s responses to the Bad 
Godesberg-Nord Government District development plans, November 20, 1969 (Stadtarchiv 
Bonn, N 1990/74). 
20 Ibid. 
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era. Thus, local critics saw in the high-rises a possible threat to an important national landmark 
and piece of Bonn’s traditional local economy. Furthermore, Brink made the astute observation 
that the model worked to conceal all of these consequences by not representing the wider urban 
context of the structures. Brink implored the new City Council not to succumb to a “craving for 
status” (Großmannssucht) and to reject the development entirely.21 
 However, the longest, most carefully considered, and most effective responses came from 
two groups, the Association of German Architects and the aforementioned Citizens’ Initiative. 
The BDA was the most important professional organization for architects and urban planners in 
West Germany and sought through its activities and publications to improve the quality of the 
country’s architecture and urban design and promote the works of its members nationally and 
internationally. Bonn City-Forum Citizens’ Initiative was founded by Roland Günter for the 
explicit purpose of providing a local public campaign to oppose the Bad Godesberg Government 
District. The BDA broadcast its opposition to the project in a press release on October 23, 1969, 
while Günter and the Citizens’ Initiative published and disseminated a brochure entitled 
Regierungsviertel Bonn — ‘Märkisches Viertel’ der Bundeshauptstadt? (Bonn’s Government 
District — ‘Märkisches District’ of the Capital City?).22 The title itself contained an implicit 
criticism of the complex in its reference to the Märkisches Viertel, a district of West Berlin 
where the Association for Social Apartment Construction was in the process of constructing an 
enormous housing estate. Like the Government District but far more immense, the Märkisches 
                                                            
21 Ibid. 
22 Bund Deutscher Architekten, Press release regarding the Bonn Government District. October 
23, 1969 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 02/189); and Bürgerinitiative City-Forum Bonn, 
Regierungsviertel Bonn — ‘Märkisches Viertel’ der Bundeshauptstadt. Bonn, 1969 (Stadtarchiv 
Bonn, N 163/163). 
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Viertel consisted of uniform high-rise buildings, and it came under attack both for its monotony 
and for the lack of sufficient infrastructure and integration into the surrounding city.23  
 The BDA and Citizens’ Initiative coordinated their statements, and their complaints 
reinforced each other to a very high degree. Both groups agreed that the proposal in question was 
an abject failure on aesthetic and functional grounds. Neither group challenged the underlying 
idea of creating a consolidated Government District in Bonn. They recognized that Bonn’s 
provisional status had consistently sabotaged the Bund’s ability to plan and build for its 
administrations and had wrought havoc with the city’s urban development and financial health. 
Indeed, both viewed the Government District as an ideal opportunity for the West German 
government to give architectural form to its democratic values and ideals and to represent the 
country’s global stature and geopolitical importance. The model’s fragmentary presentation of 
the buildings in total isolation from the surrounding city implied a stark separation between the 
government and the public, a divide that both groups claimed was unbecoming to a democratic 
society. Furthermore, the aesthetic and representational faults were matched by the deficiencies 
of the design’s functional program. The critics pointed out that the compositions of federal 
ministries were subject to dramatic changes with each new federal administration, with agencies 
and even entire ministries being created and dissolved based on the priorities of the Chancellor, 
and they claimed that the conventional office space of the Kreuzbauten lacked the flexibility to 
accommodate such shifts. 
 While neither group articulated precisely what form large federal structures should take, 
they were not automatically averse to the modernist style of the high-rises. In its brochure, the 
Citizens’ Initiative referenced Germany’s leading place in the innovation of modernist design 
during the first three decades of the 20th century and expressed a desire to recapture some of that 
                                                            
23 Der Spiegel, “West-Berlin: Slums verschoben,” no. 68, September 9, 1968, 134-138. 
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stature for postwar Germany. In a clear sign of the group’s architectural allegiances, the brochure 
also included extensive quotations by Bauhaus founder and leading German modernist Walter 
Gropius and by the Norwegian architect and theorist Christian Norberg-Schulz. The unsourced 
and undated quotes do not deal with issues of style but rather with architecture’s relationship to 
the society that produces it, its capacity, in the words of Gropius, “to release ethical energies,” 
and its responsibility, per Norberg-Schulz, to “contribute to an expansion of coexistence.”24 Such 
observations were hardly groundbreaking in 1969, but in the Bund’s focus on the pragmatics of 
space and solving the political riddle of building in Bonn and in the city’s determination to 
address its urban planning problems, more abstract considerations were almost totally absent 
from the discussion. In demanding a reset for federal construction, the Citizens’ Initiative wanted 
to reintroduce what its members saw as more fundamental questions about architecture and its 
connection to a place and people as a precondition for more concrete design decisions. 
 The Citizens’ Initiative’s brochure called the model on display “shameful” 
(beschämenswert) and “embarrassing” (blamable),25 but both the Initiative and the BDA 
reserved their sharpest criticism for the process that had led to the current situation. They decried 
the Bund’s secrecy in developing the project and commissioning designs entirely behind closed 
doors. They even went so far as to accuse the Treasury Minister, Kurt Schmücker, of lying about 
the state of the plans to a member of the Bundestag.26 That federal planners had subsequently 
announced that the third phase of the project would now be subject to a competition was too 
                                                            
24 In making these points, the Citizens’ Initiative also noted that Bonn’s City Manager, Wolfgang 
Hesse, was the son of Fritz Hesse, the mayor of Dessau responsible for bringing Walter 
Gropius’s Bauhaus to the city and staunchly defending it as the political tide turned against the 
school in the late 1920s. Bürgerinitiative City-Forum Bonn, Regierungsviertel Bonn — 
‘Märkisches Viertel’ der Bundeshauptstadt, 16-17. 




little, too late. The sole remedy was clear: federal planners should immediately cancel the current 
development and restart the process, which should now be based on an open, public competition 
of ideas. For the BDA, which advocated not for the interests of individual cities, but rather the 
disciplines of architecture and urban planning and their practitioners nationwide, open 
competitions were a significant method for maintaining and improving design standards, as well 
as ensuring that the BDA’s members had every opportunity to win prestigious commissions. The 
Citizens’ Initiative took the demand a step further and called for a prior public discussion about 
the objectives of the Government District as a way to establish appropriate parameters for any 
competition. For the local citizens group, rational urban planning leading to a more functional 
and beautiful Bonn was the overarching goal, and an open competition was an important part of 
reaching that end, but it was only useful to the extent that the local public and local government 
were included in the drafting process and on the final jury. Robust and direct public participation 
in the planning process was the key to better urban planning.  
 
The End of the Bad Godesberg Development 
 
 At the end of the public comment period on November 7, 1969, no decision from Bonn’s 
interim advisory council (Beirat) or Commissioner Franz Meyers was forthcoming. The election 
of Greater Bonn’s first official City Council was not for two more days, and the Council would 
not meet until the end of the month. Meanwhile, the local press, and increasingly the regional 
press, kept alive the drum beat of critical coverage, aided by contributions from several 
prominent West Germans. Over the course of November, Professor Tilman Buddensieg of the 
Free University of Berlin and Chairman of the Association of German Art Historians (Verband 
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Deutscher Kunsthistoriker), the famous journalist and politician, Eugen Kogon, and such well-
known architects and city planners as Ernst May in Hamburg and Thomas Sieverts in Berlin all 
voiced their disapproval of the proposed Bad Godesberg Government District.27  
 When Chancellor Willy Brandt met with his cabinet on November 28 and decided to 
table the project indefinitely, the rationale closely echoed the refrain of criticism that the public 
comment phase had unleashed. Planning for a Government District would start from scratch with 
the initiation of a competition. Brandt could also give a very practical reason for reconsidering 
future federal development. In convening his first cabinet, Brandt had consolidated several 
ministries, most notably dissolving the Treasury Ministry and distributing its portfolios between 
the Finance and Economics Ministries. In the shake-up, Johannes Rossig’s Building Department 
was reassigned to the Finance Ministry where it would remain until being moved again three 
years later to the Ministry for Regional Planning, Building, and Urban Development. Major 
cabinet makeovers were not unprecedented in new administrations, but Brandt’s actions doubled 
perfectly as a pretense for reevaluating the federal government’s needs for office space in 
Bonn.28 
 The decision elicited sighs of relief in Bonn, and the public welcomed the immediate 
promises of better communication about federal plans in the city.29 Local officials quickly began 
exploiting their newfound leverage and pressing their planning interests with the Bund. Already 
in January 1970, City Manager Wolfgang Hesse was wielding the public and its potential 
disapproval as a threat in negotiations with the Chancellor’s office over its desire to build a new 
Chancellery. Hesse wanted the Bund to fulfill other promises that it had made to the city, such as 
                                                            
27 General-Anzeiger, “Prominenz kritisiert Regierungsviertel,” November 15-16, 1969. 
28 Bonner Rundschau, “Baustopp für das Regierungsviertel,” December 4, 1969. 
29 General-Anzeiger, “Zum Bau des Regierungsviertels auch Stimmen der Bürgern hören,” 
January 12, 1970. 
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expanding parking around other ministry buildings, before it moved ahead with the Chancellery 
project, and he noted that such unfulfilled promises were no longer lost on either the City 
Council or the public.30 The new Chancellery, which was ultimately constructed next to the 
Palais Schaumburg with virtually no local input, would prove to be an early test for the new era 
of cooperation between Bund and Bonn in planning matters (see Conclusion). 
 For Johannes Rossig, for whom the Bad Godesberg Government District represented 
years of work, the building freeze was upsetting, as it laid bare the tensions he faced as he sought 
to provide the federal workforce with adequate accommodations. In a meeting with other 
building officials on the same day as Brandt’s decision, Rossig emphasized that he was under 
enormous pressure to create office space as quickly as possible, pressure that only increased by 
taking the Bad Godesberg project off of the table. Rossig noted that stopping work on the shovel-
ready plans for the Government District in order to hold a competition could delay completion 
by three or four years, and he expressed dismay that Schürmann and Bornemann’s designs could 
not simply be altered in height or size to make them more palatable to critics. As an alternative to 
a lengthy competition, Rossig suggested that the Bund convene diverse panels of experts to 
develop new plans, which could then be discussed with the public in open meetings.31 Bonn’s 
City Council, City Planning Office, and public would accept nothing short of an open 
competition, and they pushed for even more far reaching reforms and considerations, adding 
layers and complications to the planning process that would make Rossig’s predicted building 
delays of several years seem wildly optimistic in retrospect. 
                                                            
30 Bonn City Planning Office, Notes from a meeting between Bonn City Manager Wolfgang 
Hesse, Chancellor Brandt’s Chief of Staff Horst Ehmke, and the head of the Chancellery’s Legal 
Department Ernst Kern, January 9, 1970 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 1990/74). 
31 Treasury Ministry Building Department, Memo describing a meeting between Building 
Department Head Johannes Rossig and other Federal Building Officials, November 28, 1969 
(Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 1990/74). 
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Coming to Terms: the Arbeitskreis Bundesbauten Bonn and the Bonn-Vereinbarung 
 
 The first major initiative was the creation in February 1970 of the Task Force for Federal 
Construction in Bonn (Arbeitskreis Bundesbauten Bonn, ABB). The ABB consisted of roughly 
equal members from federal and municipal administrations, token representation from the 
administration of North Rhine-Westphalia, and a changing selection of external, independent 
experts to advise on architectural and planning issues. The ABB’s initial mission was to 
coordinate the accommodation of the highest federal authorities in Bonn with the urban planning 
of the city. The group’s first order of business was simply to take stock of the planning situation 
in Bonn, a task the group construed much more broadly than an accounting of square footage and 
road congestion. The ABB also wanted to return to more fundamental questions about the state 
of urban planning in general, the role of architecture in representing a national government, and 
the desires and concerns of the local public.32  
 Thus, the group’s first major decision was to convene an Expert Colloquium 
(Expertenkolloquium) in Bonn as soon as possible. The explicit aims of the colloquium, to which 
both a host of West German practitioners and the local public would be invited, were to provide 
federal, state, and local planners with comprehensive information about possible solutions for the 
city’s problems and give the public an opportunity to present and discuss ideas regarding the 
integration of the federal government into Bonn.33 The colloquium was held in September 1970, 
and the resulting report offered a detailed analysis of Bonn’s planning situation and a 
comprehensive set of recommendations for moving forward. The colloquium took a balanced 
                                                            
32 Working Committee (Arbeitsausschuß) of the Arbeitskreis Bundesbauten Bonn, First report of 
the Arbeitskreis Working Committee, February 17, 1970 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 1990/73). 
33 Ibid. 
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approach, giving equal weight to federal and municipal concerns. In particular, it paid close 
attention to how the approximately one million square feet of additional office space that the 
experts estimated the Bund would need by 1980 might be created within Bonn in ways that 
enhanced the city’s functionality and appearance and respected its residents’ desire to maintain a 
strong connection to the historical roots of the city. To that end, the colloquium report suggests 
taking measures to augment the physical presence and civic role of the University of Bonn in the 
city. It also suggested improving the accessibility and the facilities in the traditional centers of 
Bonn and Bad Godesberg in order to reinforce them as commercial, social, and cultural hubs. For 
the Bund, the experts advised establishing a third, administrative pole in the territory between 
Bonn and Bad Godesberg, bracketed by the Gronau and Kreuzbauten developments then already 
under way. This government district should be well integrated into the other parts of the city, but 
it should remain distinct and not overshadow Bonn’s older, more established neighborhoods in 
scale or profile. Furthermore, the Expert Colloquium recommended reserving a swathe of land 
immediately along the Rhine between Bonn and Bad Godesberg exclusively for recreational 
green space.34 
 If the ABB and the Expert Colloquium seemed to represent one pillar of Bonn’s demands 
on the Bund—that for greater local input and a more holistic approach to planning and to the 
integration of federal buildings into the city—the Bund satisfied a second pillar in the summer of 
1970 with the signing of the so-called “Bonn Agreement” (“Bonn-Vereinbarung”). Negotiated in 
great haste between federal and municipal officials and signed with great fanfare in Bonn’s Old 
Town Hall, the agreement for the first time detailed the mutual responsibilities and obligations of 
the Bund and Bonn in the realm of city planning. On the Bund’s side, the contract formally 
                                                            
34 Arbeitskreis Bundesbauten Bonn, Report of the Expertenkolloquium: Empfehlungen zur 
Integration der Bundesbauten in die Stadt Bonn, September 1970 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/353). 
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conceded that the presence of the federal government had placed extraordinary burdens on the 
city and committed the Bund to compensating the city financially with federal funds for the next 
decade. In total, the grants and loans detailed in the contract, all of which would be earmarked 
for city planning projects and municipal amenities and services, amounted to over one billion 
Deutschmarks by 1979, over four times the amount that City Manager Hesse had demanded 
during the Gronau negotiations in 1965.35 The decade-long time horizon was as notable as the 
total sum, as it was an explicit acknowledgement that German reunification was not imminent 
and thus Bonn was the de facto permanent capital of West Germany. To the local public, the 
Bonn-Vereinbarung was presented as an unqualified victory for the city, and the combination of 
an official acceptance of responsibility backed by a binding pledge of unprecedented material 
support led to proclamations that the “stepchild had been adopted” (“Stiefkind adoptiert”).36 
 However, the agreement also bound Bonn to consider and advance the Bund’s interests in 
several ways. Just as it was critical to the city that it have input into federal planning activities, 
the contract stipulated that Bonn coordinate its planning activities and capital investment 
program with the federal government. Specifically, Bonn had to present its plans to the Bund for 
official comment, and those comments would be submitted to the City Council as part of its 
deliberations on the city’s planning policies. The Bonn-Vereinbarung also addressed the content 
of those policies, requiring Bonn to provide and maintain the infrastructure, facilities, and 
                                                            
35 The full German title was the “Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bund, dem Land NW und der 
Stadt Bonn über den Ausbau der Stadt als Sitz der Bundesregierung und über den Ausgleich der 
damit verbundenen Sonderbelastung.” Federal Republic of Germany, North Rhine-Westphalia, 
and the City of Bonn, “Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bund, dem Land NW und der Stadt Bonn 
über den Ausbau der Stadt als Sitz der Bundesregierung und über den Ausgleich der damit 
verbundenen Sonderbelastung” (Bonn-Vereinbarung), July 15, 1970 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 
1991/759). 
36 Both local papers invoked this metaphor in reports the day after the signing ceremony. 
General-Anzeiger, “Milliardenvertrag sichert Bundesmittel Ausgleich für Bonns 
Sonderbelastungen,” July 16, 1970; and K. Rüdiger Durth, “Bund adoptierte Stiefkind Bonn,” 
Bonner Rundschau, July 16, 1970. 
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services that fulfilled the needs of the Bund, its authorities, its workers, and its guests. Among 
the specific tasks enumerated as part of this condition, some were quite concrete, such as 
ensuring the city was well integrated into long-distance transportation networks and providing 
for adequate fire protection. Others, were more abstract, particularly Bonn’s obligation to 
establish a “representative cityscape” (“repräsentatives Stadtbild”).37 If Bonn was to receive the 
special treatment befitting its role as a capital city, it would not only have to fulfill the functions 
of a capital, it would have to look like a capital, as well.   
 The end of Bonn’s time as a provisional capital seemed to be at hand, brought about by 
the collision of public opinion with federal plans that, in size and scale, were anything but 
provisional. There is some irony that Willy Brandt, a life-long member of the Social Democratic 
Party, arrived in office just in time to preside over the final stages of the shift towards 
permanence. It was the SPD that had opposed the choice of Bonn in 1949 and that had regularly 
introduced motions during those first years in the Bundestag aimed at undermining Bonn’s 
legitimacy, culminating in the first building freeze of 1956. However, Brandt’s controversial new 
foreign policy dovetailed nicely with the entrenchment of Bonn deeper into the political 
landscape. The so-called New Eastern Policy (Neue Ostpolitik) reoriented the Adenauer-era West 
German policy towards the Eastern Bloc, and particularly the German Democratic Republic, 
away from isolation and towards engagement and rapprochement. The move to begin to 
normalize relations with East Germany greatly eased tensions in the region, and in the long run, 
it likely contributed to the collapse of the authoritarian and repressive Socialist Unity Party. At 
the time, however, it reflected the recognition that the political differences between the two 
Germanys were insurmountable, and division would be the enduring status quo. Thus, the 
                                                            
37 Bonn-Vereinbarung. 
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simultaneous advent of Ostpolitik and the Bonn-Vereinbarung strongly aligned the FRG’s policy 
towards its neighbor with that towards its capital city. 
 With the framework for cooperation and mutual support established by the ABB and the 
Bonn-Vereinbarung in place by the middle of 1970, the two sides were poised to restart the 
federal planning process, begin resolving the Bund’s space deficits, and address the city’s 
planning problems. The next step would be conducting a comprehensive and open national 
competition, and the brief distributed to planners and architects was the first in the history of 
Bonn’s recent development to place symbolic and representational questions on the same level 
with functional concerns. The Bund wanted the city and the federal buildings that emerged from 
this process to project visibly the liberal, democratic values of the Federal Republic and to reflect 
the internal structure, relationships, and function of the national government. Unfortunately for 
any prospects of turning Bonn into a “representative city,” the local public had thus far loudly 
denounced the federal buildings that most threatened to effect precisely that transformation, 
Langer Eugen and the Kreuzbauten. With those buildings looming permanently over the Bonn 
landscape as reminders, and with a local public empowered by its recent victories, there were 
now substantial countervailing forces against any ostentation on the part of the Bund at the 
perceived expense of the city.  
 Thus, the issue of representation that erupted in the planning discourse for the Bund in 
the wake of the turmoil of 1969 and that overlapped neatly with the change in Bonn’s provisional 
status still had to clear the high hurdle of local resistance to changes in the city’s identity. The 
various task forces, working groups, and competitions that were convened in the following years 
were intended to facilitate compromise and advance the Bund’s construction agenda, but their 
effect was to increase the complexity in the process significantly. This made an already sclerotic 
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planning process even slower with the result that many of the federal proposals of the early 
1970s took over a decade to reach execution, were only partially constructed, or fell off of the 
design table entirely. This meant that Bonn’s appearance as the federal capital changed little 
during the decade, and its identity as a city faced little pressure from the Bund, settling into a 
mode that would remain relatively constant for the remainder of its tenure as capital. 
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Conclusion: Federal Planning, Democracy, and the Status of Local Identity in the National 
Capital in the 1970s 
 
 The breakdown of late 1969 marked a nadir in federal-municipal relations in the Federal 
Republic’s still nominally provisional capital, but it also prompted a complete overhaul in how 
the federal government treated its municipal host, both financially and politically. The Bonn-
Vereinbarung formally tied the two antagonists together by recognizing Bonn’s extraordinary 
role and by establishing a detailed set of obligations that each side owed to the other, including a 
hefty financial commitment from the Bund to the city. The agreement thus aligned Bonn’s 
interest in supporting healthy urban development in the capital with the Bund’s interest in 
maintaining adequate services, facilities, and infrastructure for federal authorities and related 
organizations and providing a symbolic face for the Federal Republic. With its broadly 
representative membership and access to expert advice, the Arbeitskreis Bundesbauten Bonn 
ostensibly offered the platform from which to steer federal development in the city in a way that 
fulfilled the needs of the city and state while avoiding the pitfalls—a lack of transparency and 
inclusion and a fraught politics—that had previously plagued it.  
 Bonn was finally emerging from the shadow of provisionality, a process that had 
unfolded slowly and in stages over the previous decade. The debates surrounding Bonn’s 
campaign to reform the region’s political geography and incorporate itself and the neighboring 
towns into a single entity initially raised key questions about the definition and function of a 
capital city and about the Bund’s appropriate role in the urban planning of its host. In making 
their arguments for and against the numerous different proposals for regional reform that 
emerged during the 1960s, state and municipal officials compiled detailed data about the precise 
effects of the Bund’s presence on the capital and its suburbs—the financial costs and the strains 
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on services and infrastructure—which militated in favor of integration. However, this 
information also strongly suggested that greater involvement in city planning and greater 
financial support from the federal budget was urgently needed in order to maintain and expand 
the city’s basic functions. When Bonn finally succeeded in merging with its surrounding 
communities to form Groß-Bonn, it gave the enlarged city’s administration the legal and political 
leverage it needed to demand and receive that support.  
 The Bund’s purchase of the Gronau and its subsequent construction of Langer Eugen, the 
30-story high-rise for Bundestag members, continued to entrench Bonn as the permanent capital, 
while also opening up a major rift between that incipient identity and the traditional character of 
the city cherished by local residents. Although unsuccessful at the time, Bonn’s demand that 
unfettered financial support from the Bund be part of any deal that allowed the sale of the land 
and the erection of the office tower set a crucial precedent by linking federal development with 
broad subsidies for the city, a link that recast the relationship between city and state by 
acknowledging that Bonn’s status and the Bund’s responsibilities were both extraordinary. The 
tower itself—even before it was completed—dominated the city’s skyline so completely that it 
came into competition with a natural landscape that had been a mainstay of local identity and the 
area’s economy for centuries. Its scale left any remaining pretense about Bonn’s provisional 
status in tatters, but it also galvanized the local public against federal development and primed it 
for more strident resistance to future proposals. Finally, the Bundestag debate over funding for 
Langer Eugen revealed that, in spite of vocal opposition, there was an appetite within parliament 
for expanding the Bund’s physical footprint in the capital in order to address its growing space 
deficits, and the approval of the parliamentary building plans effectively lowered the political 
threshold for subsequent developments. 
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 The threads that emerged in these first two episodes—pertinent questions about the 
definition and functions of a capital city and about a federal government’s obligations to it, 
regional reform and efforts to exert greater control over municipal space and urban planning, 
public services groaning under the weight of rapid growth and uncoordinated planning, a federal 
bureaucracy splintered and strained by insufficient and inadequate office space, and public 
disaffection with the results of the Bund’s efforts to solve Bonn’s problems—all came together 
with explosive consequences in the next major federal proposal, a complex of high-rise towers to 
house federal ministries in Bad Godesberg. The appearance of the parliamentary tower had 
sensitized the local public to what it stood to lose at the hands of unchecked federal development 
and provided the emotional stimulus for protest. The debates of the 1960s opened the discursive 
space in which to reconsider Bonn’s status and the Bund’s relationship to its capital city. Finally, 
West German planning law combined with the successful redrawing of Bonn’s municipal 
boundaries to provide the legal and political foundation for the success of local protests.  
 The uproar over the Kreuzbauten and its aftermath in the early 1970s finally brought the 
issue of identity and representation in federal architecture—concerns that had previously been 
suppressed by the conflicting imperatives to add office space as quickly and economically as 
possible and maintain Bonn’s provisional character—to the foreground. With large federal 
skyscrapers apparently proliferating across the Bonn cityscape and with Brandt’s new policy of 
détente with East Germany, the concept of provisionality in Bonn held little meaning for future 
plans, and even the “nominal” aspect of the status continued to recede. In his government policy 
statement (Regierungserklärung) made in front of the Bundestag on January 18, 1973, 
Chancellor Brandt referred to Bonn as the “federal capital city” (“Bundeshauptstadt”), marking 
the first time that term—the normal German term for a capital city—had been applied to Bonn in 
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an official, public forum.1 Two years later, the term became further entrenched when the Bund 
and Bonn renegotiated and extended the Bonn-Vereinbarung. Whereas the 1970 agreement still 
referred to Bonn with the longer, more equivocal title, “Seat of the Federal Government” (“Sitz 
der Bundesregierung”), the 1975 contract used the straightforward “Bundeshauptstadt.”2 In the 
official language of the state, Bonn’s identity as the capital of West Germany was beyond 
question, but the expression of this identity in the city’s space and architecture remained riven by 
local desires to remain connected to deeper history and traditions that remained irreconcilable 
with the national need for new office space and desire for clearly national structures. 
 In accordance with demands made by the Citizens’ Initiative in protesting the Bad 
Godesberg Government District and promises made by Chancellor Brandt when he cancelled 
further work on the project, the final recommendation of the Expert Colloquium convened by the 
ABB in September 1970 was to conduct an open, national planning competition. The goal of this 
first competition would not be the design of individual federal buildings. Rather, it would 
establish a baseline of the best ideas for the size, shape, distribution, and sequence of federal 
development in Bonn and the integration of that development into the existing urban fabric. 
Individual buildings or complexes would be the subject of subsequent competitions. This 
deliberate and multi-step process was supposed to yield the best solutions at both the macro and 
micro scale, but the actual result was to delay any actual construction indefinitely.  
                                                            
1 Chancellor Willy Brandt, Statement to the Bundestag, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll, 7. 
Wahlperiode, 7. Sitzung, 18. Januar, 1973, 133. 
2 The full German title of the 1975 agreement was the “Vereinbarung über den weiteren Ausbau 
Bonns als Bundeshauptstadt.” The agreement extended federal financial assistance for urban 
development in Bonn in perpetuity, stipulating a formula for the division of costs amongst the 
city, Land, and Bund rather than specifying an amount to which Bonn should be entitled each 
year for a set number of years as in the earlier Bonn-Vereinbarung. The text of the 1975 
agreement is reprinted in Karl-Heinz van Kaldenkerken and Friedrich Busmann, Ausbau der 
Bundeshauptstadt: 10 Jahre Hauptstadtvereinbarung 1975-1985; Dokumentation (Bonn: Stadt 
Bonn, 1985), 118. 
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The New Chancellery Building 
 
 The major exception to this agenda in the early 1970s was the new Chancellery building 
(Neues Bundeskanzleramt; Figure 81). Declaring an urgent need, Chancellor Brandt and his 
Chief of Staff, Horst Ehmke, bypassed the planning processes being developed within the ABB 
and conducted a nationwide design competition for a new office building to replace Palais 
Schaumburg.3 The announcement of the competition in November 1970 contravened both the 
explicit advice of the ABB’s Expert Colloquium,4 which recommended that all federal 
authorities be included in the upcoming planning competition, and the explicit requests of 
Bonn’s City Planning Office, which demanded local input on all federal projects.5 The 
Chancellor’s shirking of these appeals was only possible because the building could be 
constructed entirely on federally-owned land and thus did not require the approval of municipal 
authorities, but it drew an immediate rebuke from the chairman of the Expert Colloquium, Klaus 
Müller-Ibold. In the press conference publicly unveiling the colloquium’s results, Müller-Ibold, a 
well-respected urban planning professor in Dortmund, lambasted the Bund for this evasion and 
questioned if federal planners had any intention of following the Expert Colloquium’s guidance.6 
 Circumventing the experts’ recommendations did not guarantee swift development, and 
the new Chancellery building was not completed until 1976, by which time Brandt was out of 
                                                            
3 Palais Schaumburg remained standing as a representative reception building and additional 
office space. 
4 Arbeitskreis Bundesbauten Bonn, Report of the Expertenkolloquium: Empfehlungen zur 
Integration der Bundesbauten in die Stadt Bonn, September 1970 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 61/353). 
5 Bonn City Planning Office, Notes from a meeting between Bonn City Manager Wolfgang 
Hesse, Chancellor Brandt’s Chief of Staff Horst Ehmke, and the head of the Chancellery’s Legal 
Department Ernst Kern, January 9, 1970 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 1990/74). 
6 Wulf-Peter Schroeder, “Wieder massive Kritik am Bund,” Bonner Rundschau, November 14, 
1970. 
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office. Planungsgruppe Stieldorf—the same group of architects that was responsible for the 
Kreuzbauten—won the design competition for their austere, grid-like two-story structure (Figure 
82), and the jury lauded it for the way it tied together and gave order to the existing structures on 
the site.7 This would constitute some of the only praise that the black steel-clad building would 
receive. Its first occupant, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, famously compared it unfavorably to a 
bank or insurance building,8 and its cost—116 million Deutschmarks—was a frequent target of 
criticism.9 Even though the building was largely surrounded by parkland and hidden by trees and 
the wall surrounding the Chancellor’s complex, which softened its impact on the surrounding 
city, members of the local public heavily criticized that very isolation. The bold rectilinear forms 
and oxidized black steel cladding made the Chancellery an alien figure in the green landscape.10  
 
The “Competition for Federal Buildings and their Integration into the City of Bonn” and 
Building for a Democracy 
 
 Chancellor Brandt’s decision to circumvent the Expert Colloquium did not derail the 
parallel process for federal development in Bonn, but it was an indication of an imperfect 
commitment to its principles of cooperation and inclusion. The colloquium’s suggested route for 
development began with the ponderously titled “Competition for Federal Buildings and their 
Integration into the City of Bonn” (“Wettbewerb Bauten des Bundes und Ihre Integration in die 
Stadt Bonn”), which opened in August 1971 after a year of discussion within the Bund, the ABB, 
and various ad hoc subcommittees (Figure 83). At over two hundred pages, the brief that was 
                                                            
7 General-Anzeiger, “Königswinterer Architektenteam schuf preisgekrönten 
Kanzleramtsentwurf,” May 13, 1971. 
8 Matthias Hannemann et al., Bonn, Orte der Demokratie: der historische Reiseführer (Berlin: 
Christoph Links Verlag, 2009), 48. 
9 General-Anzeiger, “Erster Spatentisch für das Kanzleramt,” November 28, 1973. 
10 Lydia Hartmann, “Bundeskanzleramt oder Regierungs-Mausoleum?,” Bonner Rundschau, 
June 2, 1976. 
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distributed among West German architects was detailed and comprehensive in its demands. 
Successful submissions would incorporate virtually every aspect of urban planning—housing, 
transportation, environmental protection, cultural and recreational facilities—and the competition 
area spanned both sides of the Rhine and the area from the Postal Ministry building in the north 
to well south of the Kreuzbauten in Bad Godesberg. However, the brief left little doubt that the 
Bund was the ultimate client and that the consideration of larger urban issues should serve the 
primary goal of meeting the federal government’s spatial and representational needs.11 
 Furthermore, within the broad scope of the competition, and in contrast to earlier federal 
planning work, symbolism and representational qualities received equal emphasis alongside 
functional issues. In particular, the brief called for entrants to strive to “give expression to the 
basic principles of democratic political and social order,” which it enumerated as the relationship 
of the citizen to the state, the establishment and development of a political public sphere 
(Öffentlichkeit), and the organization of political institutions and bodies. In case the discussion of 
these principles in the main competition document was too vague, the organizers appended an 
essay penned by two Interior Ministry officials, Otto Jacob and Eckart Schiffer, titled “Self-
Representation of the Democratic State in the Built Form of the Federal Capital” 
(“Selbstdarstellung des demokratischen Staates in der baulichen Gestaltung des 
Bundeshauptstadt”). This is the first document in the context of federal architecture in Bonn that 
closely considers the values at the heart of West German democracy and makes concrete 
                                                            
11 Bundesrepublik Deutschland and Stadt Bonn, “Wettbewerb Bauten des Bundes und Ihre 
Integration in die Stadt Bonn,” 1971 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 1982/283). 
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suggestions for how those might be embodied in the design of government buildings and 
districts.12 
 Before their recommendations, Jacob and Schiffer made two preliminary points 
addressing the Bund’s previous architectural efforts in Bonn and the difficulty of representing 
democracy in architecture. First, the authors interpreted the Bund’s rejection of self-
representation in Bonn out of deference to Berlin and concern for economy as itself a form of 
self-representation. This perceived modesty may have been appropriate for the first two decades 
of the Federal Republic, but it had outlived its usefulness as the essential characteristic of the 
capital city. Second, Jacob and Schiffer astutely noted that attempting to fix the values of a 
democratic society in concrete and steel is inimical to those very values, chief amongst which are 
diversity and change. Given this, their prescriptions for the planner focused less on concrete 
symbols than on qualities that center the design on the fundamental building block of any 
democratic order, the free citizen. For Jacob and Schiffer, this meant a renunciation of 
monumentality that might overwhelm the individual and a commitment to accessibility and 
participation through the creation of welcoming spaces where the citizen might interact directly 
with politicians and administrators and witness the democratic process in person.13 
 Jacob and Schiffer left room for some overt symbolism in federal architecture. They 
directed architects to use the relative sizes of various institutions’ buildings, along with their 
proximity or distance from one another to reflect the structure of the federal government. Thus, 
for example, the Chancellery, Bundesrat, and Bundestag should stand in immediate vicinity, 
while the ministries should be spaced according to the intensity of contact they have to 
                                                            
12 Otto Jacob and Eckart Schiffer, “Selbstdarstellung des demokratischen Staates in der 
baulichen Gestaltung des Bundeshauptstadt,” 1971, appendix to “Wettbewerb Bauten des 
Bundes und Ihre Integration in die Stadt Bonn” (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 1990/73). 
13 Ibid. 
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parliament and the Chancellor. This implied that the ministries should not be concentrated in a 
single complex of uniform buildings but rather should be distributed and, architecturally 
speaking, treated distinctly. Moreover, although it is less specific on this point, the essay 
concedes that architecture should bestow an appropriate amount of dignity on the center of 
political decision-making in a democracy.14 However, nowhere in their essay do Jacob and 
Schiffer acknowledge that the federal architecture they describe reflected the identity of a city as 
well as a nation. Their manifesto offered a useful roadmap for designing national buildings in a 
federal democracy, but the almost total exclusion of local context from their analysis strongly 
indicated that—in spite of the new attention on aesthetic issues—the Bund was repeating its past 
mistakes.  
 The jury announced the winners of the planning competition in April 1972, with first 
prize going to the studio of Legge and Legge, a husband-and-wife team based in Lammersdorf, 
near Aachen. The six ordinal prize winners were published in the architectural journals, Die 
Bauwelt and Die Bauverwaltung,15 and the jury promoted the Legge and Legge proposal as 
offering the most sensible path forward for federal planning in Bonn, but in many respects it was 
also the least ambitious. Specifically—and in contradiction to the stated goals of the 
competition—the jury complimented Legge and Legge for not offering a grand urban planning 
solution and for basically ignoring the integration of the federal districts into the surrounding 
city. Rather, Legge and Legge won based on the strength of their basic division of federal 
authorities into three distinct locations: the area around the Gronau, northern Bad Godesberg, 
                                                            
14 Ibid. 
15 Heinz Krell, “Der Bund im Bonn,” Bauwelt 21 (May 22, 1972): 841-852; and H.-P. Oltmanns, 
“Bauten des Bundes und ihre Integration in die Stadt Bonn,” Die Bauverwaltung 45, no. 7 (July 
1972): 319-329. 
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and immediately across the Rhine in southern Beuel.16 Beuel had previously escaped the eyes of 
federal developers, but the other two suggested sites for dense federal building programs were 
hardly original.  
 Legge and Legge’s competition model (Figure 84) demonstrates clearly their lack of 
emphasis on integration. The federal conglomerations are a jumble of large masses, geometric 
forms, and sharp angles that stand out starkly against the surrounding city, which the planners 
have represented as a semi-regular grid.  Other submissions that won prizes, such as the fourth 
place entry by Gruppe Hardtberg (Figure 85), proposed distributing federal installations more 
evenly across the entire competition area. This allowed for tighter integration, but it also entailed 
disrupting a much larger area of the city during construction. The entry from Günter Behnisch, 
which did not place but earned an honorable mention, took an even more radical approach to 
integration. Behnisch’s proposed to mix apartments and federal offices vertically within the same 
complexes, a concept that the jury called problematic.17 
 To underline the gulf that still existed between municipal and federal urban development 
priorities in Bonn, the City Council promulgated a resolution on the topic timed to coincide with 
the release of the planning competition’s results. The resolution does not mention the 
competition or its results, but the implicit criticism is clear. Whereas the competition brief and 
the eventual winner both pointed towards a more intense version of the planning agenda that the 
Bund had been pursuing since the early 1960s, the City Council’s resolution—reprinted as a 
brochure and distributed to the public for maximum effect—described the development of Bonn 
as the federal capital as only one of many competing concerns that had to be balanced and 
                                                            
16 Krell, “Der Bund im Bonn,” 842. 
17 Models and plans from the Behnisch & Partners entry were unavailable, but minutes from the 
jury’s meeting describe the project in detail. “Protokoll über die Sitzung des Preisgerichts für den 
städtebaulichen Ideenwettbewerb, Bauten des Bundes und ihre Integration in die Stadt Bonn vom 
10.4. bis 12.4. und vom 18.4 bis 19.4.1972,” April 1972 (BArch, B 106/45657), 32-38. 
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coordinated.18 There is tension between Bonn’s desire to integrate federal buildings into the city 
and keep the city’s traditional centers free from an inundation of administrative facilities, but 
overall, the stress placed by the Council on integration serves as a strong rebuke to the planning 
visions contained in proposals like that from Legge and Legge. 
 Within Bonn’s City Planning Office, the criticism of the Legge and Legge plan was more 
direct. In a letter to City Manager Hesse, Building Official Gerd Nieke expressed exasperation 
that, in spite of the Expert Colloquium and competition, nothing had changed with the Bund 
except for greatly inflated ambitions. According to Nieke, the Legge and Legge plan was not a 
functional city planning solution and would not lead to a credible Bundeshauptstadt. Moreover, 
Legge and Legge presumed to make decisions about the location of federal buildings that should 
have been made jointly and in agreement with the city. To avoid disaster, Nieke recommended 
all but abandoning the Bund as a development partner to focus on issues that were within its 
control and stood to improve the city’s quality of life: building recreational facilities, improving 
roads, and promoting housing construction.19 
 
Developmental Stasis, Democracy, and Local Identity 
 
 The extraordinary increase in collaboration between the Bund and Bonn—by 1971, the 
two parties had formed or joined over a dozen ad hoc committees, working groups, and task 
forces aimed at addressing various aspects of urban planning in the region—was not closing the 
gap between their respective priorities and visions for the city. The initial planning competition, 
                                                            
18 Bonn City Council, Brochure with reprint of “Beschluß des Rates der Stadt Bonn vom 18. Mai 
1972,” May 1972 (Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 1991/755). 
19 Gerd Nieke, Letter to Bonn City Manager Wolfgang Hesse, September 21, 1973 (Stadtarchiv 
Bonn, N 1991/753). 
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which was supposed to yield an agreeable framework for moving ahead with individual building 
projects, produced a winner that received a chilly reception from local authorities. Subsequent 
discussions and competitions would beget no breakthroughs, and the search for comprehensive 
solutions and a representative city would ultimately leave the city relatively unchanged. 
 The follow-up competition to the planning contest (Bauwettbewerb Bundestag und 
Bundesrat) focused on designs for the Bundestag and Bundesrat that would anchor a 
Parliamentary District in the Gronau. It opened in September 1972, and its results—announced 
over a year later—provided no clarity. Even before the winners had been announced, the Bonn 
Citizens’ Initiative—the same group that had played a major role in stopping the Bad Godesberg 
Kreuzbauten—loudly denounced the competition. Their press release indelicately proclaimed 
that “[w]e did not force through the building freeze three years ago so that the same crap could 
be built with three years’ delay.”20 The ensuing manifesto angrily attacks the competition’s 
conception of the West German parliament as driven by planners rather than the legislators who 
were the putative clients or the German people whom they represent. The manifesto rejected the 
monumentality that the competition seemed to invite and the self-conscious creation of national 
symbols and of public spaces that attempt to anticipate or determine their function.21 
 However, in contrast to their protest of the Bad Godesberg Government District, here the 
Citizens’ Initiative offered a detailed alternative vision for the Bundestag and for architecture in 
a democracy more broadly. First, they called for a height restriction of five stories. The buildings 
themselves should be constructed of modest, warm materials and should eschew ostentation. 
Interior spaces should be as accessible and inviting as possible for the public, and exterior walls 
                                                            
20 Bonner Bürgerinitiative, Press Release: “Wir haben vor drei Jahren den Baustopp nicht 
durchgesetzt, damit nun derselbe Mist mit drei Jahren Verzögerung gebaut wird!,” October 26, 
1973 (BArch, B 134/12758). 
21 Ibid. 
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should heavily feature glass to make the interior discoverable from the outside. Outdoor spaces 
should be public, pleasant, and truly free to be used in diverse, unplanned, and evolving ways. 
The capacity of spaces, buildings, and neighborhoods to change and adapt organically over time 
is an important through line in the Initiative’s statement, bound up with the group’s definition of 
democracy as being fundamentally not about control but rather self-determination.22 The overall 
impression made by the manifesto is that the Citizens’ Initiative desired the Bund’s presence in 
the city to be as insubstantial and inconspicuous as possible. Its representative democratic 
qualities would not emerge from any overt symbolism or grand structures but from its very 
subordination to the public and the city in which it dwelled. Thus, on one hand, the Citizens’ 
Initiative’s reaction to the Bundestag and Bundesrat competition was—in form and content—an 
affirmation of West German democratic principles. On the other hand, it envisioned a capital city 
that all but disappeared into its surroundings, leaving Bonn’s space virtually undisturbed and 
allowing the federal presence to co-evolve by design with the host city and the local identity that 
its citizens drew from it.  
 Regardless of these new demands, the group’s reappearance in the planning discussion 
was not an auspicious sign for the prospects of the competition’s success. Indeed it was a total 
failure. The jury deadlocked on the four first prizes, and the architects were instructed to rework 
and resubmit their designs so that a definitive winner could be selected. One of the competition 
winners was Günter Behnisch (Figure 86), who in 1972 was receiving accolades for his design 
for the Olympic Park and Stadium in Munich. The revision process extended into 1974 and 1975 
before being quietly abandoned by the Bund and the ABB along with most of the planning 
agenda initially laid out by the Expert Colloquium. A year later, federal planning officials 
retreated to a piecemeal approach of building for individual ministries, for which they began a 
                                                            
22 Ibid. 
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cumbersome process of developing complicated rubrics to determine which federal agencies 
demonstrated the greatest need for new space. Behnisch would have to wait until 1983 for a 
completely new Bundestag competition, and then it would take another decade before his 
celebrated Plenary Chamber was completed (Figure 87). By that time, Germany had reunified, 
and the Bund was making plans to return the capital to Berlin. 
 The Bund would build again on a large scale, finally completing the Bad Godesberg 
Government District in the 1980s. The two main additions to the site are sprawling structures, 
framing a large open concrete plaza called Robert-Schuman-Platz (Figure 88) after the French 
statesman, and they have housed a changing group of federal ministries and agencies since their 
completion. However, the buildings are not tall, and their segregation, along with the 
Kreuzbauten, on a site along the boundary between Bonn and Bad Godesberg limits their 
immediate impact on the way an individual experiences the city.  
 As the federal planning process slowed to a near standstill in the 1970s, the city took 
steps to develop its space and image in ways that also placed important limits on further federal 
construction. The most consequential measure for the city’s residents and for federal 
development was the establishment of the Rheinaue, a large park that extends along the Rhine 
from the Gronau in the north and well into Bad Godesberg (Figure 89). The city opened a 
competition to design the park in late 1969 as a way to provide a major recreational facility for 
local residents, connect physically the recently merged cities of Bonn and Bad Godesberg, and 
create a venue for the decade-hence 1979 Federal Horticultural Show (Bundesgartenschau), 
which had recently been awarded to Bonn. The green space would also provide a connective 
backdrop for the Gronau and Godesberg federal buildings, and although local officials were 
careful in how they framed this point, the creation of the Rheinaue permanently preserved for the 
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use of Bonn’s citizens an enormous piece of real estate that the Bund may have otherwise 
considered prime space for expansion.  
  In its final statement, the 1970 Expert Colloquium asserted that the degree of regard 
for the interests of the public in the way national buildings are planned is an essential element of 
the self-representation of democracy.23 Although imperfect at times, the West German federal 
system, which distributed substantial authority downward to states and localities, combined with 
a dogged media and press, offered a great deal of procedural transparency in federal planning 
affairs. When the local public discovered that lapses in that transparency had led to failures on 
the Bund’s part to support their city’s needs and to physical changes in their city of which they 
strongly disapproved, they pushed back hard, and the Bund reacted by reforming the process to 
be more responsive and include more input from local stakeholders. At its culmination in the 
1970s, this worked to the Bund’s detriment, as seemingly no project could make it through the 
ponderous, multi-step planning process to construction. Nevertheless, Bonn’s cityscape and 
federal architecture are finally the result of the kinds of vigorous debate and compromise that are 
hallmarks of democratic societies, and this discourse occurred within a legal framework that 
promoted civic engagement and enshrined local autonomy in the urban planning process. As a 
national capital, the same processes that left Bonn with few and mostly disliked structures on 
which to project a sense of national identity ultimately redounded to the Bund’s benefit as being 
more thoroughly if less obviously representative of the Federal Republic of Germany’s 
democratic rebirth.  
 An uneasy equilibrium emerged in the federal capital between the national and the local. 
Still disliked and inescapable signifiers that Bonn’s identity was now and forever bound up with 
that of the Federal Republic, Langer Eugen and the Kreuzbauten had once been harbingers of the 
                                                            
23 Arbeitskreis Bundesbauten Bonn, Report of the Expertenkolloquium. 
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disfigurement of Bonn’s historical space and traditional identity. However, in the wake of the 
successful local protests in 1969, which ended the immediate threat that federal high-rises would 
proliferate, the existing towers began to take on a different cast. Bonn’s idiosyncrasies as a 
national political power center were ultimately the result of highly localized pressures on federal 
development that reflected equally local desires and anxieties. As the 1960s and 70s progressed, 
the cumulative effect of a more assertive local government and public and the new planning rules 
and procedures put into place in the wake of 1969 was a significant restriction of the number and 
kinds of federal projects that reached execution. Through the efforts of Bonn’s City Council and 
administration to advance local interests and finally the intervention of Bonn’s residents, the 
city’s urban space is defined as much by what was left unbuilt as by the buildings that were 
completed. The end result was a city that could still claim strong connections to the Rhine 
landscape and to those aspects of its history—Roman, bourgeois, Romantic, scholastic—that had 
long constituted local identity even as the landscape was significantly transformed by the city’s 
federal building. Bonn’s solitary modernist high-rises seem out of place, both in the context of a 
European capital and especially a mid-size German university town, but it is that relative 
eccentricity that gave — and continues to give — Bonn its specific character as one of the most 
peculiar capital cities of the 20th century. We can better understand that peculiarity as 
provisionality, as Bonn managed to incorporate its national role as one more facet of an intensely 
local identity. 
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Epilogue: Bonn after Reunification 
 
 With the fall of the Berlin Wall in the fall of 1989 and the ensuing reunification of East 
and West Germany, the Bundestag honored the promise it had made over forty years earlier and 
voted on June 20, 1991 to return the capital to Berlin. The extremely close vote—338 for and 
320 against—indicated just how much attitudes had changed since the 1950s, when quixotic 
attempts to return the government to the isolated exclave of West Berlin occurred routinely. 
However, the transition was slow, and the Bundestag did not meet for the first time in its new 
home until 1999. In the wake of the 1991 vote, Bonn and the Bund negotiated and passed the 
Berlin/Bonn Act (Berlin/Bonn-Gesetz), which bestowed upon Bonn the unique title of “Federal 
City” (Bundesstadt) and divided the federal authorities between the now-former and the current 
capital cities. Under the agreement, Germany’s Parliament, Chancellor, President, and the 
majority of ministries would move to Berlin, but Bonn would retain a majority of federal jobs, 
which minimized the disruption for families in the federal workforce. 
 In this way, the effect on Bonn of the capital returning to Berlin was extremely muted. 
The federal bureaucracy, which was perennially constrained for space, easily expanded to fill the 
buildings and offices vacated by the agencies that moved east. After the Bundestag moved in 
1999 and following a complete interior renovation, the United Nations took over occupation of 
Langer Eugen, making it the headquarters of its Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
Günter Behnisch’s new Bundestag plenary building—unfortunately completed three years too 
late in 1992—became the centerpiece of a heavily-used international conference center.  
 In the early 21st century, Bonn has exchanged its national profile for a more prominent 
role in international institutions. The presence of the United Nations is a significant part of this, 
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but Bonn is also home to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development—
now housed in the former New Chancellery building—which oversees Germany’s extensive 
international development and aid programs and thus draws numerous NGOs to the city. 
Furthermore, the privatization of the Deutsche Bundespost in 1995 yielded the 
telecommunications conglomerate, Deutsche Telekom, and the shipping and logistics giant, 
Deutsche Post/DHL, both of which maintain their corporate headquarters in Bonn.  
 These globalized concerns ensured that Bonn maintained a high degree of economic 
prosperity and cultural vitality—especially relative to a city of its size—but they have created a 
new set of fault lines in Bonn’s identity as a city. In some ways, the new battles are familiar, and 
they continue to play out largely in the realm of the city’s architecture. Deutsche Post’s 
construction of the Post Tower (Figure 90)—a sleek 41-story glass skyscraper designed by 
Helmut Jahn—from 2000 to 2002 on a site adjacent to Eiermann’s parliamentary tower led to a 
rearguard action by local citizens to have the land protected from development under the same 
landmark status given to Langer Eugen in 1997. Ironically, the very same structures that were 
once at the heart of the collision between federal architecture and local identity were now being 
co-opted to forestall what were perceived as further assaults on Bonn’s landscape and the 
public’s close identification with it.  
 Wrapped up in these new debates were questions of how to preserve and memorialize 
Bonn’s brief but profound role in 20th-century history in the face of 21st-century commerce’s 
unrelenting imperatives to expand, innovate, and refresh. Bonn always had an ambivalent 
relationship to its identity as a national capital, but the city also quickly assimilated it as a 
critically important period in local history. When confronted with another set of wrenching 
transformations to its space and appearance, which threatened to mute or efface entirely the 
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connection to the eponymous Bonn Republic, the city’s citizens—this time often with the 
cooperation of the Bund, which also had a strong interest in protecting its historical legacy—
moved again to guard their collective urban identity. The result will almost certainly be a new 
composite, incorporating the city’s new international and corporate outlooks and transmuting 






Figure 1. Aerial view from 1957 of the West German Bundeshaus, Bonn. In the center is Martin 
Witte’s original Pedagogical Academy (1930-33) renovated by Hans Schwippert with the 
addition of the glass-walled Bundestag Plenary Chamber (1949-50; center-left). Photograph by 




Figure 2. Hans Freese, Federal Foreign Office Building, 1953-55, Bonn. Photograph by Samuel 
L. Sadow, 2013. 
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Figure 3. View looking east of Frankfurter Tor, Hermann Henselmann, Stalinallee (Karl-Marx-
Allee), 1952-1960, Berlin. Photograph by Samuel L. Sadow, 2012. 
 
 
Figure 4. Heinz Graffunder, Palast der Republik, 1973-1976, demolished 2006, Berlin. 




Figure 5. The Berlin Wall at the Brandenburg Gate, 1961. Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild B 
145/P061246/o.Ang. Reproduced under a Creative Commons License. 
 
 
Figure 6. Walter Gropius, Apartment House, Hansaviertel, 1956-57, Berlin. Photograph by 
Manfred Brückels. Reproduced under a Creative Commons License. 
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Figure 7. Hans Scharoun, Berlin State Library, Kulturforum, 1967-1978, Berlin. Photograph in 
the public domain. 
 
Figure 8. Egon Eiermann, High-Rise for Members of the Bundestag (Langer Eugen), 1967-
1969, Bonn. Photograph by Horstheinz Neuendorff. Source: Südwestdeutsches Archiv für 




Figure 9. Planungsgruppe Stieldorf, Ministry Buildings (the Kreuzbauten) for the Federal 
Ministry of Justice (right) and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (left), 1969-1975, 




Figure 10. Map of Bonn, ca. 1990, showing the locations of the major federal institutions. 
Larger shaded circles indicate larger institutions. Downtown Bonn and Bad Godesberg are 




Figure 11. View of the Siebengebirge (“Seven Hills”) from Bonn with the ruins of Burg 
Drachenfels visible on the rightmost peak. Photograph by Samuel L. Sadow, 2013. 
 
 
Figure 12. Ruins of Burg Drachenfels, 12th century, destroyed 17th century, Königswinter. 
Photograph by Samuel L. Sadow, 2013. 
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Figure 13. Ruins of the Godesburg, 13th century, destroyed 1583, Bonn-Bad Godesberg. 
Photograph by “Dickbauch.” Reproduced under a Creative Commons License. 
 
 
Figure 14. Albert Speer and Adolf Hitler, Model for the redesign of Berlin (“Welthauptstadt 








Figure 16. Detail of a map of Bonn (1950) showing the Altstadt with Münsterplatz in the lower 




Figure 17. Map of Bonn showing original city wall, Matthäus Merian, 1646. Source: Stadtarchiv 
Bonn, Kartensammlung, Karte Nr. Ba 60. 
 
 




Figure 19. Detail of a map of Bonn (1950) showing medieval Altstadt and surrounding 
subsequent development. Copyright Stollfuß Verlag Bonn. Source: Stadtarchiv Bonn, 
Kartensammlung, Karte Nr. Bc 210.  
 
 
Figure 20. Enrico Zucalli and Robert de Cotte, Residenzschloss (currently the Administrative 




Figure 21. Robert de Cotte, Poppelsdorfer Schloss, 1715-1723, Bonn. Photograph by Samuel L. 
Sadow. 
 
Figure 22. Aerial view of Poppelsdorfer Allee with Poppelsdorfer Schloss in the foreground and 
the Residenzschloss in the background. Source: Andreas Denk and Ingeborg Flagge, 
Architekturführer Bonn (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 2009), 23. 
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Figure 23. Johann Conrad Schlaun and François de Cuvilliés, Schloss Augustusburg, 1723-
1728, Brühl. Photograph by Samuel L. Sadow, 2009. 
 
 
Figure 24. Balthasar Neumann, Stairwell, Schloss Augustusburg, 1740-1746, Brühl. Photograph 




Figure 25. François de Cuvilliés and Michel Leveilly, Koblenzer Tor, Residenzschloss, 1751-




Figure 26. Michel Leveilly, Altes Rathaus, 1737, Bonn. Photograph by Samuel L. Sadow, 2013. 
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Figure 27. Michael Leydel and Adam Franz Friedrich Leydel, Redoute, 1790-1792, Bonn-Bad 




Figure 28. Siegfried Wolske, Beethovenhalle, 1950-1959, Bonn. Photograph by 
“Wolkenkratzer.” Reproduced under a Creative Commons License. 
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Figure 29. Overview map of Bonn showing the locations of its constituent towns and villages. 




Figure 30. Old Rhine Bridge, 1890s, Bonn. Depicted in postcard, ca. 1908. 
 
 
Figure 31. Kennedy Bridge, 1948-1949, Bonn. Photograph by “Wolkenkratzer.” Reproduced 




Figure 32. Top: Museum Koenig, 1912-1934, Bonn. Photograph by Samuel L. Sadow, 2013. 
Bottom: Opening ceremony of the Parliamentary Council, September 1, 1948. Photograph by 




Figure 33. Gallwitz-Kaserne (Federal Ministry for Economics), ca. 1949, built 1936-1938, 
Bonn-Duisdorf. Source: Stadtarchiv Bonn, Fotografische Sammlung, Foto Nr. 05085. 
 
Figure 34. Troilo-Kaserne (Federal Ministry for Food, Agriculture, and Forests), 1958, built 
1936-1938, Bonn-Duisdorf. Source: Bundesbildstelle, 5130/3. 
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Figure 35. Aerial view of the Düppel-Kaserne (Federal Ministry of the Interior; foreground), 
1913, and Husaren-Kaserne (Federal Ministry of Finance, background), 1907, Bonn. In the 
immediate foreground can be seen the Federal Building Agency’s High-Rise for Ministry of the 
Interior, 1968-1969. In the far background is Franz Sales Meyer’s Expansion for the Ministry of 
Finance, 1951-1954. Source: Stadtarchiv Bonn, Fotografische Sammlung, Foto Nr. 14811. 
 
Figure 36. Rosenburg (Federal Ministry of Justice), 1831, Bonn. Photograph by P. Strack. 
Source: Stadtarchiv Bonn, Fotografische Sammlung, Foto Nr. 16712-1. 
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Figure 37. Haus Carstanjen (Federal Ministry for the Treasury), 1881, Bonn-Bad Godesberg. 
Photograph by Hamburger Aero-Lloyd. Source: Stadtarchiv Bonn, Fotografische Sammlung, 
Foto Nr. 10517. 
 
 
Figure 38. Aerial view of HICOG headquarters, later the United States Embassy, Bonn-Mehlem. 
In the center of the image is Schloss Deichmannsaue, 19th century. In the foreground is Otto 
Apel, Sep Ruf, and others, HICOG/US Embassy Building, 1950-1952. Photograph by Aero-Foto 
A. Schwarzer. Source: Stadtarchiv Bonn, Fotografische Sammlung, Foto Nr. 10955. 
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Figure 39. August Dieckhoff, Villa Hammerschmidt (Federal Presidential Office and 
Residence), 1860, Bonn. Photograph by Sachsse. Source: Stadtarchiv Bonn, Fotografische 
Sammlung, Foto Nr. 06055-a. 
 
 
Figure 40. Palais Schaumburg (Federal Chancellery), 1858-1860, Bonn. Source: Stadtarchiv 
Bonn, Fotografische Sammlung, Foto Nr. 05235-6(f). 
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Figure 41. Hans Schwippert, Plenary Chamber, Bundeshaus, 1949, demolished 1986, Bonn. 
Source: Stadtarchiv Bonn, Fotografische Sammlung, Foto Nr. 03644-20. 
 
 
Figure 42. Josef Trimborn, Federal Ministry for Post and Telecommunications, 1953-1954, 
Bonn. Photograph by Samuel L. Sadow, 2013. 
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Figure 43. Federal Building Agency, Federal Press and Information Office, 1954-1956, Bonn. 
Photograph by Samuel L. Sadow, 2013. 
 
 
Figure 44. Hans Dustmann, Allianz Buildings (Tulpenfeld), 1964-1968, Bonn. Source: 
Stadtarchiv Bonn, Fotografische Sammlung, Foto Nr. 05146-c. 
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Figure 45. Map of the Bonn Region showing the outcome of the Bonn-Act, 1969. A 
consolidated Groß-Bonn is at the center of the newly created Rhein-Sieg-Kreis, which comprises 
nineteen counties or Kreis. Source: Der Städtetag (July 1969): 3. 
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Figure 46. Map of Bonn highlighting the four communities that voluntarily agreed to be 





Figure 47. Map of Bonn showing the “Stakemeier Plan” for Regional Reform with community 




Figure 48. Map of Bonn showing the change in population in various communities since 1950. 
Source: Stadt Bonn, Neuordnung Bonner Raum (Bonn: Stadt Bonn, 1967). 
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Figure 49. Map of Bonn showing commuting patterns. Source: Stadt Bonn, Neuordnung Bonner 
Raum (Bonn: Stadt Bonn, 1967). 
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Figure 50. Map of Bonn showing major transportation networks. Source: Stadt Bonn, 
Neuordnung Bonner Raum (Bonn: Stadt Bonn, 1967). 
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Figure 51. Bad Godesberg poster campaign against incorporation into Bonn (“Hands off Bad 
Godesberg!”). Source: General-Anzeiger, November 23, 1968. 
 
Figure 52. Aerial view of the Bundeshaus (foreground) and Langer Eugen with the Gronau 




Figure 53. Egon Eiermann, Competition Entry for the Federal Foreign Office Building in Bonn, 
1951. Source: Südwestdeutsches Archiv für Architektur und Ingenieurbau am Karlsruher Institut 
für Technologie (KIT), Werkarchiv Egon Eiermann. 
 
 
Figure 54. Sep Ruf, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation) 
Headquarters, 1953, Bonn-Bad Godesberg. Photograph by “Mkill.” Reproduced under a Creative 




Figure 55. Sep Ruf, Bavarian Representative Office (Landesvertretung Bayern), 1955, Bonn. 
Photograph by Samuel L. Sadow, 2013. 
 
 
Figure 56. Sep Ruf, Ludwig Erhard Residence, 1952-1956, Gmund am Tegernsee. Photograph 
by Gabrielle Gräfin Arnim. Source: Winfried Nerdinger and Irene Meissner, Sep Ruf, 1908-
1982: Modern emit Tradition (Munich: Prestel, 2008), 59. 
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Figure 57. Sep Ruf, Chancellor’s Residence and Reception Building (Kanzlerbungalow), 1963-
64, Bonn. Photograph by Engelberg Reineke. Source: Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F057336-0002. 
Reproduced under a Creative Commons License. 
 
 
Figure 58. Egon Eiermann and Sep Ruf, German Pavilion, Brussels World’s Fair, 1958, 
Brussels. Photograph by Eberhard Troeger. Source: Südwestdeutsches Archiv für Architektur 




Figure 59. Egon Eiermann, German Embassy, 1962-1964, Washington, D.C. Photograph by 




Figure 60. Western entrance to the Reichstag Building, Berlin, with glass curtain wall designed 
by Paul Baumgarten as part of his renovations. Paul Wallot, Reichstag Building, 1884-1894, 
renovated by Paul Baumgarten, 1961-69, Berlin. Photograph by Karl E. Jacobs. Source: Stiftung 




Figure 61. Paul Baumgarten, Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) Building, 




Figure 62. Federal Building Agency, Proposal for the expansion of the Bundeshaus (top: floor 
plan; bottom: elevation), 1961. Source: Südwestdeutsches Archiv für Architektur und 
Ingenieurbau am Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Werkarchiv Egon Eiermann. 
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Figure 63. Aerial view of the Gronau before the construction of Langer Eugen with the sports 
park in the center and the Bundeshaus in the foreground. Photograph by Aero-Lux Büscher & 
Co. Source: Stadtarchiv Bonn, Fotografische Sammlung, Foto Nr. 03277-91. 
 
 
Figure 64. Model and site plan of the Bundeshaus expansion in the Gronau published in Revue, 
April 14, 1963, 12-13. 
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Figure 65. Federal Planning Council, Model of the Bundeshaus expansion in the Gronau, 1963. 
1) Old Bundeshaus, 2) Party Faction Building 3) New Bundestag Plenary Chamber, 4) 
Bundestag High-Rise, 5) New Bundesrat Building, 6) Bundestag President Building, 7) Hotel. 
Source: General-Anzeiger, June 29, 1963. 
 
Figure 66. Federal Building Agency, Site Plan showing proposed expansion of Bundeshaus in 
the Gronau overlaid on existing street plan, 1963. This plan, unlike the model in figure 63 was 




Figure 67. Federal Planning Council, Model of the Bundeshaus expansion in the Gronau 
showing the addition of seven ministry buildings (left), 1965. Source: Südwestdeutsches Archiv 




Figure 68. Federal Planning Council, Model of the Bundeshaus expansion in the Gronau, 1966. 




Figure 69. “Brasilia am Rhein:” drawing of the Bundeshaus expansion plans with individual 
buildings labeled. Drawing reflects model seen in figure 63. Source: Der Spiegel, no. 21, May 
20, 1964, 21. 
 
Figure 70. Photograph of Langer Eugen under construction with Drachenfels and the 
Siebengebirge in the background. Source: General-Anzeiger, May 10, 1968. 
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Figure 71. Federal Building Agency, Site Plan of the Bad Godesberg Government District, 
based on designs by Joachim Schürmann and Fritz Bornemann, January, 1968. The plan shows 
an eighth Kreuzbau of only seven stories in the upper left. The two buildings by Planungsgruppe 
Stieldorf (1969-1975) are marked by “J” and “WF.” Source: Bundesarchiv, B 126/42724. 
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Figure 72. Map of Bonn with the federal development sites in the Gronau and north Bad 
Godesberg highlighted. Copyright Stollfuß Verlag, 1970. Source: Library of Congress Map 
Collection. Additions by the author. 
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Figure 73. Le Corbusier, Ville contemporaine de trois millions d'habitants, 1922. Copyright 
Fondation Le Corbusier/ADAGP. 
 
 




Figure 75. Left: Façade, Egon Eiermann, High-Rise for Members of the Bundestag (Langer 
Eugen), 1967-1969, Bonn. Right: Façade detail, Planungsgruppe Stieldorf, Ministry Building 
(Kreuzbau), 1969-1975, Bonn-Bad Godesberg. Photographs by Samuel L. Sadow, 2013. 
 
 
Figure 76. Joachim Schürmann and Fritz Bornemann, Model for the Bad Godesberg 
Government District, 1969. The two buildings designed by Planungsgruppe Stieldorf are in the 
foreground. Source: General-Anzeiger, August 14, 1969. 
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Figure 77. Planungsgruppe Stieldorf, Ministry Buildings (Kreuzbau) for the Federal Ministry of 
Justice, 1969-1975, Bonn-Bad Godesberg. Photograph by Samuel L. Sadow, 2013. 
 
 
Figure 78. Model of the proposed second phase of the Bad Godesberg Government District, 
October 1969. Planungsgruppe Stieldorf’s towers, already under construction, are in the 
foreground, and Schürmann and Bornemann’s additions are in the background. Photograph by 
DPA/Landov. Source: Bonner Rundschau, October 7, 1969. 
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Figure 79. Federal Building Agency, Federal Ministry for Economics High-Rise, 1967-1969, 
Bonn-Duisdorf. Photograph by LinoProjekt. Source: Bundesamt für Bauwesen und 




Figure 80. Spectators examine the model for Bad Godesberg Government District in Bonn City 




Figure 81. Planungsgruppe Stieldorf, New Chancellery Building (Neues Bundeskanzleramt), 
1970-1976, Bonn. Source: Stadtarchiv Bonn, Fotografische Sammlung, Foto Nr. 14756. 
 
 
Figure 82. Planungsgruppe Stieldorf, Competition Model for the New Chancellery Building, 
1971. Source: General-Anzeiger, May 13, 1971. 
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Figure 83. Cover of the competition brief for “Wettbewerb Bauten des Bundes und Ihre 
Integration in die Stadt Bonn,” 1971. The black line on the map indicates the area of Bonn 
covered by the competition. Source: Stadtarchiv Bonn, N 1982/283. 
 
Figure 84. Legge and Legge, Competition model of Bonn for “Wettbewerb Bauten des Bundes 
und Ihre Integration in die Stadt Bonn,” 1972. Source: Die Bauverwaltung, 45. Jahrgang, 7. Heft 
(July 1972): 322. 
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Figure 85. Gruppe Hardtberg, Competition plan for Bonn for “Wettbewerb Bauten des Bundes 
und Ihre Integration in die Stadt Bonn,” 1972. Source: Die Bauverwaltung, 45. Jahrgang, 7. Heft 
(July 1972): 327. 
 
 
Figure 86. Behnisch and Partners, Competition model of the Parliament Complex for 
“Wettbewerb Bundestag und Bundesrat,” 1973. Source: Karl-Heinz van Kaldenkerken and 
Friedrich Busmann, Ausbau der Bundeshauptstadt: 10 Jahre Hauptstadtvereinbarung 1975 - 





Figure 87. Behnisch and Partners, Bundestag Plenary Building, 1989-1992, Bonn. Photograph 
by Samuel L. Sadow, 2013. 
 
 
Figure 88. Robert-Schuman-Platz, 1983-1989, Bonn-Bad Godesberg. Photograph by 
“Wolkenkratzer.” Reproduced under a Creative Commons License. 
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Figure 89. Gottfried Hansjakob, Landscape plan for the Rheinaue, 1970s, Bonn. Source: Karl-
Heinz van Kaldenkerken and Friedrich Busmann, Ausbau der Bundeshauptstadt: 10 Jahre 
Hauptstadtvereinbarung 1975 - 1985; Dokumentation (Bonn: Stadt Bonn, 1985), 68. 
 
Figure 90. Egon Eiermann, High-Rise for Members of the Bundestag (Langer Eugen), 1967-
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